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I: Interventions

Can The Truth Still Set Us Free?
Originally posted 29 May, 2022
My recently deceased dissertation supervisor and collaborator John McMurtry would often say
that the truth will win in the end, once it has become known. He arrived at this principle by
reflection on the many examples of government cover-ups of atrocities. He reasoned that the fact
that governments of all political stripes, in different periods of history and parts of the world, try
to keep mass killings a secret proves that they fear that people’s knowledge of the truth would
undermine their legitimacy. Even the Nazi’s tried to keep the Holocaust secret.
The Nazi’s did try to keep the Final Solution secrete, but they did not conceal their antiSemitism. On the contrary, they used it as a most powerful mobilizing weapon. Those who lived
near the camps could also have not been under any illusions as to what was going on in them. In
fact, Claude Lanzmann, in his documentary Shoah, proves that villagers living near Auschwitz
knew what was going on, but did nothing.
If the truth is to win in the end, then it must not only be, but be accepted as being, an objective
and neutral force that determines policy. The yearly reports of International Panel on Climate
Change have provided detailed empirical and statistical evidence of the reality of climate change,
but this evidence has not been sufficient to produce systematic global changes to energy
production or consumption. In the past week, America has been scarred by yet another racist
mass shooting and another slaughter of schoolchildren. But the smell of gunpowder had not yet
dissipated before the usual suspects were on television arguing that regular mass killings are not
grounds for gun control.
Those who buy V-8 trucks place their right to consume ahead of the evidence of the link between
fossil fuel consumption and climate change. The NRA points to the Second Amendment’s
guarantee of the right of American’s to bear arms. Both link freedom of choice to the good life,
but both ignore the fact that life is a presupposition of a good life and life has objective
conditions. They invoke their interpretation of the values enshrined in the US Constitution, but
do not see those values as means of problem solving that have to be continually adapted to
changing conditions. When a constitutional principle like the Second Amendment (designed to
solve the problem of the possibility of British counter-revolution) is a consistent cause of death,
does not the truth of the values demand changed interpretations, out of respect for the deeper
values the document is supposed to serve?
Philosophers might think that way, but politicians do not. McMurtry was a consummate
philosopher who followed the arguments where they led, but he tended to think of politics as
either rational or irrational, rather than as having a rationality of its own. I would say that
political rationality exerts a causal force in history, even though it is often irrational, from a nonpartisan, objective perspective. I have been trying to examine this contradiction in relation to

international relations (see my posts on the crisis in Ukraine), but it is more pervasive. It operates
everywhere there is a struggle for power, and affects the Right as well as the Left, albeit in
different ways.
Statistical and empirical evidence about the reality of climate change has neither fundamentally
altered the prioritization of fossil fuel-led economic growth by governments nor changed
individual consumer behaviour for the most part. There are few overt climate change deniers; the
problem is that objective scientific information is not being converted into systematically
changed policy and individual practice. In fact, as some environmentalists noted with alarm, the
West’s reaction to the Ukraine crisis through climate considerations out the window and focused
solely on finding fossil-based alternative sources for Russian oil and natural gas. Profits for oil
companies have soared during the crisis. Soaring prices are an incentive for more exploration
and a prolonged reliance on fossil fuels.
The left also has a problem with truth. Marx thought of himself as a scientist (he called Capital a
‘triumph of German Science’) and he clearly continues the Enlightenment attempt to expose to
use objective rationality for socially critical ends. Notwithstanding those original commitment to
objectivity, in the twentieth century more skeptical attitudes towards science have dominated
Western Marxism and the broader socialist left. Scientific rationality itself demands a selfreflective and self-critical stance: to the extent that the left exposed the complicity between
capitalist industry and the scientific establishment, it made important discoveries about how
science can be dissuaded from the objective search for truth by social and economic forces. But
when it strayed too far into the idea that all knowledge is socially constructed, such that logical
systems like mathematics are regarded as racist, or that human identity construction somehow
can change material reality, or that everyone has their own ‘truth’ to speak, the left flirts with
analogous irrationality it like to accuse the right of perpetuating. If everyone has their own truth,
then there is no truth: truth is a normative standard for the evaluation of our distinctive beliefs,
stories, interpretations, etc.
Time and again liberals inveighed against Covid-skeptics to “follow the science.” I agreed
(although I was also critical of some of the preferred policies). In any case, the point here is that
the mathematics upon which epidemiology relies (including the discovery of the differential
impact of Covid on Black and working class people) must work if it is going to be a reliable
guide to practice. But that application of mathematics works because natural forces can be
quantified, statistically modelled, and causally explained.
My point is that if you use data for any means, you are presupposing the truth of statistical
reasoning, which in turn presupposes the truth of the logical structures from which mathematics
is built. The teaching of mathematics might be racist: improve it. But the logical structures are
not: if a is > than b and b is > than c, then it follows necessarily that a is > than c. The left does
oppressed people no favours when it argues that methods of reasoning that prove themselves
time and again to explain phenomena and enable wider ranges of action are culturally relative.
There is no “Western” science. There are different uses of science, and one of those uses allied
new technologies to colonial violence and conquest. But Newton’s physics was not “Western.” If
it were, then it could not have been used to plot the trajectory of canon balls outside of England.
The logical structures upon which his laws of motion depended are not functions of a Western

way of looking at nature. Indeed, the origins of the mathematics on which natural science rests
are not exclusively Western. And if natural science is an exclusively Western pursuit, what does
one say about the intensive efforts across the non-Western world to develop their scientific and
technological capacity for the improvement of their citizens lives? Binary code is binary code,
whether the language of the engineers is English, Hindi, or Mandarin.
However, the problem of the relationship between knowledge and social organization is not as
simple as this cautionary note against dogmatic forms of cultural relativism suggests. In the early
modern period when the contemporary form of natural science was taking shape, natural
philosophers sometimes thought of natural laws as the grammar of the Book of Nature. The
metaphor is apt, but not for the reasons that they thought. Nature is a book in that it must be
interpreted. I do not mean that there is no difference between physics, philosophy, and poetry,
that science is just (as Richard Rorty might put it), just another story we tell. My point is that
because data must be interpreted, there will be disagreements amongst scientists. These
disagreements are essential to the development of scientific knowledge, but they also open the
door to skeptical abuse of reasoned disagreement.
The debate around Covid vaccines is a case in point. If one looks, one can find scientists that
were critical of vaccine policies, and they supplied arguments to support those concerns. Vaccine
skeptics seized upon the conclusions, but ignored the counter-arguments from other scientists.
The problem here is not that critical scientists were disseminating “misinformation” as the provaccination camp maintained. The solution is certainly not to have governments and social media
platforms decide what arguments can circulate in the public sphere. I remain astounded at the
utter political naivete (to choose the mildest epithet I can think of) of some on the liberal left
when it comes to their support for censorship. There are no good capitalists and none should be
put in charge of the arguments that are allowed to circulate in the public sphere. All people have
brains and the left above all should not only trust people to use them, but insist that they be
allowed to do so.
The problem is not so much one of misinformation as it is a failure of reasoning. When factoids
or conclusions are cherry-picked and then inserted into an argument as if they were definitive,
those who assert them must be held accountable by the standards of scientific truth they
themselves invoke. That means that they must be able to refute the counter-evidence that they
ignore. Take another example: climate change. Since the models that predict catastrophic
outcomes if the planet continues to warm are generated from massive data sets, and that day to
day weather patterns are highly variable, there is bound to be a lot of noise in the models (i.e.,
there will be local variations or deviations from the predictions that skeptics can cherry pick as
evidence against the global phenomenon. When they do so they should be met with the calm
demand to produce an alternative model, based upon an equally comprehensive data set, that
provides an equally probable outcome to the model that they claim to reject on scientific
grounds. If “the science” is on their side, then they should be able to answer the challenge.
If skeptics were met with a calm demand to create a better model, then they would immediately
be exposed as faulty reasoners. Sadly, what typically happens is that they are met with moralistic
derision, which allows them to paint themselves as bold dissidents protecting truths from big
government. For much of the twentieth century the left used to make those arguments. It is a sign

of the intellectual degradation of much of the liberal left that it now uncritically embraces
repressive state power and the platitudes of “good” capitalists as the solution to the problem of
dissent. Hence, instead of turning the dissident’s use of science against them, to expose their
incapacity to provide better evidenced models, every debate almost immediately collapses into
childish name-calling. Then both sides take their toys and go to their respective camps, leaving
the skeptical argument to circulate amongst the true believers, and thus continuing to exert the
pernicious effects that it was designed to produce.
The truth does not out when the world becomes siloed in this fashion. Or rather, the truth will
out, but as destructive consequences that could have been avoided had there been real arguments,
dispassionate assessment of the evidence, and collective action taken on the basis of those
assessments. However, that conclusion seems tantamount to saying that politics should be
abolished.
There are strains within the Marxist tradition that tended towards this conclusion (politics under
socialism, Lenin said, would become the mere administration of things). But even in the
Bolshevik Party there was never unanimity about how the new state and economy should be
administered. Early on, those debates were democratic. Soon, they degenerated into mass
murder.
As I noted in Borges’ Library, the fact that everyone has a brain and is positioned just a little bit
differently than every other person means that there will always be different perspectives on even
the most objective of objective realities. Scientists interpret data differently, some think that
anomalous results disprove a long-standing theory, others work to adjust the theory to the new
data. In the long run the truth does out, to the extent that scientists allow their decisions to be
determined by the data and the best explanation. Given that careers, grants, reputations, and
prizes all ride on the outcome of these debates, science is hardly free from politics. However,
over the long run it does seem that the better theory does win out in the end.
Can the same be said of history? I used to think of history in a more straightforwardly
progressivist way, looking at the history of struggles on analogy with the history of scientific
argument. Eventually, I believed, the truth of values like substantive equality, self-realization,
and ecological integrity would win out; that people would come to see that there are objective
human interests and that there are better and worse ways of organizing society to satisfy them. I
still believe that those objective interests are real and that there are better and worse ways of
satisfying them, but I am more skeptical now than formerly if there will ever be able to generate
a political movement strong enough to create the needed institutions.
That might just be a function of drawing political inferences from a too-restricted time-frame
(the hardening of political position into fixed camps neither of which can increase its supporter at
the expense of the other. The relative fixity of political positions in the last twenty years or so
may prove to be a function of temporary conditions and give way to the sort of mass socialist
consciousness that Marx always expected the crisis of capitalism would generate. Or it might be
a function of changed communicative circumstances that social media has brought about. That
possibility is the one that worriers me. Social media is less a forum for arguing towards

agreement about the best explanation and more a platform in which the like-minded congratulate
themselves for their genius and morality and deride their opponents for stupidity and perfidity.
Should those changed conditions of communicative action, to borrow a term from Habermas,
prove deep and fundamental, then I am not certain that the sort of political truths that I believe
exist to be discovered and defended can set us free. Of course, conclusions like this one give
themselves the air of finality when in fact all human judgement is provisional: history is the
record of our problem solving efforts. When one set of attempts systematically fails, new
societies arise in their wake. A complete failure is imaginable (there is no cosmic guarantee that
humanity must always exist), but we have also recovered from global system collapses before.
Perhaps only deeper system shocks than we are currently feeling will re-awaken a commitment
to objective truth as the ultimate guide to policy.

Borges’ Library
Originally posted, 15 May, 2022
1
Borges’ “The Library of Babel” begins with a description the universe: “The universe (which
others just call the Library) is composed of an indefinite, perhaps infinite number of hexagonal
galleries … From any hexagon one can see the floors above and below– one after another,
endlessly. The arrangement of the galleries is always the same: Twenty bookshelves, five to each
side, line four of the hexagon’s six sides … One of the hexagon’s free sides opens into a narrow
sort of vestibule, which in turn opens onto another gallery, identical to the first, identical in fact
to all.”
Borges’ fantastical imagination paints a geometrical picture of infinity as composed of the
endless iteration of the same finite structure. Just as one can always add a new number to the
number line, one could always step into a new gallery, in which new books would be found, in
which new meanings could be discovered.
But I do not think that Borges is interested in the architecture of infinity. Rather, his Library of
Babel is perhaps better understood as a metaphor for the actual infinity of literary meaning. No
library on earth conforms to Borges’ specifications. Yet each contains an actual infinity of
meanings. Indeed, every particular work of literature contains an actual infinite of meanings. The
same paradox that Heraclitus expressed when he said that “into the same river every different
waters flow” is released every time a new person opens a book: into the same book, ever
different meanings flow.
Infinities test the limits of the human power to understand. The great German mathematician
Georg Cantor, the founder of set theory, was said to have been driven mad by his mathematicalphilosophical inquiries into infinite series. Not only were there different infinite series, he
discovered that one could perform the same sorts of mathematical operations on infinite values
as one could finite. That is, one could multiply them, add them and so forth. But what is the
product of the multiplication of two infinite sets?
My mind cannot swim with Cantor in these deep waters. Most cannot. But everyone who can
read holds an actual infinite set of values (meanings) in their hand every time they read a book.
But how can a finite set of words, deliberately arranged by an author to mean one thing rather
than another, contain an infinity of meanings? Because no two people are exactly alike, have had
exactly the same experiences, or come at problems from exactly the same direction. When
different people read the same book, they therefore discover something new, because something
appears to them from their perspective a little more clearly than from another.
Moreover, books move through time. Historical changes reframe the context in which a book is
read. The human dramas that captivate us in a novel or the breathtaking emotional valences with
which the best poetry charges even the most commonplace events take on different shades of
meaning in different social and historical contexts. Both Elizabethans and people living now can

appreciate the brilliant simplicity of Shakespeare’s famous pun: “Now is the winter of our
discontent made glorious summer by this son of York,” but it would have had a political charge
to people living closer in time to the War of the Roses than it does to us. The words on the page
do not change, but the social framework within which they are read and interpreted do. Since
there will be no end to these historical changes (so long as human beings live) as long as a book
is read, it will continue to unfold new meanings.
Furthermore, individuals do not remain the same. Much of my work as a philosopher involves
re-reading texts that I have worked with before. When I go back to books that I have worked
with before as part of a new project, I inevitably think a thought I have not thought before, even
in relation to the same passages. Over time, I have underlined every sentence of the most
important pages of the books I come back to most often. The markings are artifacts of the on
going discovery of new meanings. On one occasion one paragraph struck me as particularly
significant; on a later occasion, another, and on a third, a I found a sentence that I had ignored
before to have suddenly acquired particular salience.
Readers differ, historical worlds change, one’s own interests develop overtime, but the book, the
source of meaning, stays the same. There is an actual infinity of meanings because there is no
limit to the differences that characterize readers and contexts.
I do not know of any philosopher that has been driven mad by the paradox of a finite text
containing an infinity of meanings, but it has continually attracted philosophical attention and
generated completely opposed responses. Plato preferred the spoken to the written word
precisely because books (or in his day, scrolls) could escape the context of their initial creation
and allow for uncontrolled interpretation. The materialization of ideas destroyed their purity and
sowed the seeds of dispute and conflict. Derrida, on the other hand, revelled in the endless layers
of meaning contained in texts. Reading his work is like trying to remember where the exit to
Borges’ Library of Babel was. Once we get inside, Derrida laughs, there is no exit: There is not
outside text, there is no outside context, he teased.
I agree with Derrida that opening a book unleashes a magical power into the universe. Our eyes
(or fingers, if we are reading Braille) are philosophers’ stones that bring dead ink marks to life.
Every time a passage is read, a new shoot, a new leaf grows. There is no limit to how many
branches, how many leaves, how many flowers can grow on the tree of meaning. But that is not
the whole of the magic. Its power becomes more mysterious still when we remind ourselves that
although infinite, the meanings discovered in any particular book are not arbitrarily created.
There are objectively incorrect readings of books, but no one which expresses the complete and
final truth. So the set of infinite meanings is opposed to another infinite set of misreadings.
The opposition between true and false interpretations points towards another paradox of reading.
When I read, my mind is both completely free and totally determined. One gets ‘lost’ in the
book: the mind is absorbed in the world created by the text. But this absorption frees the mind to
think new thoughts. Reading closes off attention, confines it to the pages, but this closure is itself
an opening to think that which has not yet been thought. There is no predicting what these new
thoughts will be: scan my brain as meticulously as you want while I am reading. You will never

discover what my next thought will be. The texts leads me down roads that did not exist before I
started reading. For you, other roads will open up. And so on, ad infinitum.
And yet, this total freedom is also total determination. One cannot just think anything one wants
if one wants to understand a book. If one argued that Crime and Punishment is about
Dostoevsky’s grandmother’s borscht recipe, one would be wrong. If one argued that it is a
defence of Christian conscience against the nihilist principle that others’ lives have meaning only
to the extent that they are instrumentally useful to more powerful people, one would be correct.
One would also be correct to read it as a philosophical detective novel. Or one could just read it
to be carried along by the human drama if the story and not think too philosophically about it.
Infinite perspectives open up infinite nuances of meaning; infinite nuances of meaning create the
possibility for infinite discussions of the infinite nuances of meaning. Add these together, extend
them back in time and forward into the open ended future of the human project and you will
realize that there is no finite number we could assign to fix the value of the possible meanings of
any given work of literature.
Derrida captures this magic of reading, but I think that he misunderstands its source. It is not the
text itself, or the context itself, which generates the infinite set of meanings. It is rather the
persistence of the text in an objective natural and social world populated by human beings who
face real problems that explains the fecundity of books. We can understand characters and
metaphors because we share a material world with the novelists and the authors who write the
book. We create our own interpretations because we inhabit these shared worlds as unique
individuals. The reader is both inside and outside the text: inside, as our minds are led along by
the language of the book, but also outside, making the words make sense in terms of our own
lives.
To understand, therefore, we must follow and lead at the same time. We have to be swept along
by the words the author chose, but we have to map those words onto the world that we live in.
“Living” literature resonates with new meanings in changed circumstances. The attentive reader
does not try mechanically impose old words on new circumstances. Rather, they freely allow the
“old” world of the text and the “new” world of their present circumstances to freely intermingle
in their mind.
This free play between old and new worlds in the minds of readers can only take place, I think, if
reading is first and foremost a solitary activity. Our world is too quick to comment. One should
write or comment only when one has something to say that has not been said before. The internet
is a chatterbox that never shuts up and makes people afraid to think for themselves. Paul Virilio
says somewhere, with characteristic eccentric brilliance, that knowing what everyone else thinks
in real time produces a “communism of affects;” a totalitarian closure of imagination and feeling
around banal sentiments. Different factions gather around different sides of the same banality;
the original thought, the one that no one might agree with, is never posted.
Interpretation is thinking and thinking must be allowed to unfold free of the distractions of what
we think other people will think about our thoughts. In order to understand, we must not worry
about whether other people will agree. Time and other people should disappear as we wander the

stacks of Borges’ Library. Perhaps Jorge Luis himself sits at a desk at the entrance to the library
demanding silence as the price of admission.

Reason, and Raisons d’Etat
Originally posted, 29 January, 2022

Philosophers have long argued, in somewhat different terms, that the best social world would be
objectively of rational. In the classical age of the Greeks, reason was associated with principles
of divine order. The social goal was to create institutions which reflected those principles,
bringing to the relationships between human beings the eternal harmony of divine perfection. In
the Enlightenment, the naturalized hierarchies that classical thought tended to support (of men
over women, freemen over slaves, etc.,) were challenged. Nature and society were both
historicized and reason re-interpreted as a capacity that exposed the way that particular social
interests presented themselves as universally valuable, reflective of an eternal order
unchangeable by human beings. Hence they exposed as ideological justification for the rule of
kings, nobles, and priests all doctrines of natural superiority and inferiority. Marxism, and, in the
twentieth century, Critical Theory are developments of the original Enlightenment use of reason
as a weapon of social criticism.
Despite the essential differences between the classical and critical conceptions of reason, the
history of the political uses of reason is unified by a common theme: that a rational view is
ultimately impartial, even if it supports one side or another in matters of social conflict. Hence, if
it is true that reason can at least approach an objective understanding of events, then it would be
able to determine which side of any given conflict is better supported by facts and evidence and
which side is merely trying to impose its particular interests for the sake of augmenting its own
power.
But there is a distinct and very different understanding of reason at work in the day to day tumult
of opposing political forces. The philosopher’s reason, even when politically partisan, strives to
make and support universalizeable claims that are in principle acceptable to the other side.
(Habermas’ reconstruction of democratic deliberation as ‘communicative action’ is a
paradigmatic example). In contrast, ‘raisons d’etat’ are reasons which make sense only from a
partisan standpoint, but might well appear to be irrational from an objective point of view.
The current fluid conflict between the United States, NATO, and Ukraine on one side and Russia
on the other is a case study in the conflict between objective reasoning and raisons d’etat. If one
abstracts one’s perspective from allegiance to one side or the other and looks at the situation
objectively, the conflict appears absurd– there is nothing meaningful to risk war over. If all sides
contemplated the matter objectively, it would become apparent that they cannot secure their
maximalist demands. Russia is too weak economically (GDP per capita, 10 000US$, as opposed
to the United States, 63 000 US$) to hold out without ruin against severe Western sanctions.
However, the West is not powerful enough to force Russia to back down if the latter believes that
its very existence is at stake. However, from an objective standpoint, it is obvious both that
Russia’s existence is not at stake and that the claim that Russia is going to overrun and conquer
Ukraine, the Baltic countries, and Poland is hysterical fear-mongering.

But we can go even further. If we abstract further from existing geo-political conditions, if we
look at the earth and human beings from the standpoint of our needs and generic relationship to
the earth, the differences that fuel political conflicts do not exist. Viewed from the perspective of
organic life, different national traditions are not relevant to survival, but only our ability to
satisfy our most fundamental needs. National borders and boundaries are arbitrary lines on a
map: legal-historical fictions when judged from the perspective of earth as planet. Notions of
national pride and dignity, feelings of humiliation or triumph appear as irrational emotional
drivers of life-destructive behaviour.
A politics derived from these abstract rational considerations would eschew conflict and war in
favour of co-operation, would abolish borders and focus on using the earth’s resources to satisfy
the needs of each and all, and elevate the motivations of collective action beyond reactive
feelings of resentment and pride. In short, a completely dispassionate, rational assessment of the
conditions of human lives would recognize immediately the irrationality of: the current interstate system, (there is only one planet); the need for spheres of influence and control (relevant
only if one has enemies to defend against); the feelings of partiality towards members of one’s
own nation and language group (linguistic and cultural differences will persist, but there is no
principled reason to love one’s cultural neighbours more than anyone else); the use of resources
to maintain gigantic standing armies and the waste of intellect involved in arms-industry driven
scientific research, and the ‘resolution’ of conflicts through mass killing episodes (each of which
fuels resentments in the losers and sets up the conditions for the next round of conflict and
killing). Reason pulls our gaze upwards, maybe not all the way to a “God’s eye view” but high
enough that it becomes possible to understand that none of these drivers of conflict are rationally
or materially necessary. Therefore, they could all be abolished by collective decision.
But there is the rub: politics has its own rationality that is out of phase with reason. Raisons
d’etat grows from the soil of history. They drive the pursuit of particular material interests in
objectively insane but politically coherent directions. State functionaries calculates, but not only
with numbers, but emotional variables drawn from history that live on under changed
circumstances. Old fears and past glories combine to generate path dependencies that if,
unchecked, could lead to disaster, but have a comprehensible political logic of their own. Hence,
if something like NATO exists, and a country like Ukraine, which has been the victim of Soviet
aggression, is outside of it, the nation might well calculate that getting under NATO’s collective
security umbrella makes sense. The same situation, from the objective standpoint, looks very
different. Since NATO was created to contain a Soviet Union which no longer exists, NATO no
longer has a reason for being, and should have been disbanded once the Soviet Union collapsed.
As we now know, the Soviet threat was largely over-hyped, and contemporary Russia can only
be compared to the Soviet Union on the weakest of geographical analogies. Russia was the major
national power of the USSR, but contemporary Russia, dependent as it is on natural resource
exports to the European Union,is not in the objective position to threaten EU countries, much
less the United States, in any real way.
Putin, reasoning objectively, must surely know these facts. He too, however, is be motivated by
raisons d’etat and not purely objective reasons. He is not nostalgic for the Soviet Union, as
Western commentators often argue, but he is schooled in Russian history: a history of invasion
from Napoleon to Hitler that have cost an astounding number of Russians their lives. His

motivation is to prevent NATO getting any closer to his borders, while maintaining Ukrainewhose territories have deep cultural significance in Russian history– in the Russian sphere of
political and economic influence. Once again, viewed through the prism of the long sweep of
Russian history, his calculations make sense, even though there is no real danger of NATO or the
United States invading.
While neither Russia not NATO is any objective threat to the other– neither side has any
compelling interest to invade the other and no means to conquer the other even if there were such
an interest– calculations which follow from either side’s raisons d’etat could lead to war. Viewed
objectively, the EU (which is addicted to NATO because it provides maximum security at a
fraction of the cost of a European security system) depends on Russian resources and Russia
depends on EU money. There are no serious ideological differences between the blocs
(overblown rhetoric about Putin’s nostalgic Russian nationalism notwithstanding). Viewed from
within each power bloc’s frame of reference, however, neither side can appear to the other as
weak. Hence the subtle dance of threat escalation, cheered on by a massive media-academicthink tank word industry in the US and the domestic political needs of Putin in Russia.
Trapped in the middle are the Ukrainians, who should be the one’s preaching objective analysis
and sane political calculation. Should war break out they will certainly be abandoned by the
West– there is no political appetite anywhere in Western Europe for the levels of casualties a
ground war with Russia would cost. Ukraine would be militarily devastated, but Russia could
never achieve its objectives. No doubt Ukrainians would rise to the last person to resist and the
US would no doubt impose economy-destroying sanctions. Russia would become even more of a
pariah state than it already is in Western eyes.
The US, given its world leading arms industries and control over the global financial system,
would laugh– as it always does– all the way to the bank. The first victim of the sanctions regime
would be the Nordstream 2 pipeline. The US liquified natural gas industry has been clamouring
to gain a toe hold in the European market. Thus far, the lower costs of Russian gas have kept
Germany on board with the project, but they would not be able to certify it in the event of a
Russian incursion into Ukraine. US arms would surely pour into the conflict zone, as would, no
doubt, mercenaries, er, sorry, private military contractors like Blackwater. Academic and media
careers would be made advising the Biden administration. Fossil fuel executives, arms
manufacturers, and commentators, safe at home thousands of miles away from the killing would
be rolling in dough while Ukrainians and Russians would be dying.
Insane. And it takes no special insight to see the insanity. And yet the logic of conflict all makes
perfect sense too. No one is acting irrationally from a political standpoint, and yet, from an
objective standpoint, the logic of conflict threatens an outcome that is completely irrational:
needless destruction of human life.
Social critics cannot be naive: raisons d’etat are as real as compelling as the rules of logical
inference. Hence simply preaching rationality without addressing the structural economic and
political drivers of conflict will never work. On the other hand, abandoning rationality as a
source of objective evaluative criteria on the basis of spurious claims that objectivity is just
another form of political partisanship does nothing to promote peace and save lives but instead

serves the interests of state proponents of armed violence. One or another side in a conflict will
have reason on its side: objectivity is not neutrality. People must therefor take partisan stands,
but if those stands are to promote peace, they must be rooted in an objective evaluation of the
real situation.

Poker 101
Originally posted, 24 February, 2022
I’ll not be resigning my cushy tenured position for a spot on the World Poker Tour anytime soon,
but I know enough about how to play to avoid betting everything on a bad hand. Vladimir Putin
and the right wing organizers of the Freedom Convoy in Canada could learn from my caution.
Since the US encouraged the Maidan uprising in 2014, Ukraine has been split between the
Ukrainian nationalists that took power and Russian speaking (and Russian identifying) citizens in
the East. In response, Putin orchestrated the return of the Crimean peninsula to Russian control
(it was only ceded to Ukraine in 1951 by Khrushchev, before that it had been part of the Russian
Empire, and before that, Ottoman). Putin’s move brought widespread international condemnation
and an intensified push on the part of Ukrainian authorities for deeper integration with the West,
including NATO membership. Understandably, the Russian government, already encircled by
NATO and the United States (people forget that Russia’s eastern neighbour is the United States),
fears any further tightening of the circle. However, given the current alignment of global forces,
there is little that they can do to prevent it.
Hence Putin’s decisions to first recognize the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk
People’s Republics and then, last night, launch military strikes against Ukraine, are disastrous to
all concerned. Ukrainian civilians will almost certainly be killed, the Russian economy strangled,
bringing renewed hardship to that long-suffering people, energy prices will rise around the
world, stretching many working class budgets beyond the breaking point. Frightening instability
has been injected into the geo-politics of Europe whose long-term implications cannot be
predicted.
Already the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline has been suspended and the ruble is in free fall. Ordinary
Russians will see the costs of imports skyrocket (if any imports remain) and Russian businesses
will find it more and more difficult to invest in the newest technologies. The Russian economy
will remain trapped in an export-based system in a world which will rapidly seek alternatives
sources for its goods. Putin has played his hand, but in a politically and economically disastrous
way.
The historical and political reasons why he has made this move are clear. US policy since the
Cold War bears the ultimate responsibility. First, Putin was made possible–necessary?–m by the
looting of the Soviet economy encouraged by the finest economic minds the American Ivy
League could furnish. Real incomes and life-expectancy collapsed under the alcoholic shambles
that was Boris Yeltsin; someone who could restore order and pride was objectively necessary,
and Putin fit the bill. His latest gambit, however, is mostly likely to be his last.

As I argued in “Reason, and Raisons D’etat,” that which makes sense politically from a national
perspective is often irrational from an objective perspective. From an objective perspective, I
struggle to see how Putin can achieve his aims. He can cut off the supply of gas to Europe, but
his economy depends upon resource exports. He seems to be banking on deepening connections
to China. That gives him an alternative export market, but it comes fraught with its own risks.
First, China’s economy depends on energy imports, but it also depends on manufacturing exports
to the US. To be sure, China shares with Russia an interest in limiting US hegemony, but its
dependence on US consumers will limit the extent to which it will support Russian moves that
could expose its economy to further US sanctions. Moreover, Chinese foreign policy is rooted in
a very strong affirmation of national sovereignty and self-determination. They rely on that
principle to justify their policies in Tibet, their treatment of national minorities, and their Taiwan
policy. Whatever the complex history of the formation of Ukraine’s current borders, no one in
the international community will see this invasion as anything but an illegitimate and illegal
violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Already, China has moved to distance itself from the Russian
move. Putin is going to find himself completely isolated. Beyond the pointless loss of life the
invasion will cause, it is also self-undermining: it will mostly likely hasten rather than prevent
Ukrainian membership in NATO (at the very least it will permanently ensconce Ukraine in the
Western camp).
When you have a terrible hand, you do not push in all of your chips. You fold and wait patiently
for the next hand, and the hand after that, and the hand after that, if necessary. At worst, you
walk away from the table with the shirt on your back and the keys to your car. Neither Ukraine
nor NATO were ever going to invade Russian territory. Putin’s impatience will have almost as
dire results for the Russian people as an invasion would have caused.
Turning our attention back to my own shores, there were no tidal geopolitical forces pushing the
“Freedom Convoy” down Canadian highways to Ottawa and border crossings in BC, Alberta,
and Ontario, and their political miscalculations will not have global effects. Nevertheless, the
leadership’s decisions are another paradigm case of mistaking weakness for political strength.
The initial aim of the Freedom Convoy were simple enough: end the vaccine mandate imposed
on cross-border truckers. But this simple demand soon attracted a plethora of anti-government
grievances, mostly emanating from Alberta, the traditional home of the Canadian far right which
has long harboured anti-Ottawa, anti-liberal, and anti-Trudeau sentiment. (Trudeau pere’s
National Energy Policy was a flashpoint for the Alberta right in the 1980s: remember those “Let
the Eastern bastards freeze in the dark” bumper stickers).
The convoy managed to attract a few thousand active participants. One must give credit where
credit is due: they displayed remarkable creativity and determination. They blockaded downtown
Ottawa for 3 weeks and kept North America’s busiest commercial border crossing between
Windsor and Detroit closed for a week. I went and argued with a group of Windsor protesters:
there were no tactical or strategic geniuses there, only highly committed people willing to put
themselves on the line for what they believed in– a strong contrast to the mobilizing failures of
the left for the better part of 40 years.

Alas, the goals of the movement were either unrealizable (even had Trudeau given ground on the
truckers’ vaccinations, the American government has the same regulation, and would not be
swayed by a few thousand Canadians, even if they did wave a lot of American flags), deeply
confused (after the Emergencies Act was declared, many in Ottawa decried the violation of their
First Amendment Rights, confusing the American and Canadian Constitutions), or lunatic
(overthrowing the Liberal government).
While there was no chance of any of these demands being met or political goals realized, the
Convoy will most likely have a lasting– and deleterious– effect on Canadian politics. None of the
three major political parties comes out stronger: The Conservatives had no choice but to back the
movement, for fear of losing ground to the far-right Canadian People’s Party, but back
themselves further into a political corner from which there may be no electoral escape for the
foreseeable future. The Liberals come out looking both too weak and too authoritarian, first
dithering while Ottawa froze and then imposing the Emergency Measures Act. The NDP,
unsurprisingly, wanted things both ways and will be judged accordingly as incapable of making
firm, principled decisions.
However, the real damage will be to the future of protest in Canada. Now that the seal has been
removed from the use of the Emergencies Act to forcibly remove protesters (who were causing
real damage but were far from being insurrectionary) the bar has been worringly lowered for its
future use. Even if the Act is not again formally invoked, governments and police will feel
emboldened to swiftly pounce on and remove anything resembling a barricade or blockade.
Picket lines and First Nations’ protest encampments have always been targets; they will face
much graver risks now as governments of the day will harken back to the Freedom Convoy to
justify repressive measures long after the diesel clouds over Wellington Street have dissipated.
There may have been no political alternative at the time the act was invoked, but no one should
gloat over the long term implications of its having been used.

Neither Washington Nor Moscow
Originally posted, 1 March, 2022
The title of this post was the slogan of the International Socialist Tendency to which I once
belonged. I can hardly believe that it is still relevant thirty years after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the purported end of the Cold War. However, instead of beating our swords into
ploughshares, the search for new enemies began. Yes, there was a brief period of euphoria and
optimism in the West, but soon a needless war had been started with Saddam Hussein. For
awhile it looked as though the corrupt dictatorships that had once served US and Western
purposes would satisfy the need for enemies, but they alone could not justify the massive outlays
for new weapons systems and nuclear arms to which the American economy is addicted.
Enter Putin’s Russia, China, and al Qaeda. The later, ghost-like, became the justification for the
Global War on Terror which, at last count, had cost 9 trillion dollars and about 900 000 lives (as
a consequence of direct combat; the figure would be much higher if deaths due to increased
disease and the break down of social institutions were factored into the figure). The figure also
excludes surplus deaths in Iran as a consequence of its having been starved of funds for medicine
for decades). But the real prizes were Russia and China, peer competitors (or so we are told)
whose very existence is a challenge to the “free world” (yes, the term is back again) and
therefore require perpetual mobilization, confrontation, and militarization.
I cannot recall mass boycotts of California wine or Disney movies to protest the wanton
destruction of lives, livelihoods, and whole societies during the twenty years of the War on
Terror. People cheered as wedding parties were evaporated by Predator drones firing Hellfire
missiles. Those who reported on the truth, like Julian Assange, were discredited, hunted down,
and tortured (if being imprisoned without trial for a decade is not torture, I do not know what is).
But only the Russians and Chinese spread propaganda, our press is free.
The hypocrisy and self-righteousness of Western government and their fawning mainstream
media is unbearable.
However, we must not make the mistake of painting Putin as a heroic anti-imperialist. He is
certainly opposed to the expansion of NATO, but for raisons d’etat, not because he is trying to
build a coalition of non-aligned forces to promote freedom, democracy, and substantive equality.
The reason he has invaded Ukraine is not difficult to understand: he reached out to the US and
NATO with clear demands, and instead of seriously negotiating those demands and arriving at
some acceptable middle ground, he was rebuffed and lectured. He has made a colossal strategic
error. He has unleashed the murderous power of his military against the Ukraine and bears
responsibility for the mass destruction of human life. He has brought about an unprecedented
rain of sanctions which will destroy his economy and worsen the already hard lives of most
Russians. Russians will be locked once again with their borders, depriving the world of their
talents as athletes, scientists, and artists, and most likely narrowing and hardening their view of
the rest of the world. Nevertheless, Russia exists within a state system and the decisions of its

leaders must be understood within that state system, no matter how irrational its political logic is
when viewed from an objective perspective.
As the killing unfolds one could say of international law what Gandhi once said about Western
civilization: it would be a good idea. International law is invoked only when it suits the victor’s
purposes. The victors themselves are free to pillage and maim as they please. The losers are
always the people who do not care about international relations and just want to get on with their
lives, love their families and friends, and make their way through the world. I cannot imagine, on
this morning which dawns peaceful for me, the grief, anger and terror of ordinary Ukrainians as
Russian bombs and missiles continue to pour down, so I will not try to write as if I do.
I am long past the point of being able to convince myself that fundamental geo-political conflicts
will be resolved. I have read too much history: time and again the states system is reconfigured
around a new hegemon, and all the old shit (preparation for and then actual war) begins again.
The solution is simple: everyone stop wanting what they do not have, relate to others with
openness and understanding, cultivate a peaceful and caring disposition to all things. That is the
deep message of most religions and the best of philosophy, but it is ignored time and again. Why
will this time be different?
So we must content ourselves with managing catastrophe after catastrophe. Once one begins, as
now in the Ukraine, the best one can hope for is a quick negotiated resolution. But has Biden or
any Western leader called for and encouraged negotiations? No, they have rushed to flood arms
to Ukrainians. Ukrainians have the absolute right to self-defence, but we have seen many times
before what happens when arms flood into a war zone: it prolongs the fighting and increases the
number of dead– but also, of course, the profits of weapons makers.
Covid could have been treated as a wake up call telling us to learn to cooperate across borders
and simplify our lives. Who has not learned during the pandemic that the only really important
thing in life is our ability to connect with the people we care about and love? But the virus was
not treated as teacher but an enemy to be defeated. Now that it is in retreat, the world falls back
into its life-destructive normalcy.

Thought in Three Dimensions
Originally posted, 9 March, 2022

When confronted with any political problem we face three interrelated tasks. The analyst must
understand, assign responsibility, and decide how to respond. How we respond will be a function
of understanding and responsibility.
Responsibility cannot be assigned unless the problem is understood. When I say “responsibility”
in this context I am not talking about legal responsibility, still less moral blame worthiness.
Legal and moral questions arise in political life, but to understand a problem politically both, and
especially the later, must be bracketed. Legal responsibility (say, for war crimes) is a matter for
the courts. Morality is something else again. Nothing is easier than charges of wanton
inhumanity, but when we think of political conflicts in terms of abstract categories like “good”
and “evil” we grossly oversimplify their historical emergence and impede rather than deepen
understanding.
The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a case study in how conflating responsibility
with moral blameworthiness impedes comprehensive understanding. The Russian army may be
committing war crimes and Putin may be, as his legion of critics maintain, “evil.” But he did not
invade because he is evil or for the sake of committing war crimes. Make no mistake: Putin and
his inner circle are responsible for the invasion. They are legally accountable for whatever war
crimes are committed, whatever reparations are owed, and for any other negative consequences
that their illegal actions are causing. Putin and those who execute his orders are also, like every
human being, moral subjects who may justly be judged for the pain and death their decisions
have caused. But proper political understanding must bracket those two dimensions of the web of
human agency and action.
Political understanding must do so because both isolate actions from historical context and fix
blame on individuals. The US and the EU knew from at least 2008 that Russia was
unequivocally opposed to NATO expansion but both have persistently ignored those concerns.
One cannot understand the actions of political agents, which, as I have been pointing out in the
past few posts, act on raisons d’etat and not objective reasons, on the terms in which we would
evaluate the day to day actions of people not in positions of power. Political agents, especially
when the problem has the world historical implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, are
not acting as legal or moral individuals, but as historical subjects shaped by and carrying with
them the cumulative effects of past actions.
From a legal and moral standpoint, Putin is an individual subject to legal and moral judgments
that others will render. But as the person who ordered the invasion of Ukraine, he is the President
of the Russian Federation and the embodiment of the history of that Federation and its

relationship with the West since he assumed power in the 1990s. The only way we can
understand his actions is by understanding that history. When we understand that history, we
must acknowledge that NATO and the United States have played a role in generating the
tensions that Putin is now trying (and failing) to overcome by force.
Moralistic explanations always crash against the rocks of one-sidedness. If the explanation for
the war is that Putin is an evil megalomaniac, then there is no reason to investigate the history of
Western relationships with Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. If we shout loudly
enough about his inhuman tactics in Ukraine, we can silence critics of our own side’s use of the
same tactics. One of the main headlines last week was that Russia had used or was preparing to
use a thermobaric weapon. What those same outlets failed to report was that the US used
thermobaric weapons in Afghanistan: a country without an air force or air defence systems. One
could go on for pages and pages with similar examples of the abject hypocrisy of Western
leaders. The point is not to distract attention from Russia’s actions in Ukraine and argue that the
US and NATO are the true evil empire. Ukrainians resisting the war have rightly cautioned
against arguments from Western Marxists like David Harvey who have downplayed Russian
responsibility. I agree with those criticisms. However, one must still factor in the history of
aggressive NATO expansion when we try to comprehensively understand the current conflict.
The clear fact of the matter is that had the United States betrayed its promise to Gorbachev and
the disintegrating Soviet Union to not expand NATO, and that is the starting point of the causal
chain that leads up to the on-going Russian bombardment of Ukraine. Moreover, had the US sat
down and seriously negotiated with Russia in the run up to the war, the war might not have been
launched.
I do not want to distract from the current realty by introducing counter-factuals or to reduce
Putin’s responsibility for the war. He gave the orders and there was no compelling strategic
necessity to do so (in fact, this decision will probably rank as one of the great strategic errors of
all time). The point is that the West calculates its moves not in terms of good or bad but in terms
of strategic interests just like Putin or any other political agent. The horrors of war are unleashed
not because the leaders of any bloc are psychopathic monsters, but because they act according to
an inhuman calculus of political and strategic power and weakness; they evaluate their success
not in terms of how many lives are wasted in pursuit of the objective, but in terms of whether the
objectives are met. One may wish it were otherwise and I and all peace loving people do so wish,
but that wish changes nothing. Those in charge of policy understand that lives hang in the
balance of their decisions— Western experts predicted this war but refused to negotiate
nonetheless– but they do not make decisions on the basis of the only moral principle that
ultimately matters in international affairs: preserve peace and maintain life above all costs. No
major political power in history has ever made decisions on that basis. Only 6 year olds think
that history is a struggle between “good” guys and “bad” guys. The structural conditions of geopolitical conflict are enough to ensure that no one who thought and acted on the principle that
lives should be preserved at all costs would ever get anywhere near power. They would be
incapable of making the decisions that the “balance of power” forces people to make, and they
would never be acceptable to the economic political, and military interests that rule states and
have ruled them in different forms for thousands of years.

Hence the real fruit of dispassionate understanding of the depth causes of international conflict in
general and the present one in particular is (for me at least) despair. In order to finally overcome
the structures that continually cause violent conflict the world would need new political agents
capable of achieving total disarmament such that large scale warfare becomes impossible. But
who would disarm in the middle of a fight? And when is there not a fight going on somewhere?
Hence the objective conditions for the emergence of the political subjects who are needed to take
bold new steps towards permanent peace are never met. Genuine voices of peace always emerge,
but they are always marginal.
Unfortunately, these voices of peace are too often silenced and cowed by the much larger chorus
of braying xenophobes and chauvinists who insist on simplistic moralistic demonization of the
whole of the people who constitute the ‘enemy.” One can certainly understand Ukrainian
animosity towards Russia (although many in Ukraine have reached out in exemplary fashion to
ordinary Russians to urge them to work to stop the war). One might not like the consequences for
everyday Russians the severe of the economic sanctions will have, but Putin’s aggression could
not go unanswered. Critics of the current global system will be troubled by the hypocrisy and
double standards (why is the US never sanctioned, and who is the US, given its history, to try to
teach lessons in humane treatment), but the reality is that there is no third party in heaven
floating above the fray who can intervene to stop this war. There is only the nations of the rest of
the world, and the most powerful agents in the rest of the world are the US and the EU.
Sanctions are the only real weapon short of actual armed intervention, imposed on the Russian
Putin’s decisions are thus the root cause of these sanctions and he will have to answer to his
people (who have been demonstrating in impressive numbers, given the strength of the internal
security apparatus they face). General economic sanctions were therefore inevitable and
justifiable. On the other hand, quite unjustified and dangerous are the wild rash of sanctions in
individual Russians and even digital representations of Russian. Why should paralympians be
banned from the Beijing Games? What possible causal force could they exert to stop the war?
Why then are they being held responsible? Even more absurd: why have sports video games
deleted the avatars of Russian national teams. Were they supposed to spin themselves into a
digital golem and stop Putin? And even worse: why was a class on Dostoevsky (the study of
whose peerless looking into the human heart of darkness is most needed at the moment)
cancelled by an Italian university? Universities are places of free inquiry; whomever imposed
this ban should ban themselves from their post– they are clearly unfit for intellectual work.
Will we soon be hearing calls for the internment of Russian Canadians?
Moral hysteria is not an effective basis for solidarity. It contributes to the unthinking
demonization reduction of complex cultures and individuals to “enemy” status. Such demonizing
drives supply the motivational fuel that keeps major conflicts burning. They prevent otherwise
intelligent and good-hearted people from understanding history, causes, and the role their own
nations have played in stoking conflict. They serve to perpetuate those conflicts, not resolve
them. Look to history: when people are backed into a corner and despised en masse because of
the actions of their leaders, they do not turn their backs on each other and their history but band
together even tighter. The Taliban rule Afghanistan again after 20 years of US and NATO war
and Iranians have maintained their revolution despite 40 years of American sanctions. Above all,

the world has to mobilize to prevent Ukraine from becoming another Afghanistan: a land laid
waste by forty years of great power politics. The way to help Ukrainians is to insist on a
ceasefire and negotiations, not to mindlessly chant Cold War slogans about godless and heartless
Ruskies out the destroy the free world.

Why Universality Matters
Originally posted, 23 March, 2022
No sensible human being can look on at what the Russian army is doing in Ukraine and not be
appalled. The strategy has become obvious: major cities will be pummelled from afar by artillery
and missiles until Ukrainians submit to Russian demands. Ukrainians, sadly, have become, (as so
many other members of smaller nations have become in the past), pawns to be sacrificed in
another round of the “great game” of global power-jockeying for geo-political advantage. This
case is a particularly egregious example of life being wasted for no tangible political gain for the
aggressor. The very ‘security’ demanded by Russia has been undermined by the invasion
designed to achieve it. They may eventually bleed some confession of neutrality out of Ukraine,
but at the cost of economic and political isolation that will have disastrous consequences for a
generation at least.
I have argued in previous posts that the great game operates according to its own morally upside
down logic: good and bad is calculated in terms of gains or losses of power, not preservation and
development of life. Once the game shifts to a military phase, no one can say how far it will
degenerate. No one intended World War One to last four years, and no one could have predicted
that World War Two would end with the dropping of atomic bombs. There is no political reason
why the war in Ukraine could not end up with a nuclear exchange between Russia and NATO.
That outcome is unlikely, but not excluded by the rules of game. The rules permit great powers
to pursue their aims by military means up to the point at which they are stopped by superior
military power or the the adversary capitulates. In the present conflict, Ukraine has been left to
do the fighting (with an ever-increasing supply of NATO weapons). If media reports are accurate
they have inflicted heavy losses on the Russian invaders, but have not been able to stop the
relentless shelling. Arms shipments are good for the arms dealers, but any prolongation of the
war will prolong the suffering of Ukrainian civilians. If Biden is serious about wanting to serve
the interests of Ukrainians, he should be doing everything that he can to to bring about a
negotiated solution. However, he has said almost nothing about the on-going negotiations.
Amazingly, the “leader of the free world,” he has not even spoken to Putin.
But as amazing as this failure is from a perspective situated outside the fray, it suits his role as
“leader of the free world” perfectly. For while America is not party to the actual combat, it is
centrally involved in the struggle. Its aims directly contradict the interests of the Ukrainian
people. From the standpoint of America-as-great-power, the longer the conflict goes on, the
better it is for their relative position in the world. Russia bogged down in Ukraine weakens one
half of the Russia-China alliance that is worrying American foreign policy experts. Sanctions on
Russian energy increase opportunities for American energy companies. And of course, arms
makers are ecstatic as Europe is on a weapon-buying binge of historic proportions.

These realities do not square with the good cop, bad cop framing of the conflict in the
mainstream media and popular imagination. The viral spread of moral support for Ukrainians
and the herd-mentality demonization of all things Russian abstracts from the more unpleasant
complexities of global real politik. Nevertheless, people are not wrong to reach out in sympathy
and solidarity. But unless the moral basis of the identification is understood in its true
universality, popular care and concern for Ukrainians risks being captured by Western leaders.
On the one hand, they will cynically exploit it to hide the role they have played in creating the
conditions for the war. On the other hand, expressed without reflection against all things
Russian, it can become an example of the xenophobia and hatred its deeper moral sentiments are
supposed to overcome.
I have discussed the geo-political dimensions of the conflict in preceding posts. Here I want to
focus on the moral problem posed by the reaction to the war in the West, and in particular the
exclusionary and inconsistent valuation of human life it expresses. The Internet is capable of
marshalling tsunamis of grief and outrage, but not organizing moral posturing into consistent and
coherent criticism. People are rightly horrified and dismayed by the loss of life and the wanton
destruction that Russian forces are causing. However, these same forces of destruction have been
put to work by NATO and the US across the Middle East, Central Asia, and Eastern Africa for
two decades. There was widespread opposition to the 2003 Iraq War, but it soon settled in to
become background noise once Saddam had been toppled, even though the Western caused
violence to the Iraqi people did not cease. Millions were not raised and borders certainly not
flung open to welcome Iraqi refugees.
The war in Yemen, fuelled by American weapons, has not resulted in invitations to Houthi choirs
to sing the equivalent of the Houthi national anthem. 400 000 people have been killed thus far
and one of the world’s poorest countries laid waste by the Saudi intervention into the civil war.
Millions of people were killed in the Congolese Civil War: refugees from it and other conflicts in
Africa are met by armed EU patrol boats in the Mediterranean and turned back. Last week, the
UN reminded the world of the civil war in Ethiopia and argued that residents of the Tigray
region were at the highest risk of famine. I have seen no move to boycott Ethiopian restaurants
and see no one flying Tigray flags on the cars.
The point: individual people cannot solve all the world’s problems by expressions of outrage, no
matter how justified. Instead, what they can do is to demand consistent, life-affirming policy
from their governments. If a short term response to a conflict demands that other nations accept
refugees, then they must accept all refugees from all conflicts. Refugees need refuge: consistent
and coherent valuation of life responds to the need, not the identity, of the needy person.
Life is not valuable because it is Ukrainian or European. Life is valuable because it is
unrepeatable. War is not only wrong when “the enemy” launches it. It is always wrong (but
sometimes, according to the logic of geo-politics, inevitable) because it destroys unrepeatable
lives. The dead do not rise once victory has been achieved. Typically, their ghosts haunt the
living and fuel the next round of historical resentment and hatred.
A morality rooted in life-value affirms as its first principle that all lives, those of friend and
enemy alike, are equally valuable. The person who values life does not cheerlead for one side or

another in armed conflict, but demands that the root causes be understood and addressed through
negotiations. The person who values life does not insist that people who have no causal power
over their government’s decisions be erased from the world. The person who fully values life
does not demand escalation, support arms shipments, or insist on interventions which would only
widen and deepen the conflict and cause more death.
Those who value life have no option but to demand a negotiated solution. Yet– in the surest
proof that the US pursues only its own raisons d’etat and not peace– the US has been actively
working against successful negotiations. The State Department, casually at ease sacrificing
Ukrainian and Russian lives, has been encouraging Zelensky to hold out. Suddenly, the 20th
century’s greatest violator of national sovereignty is concerned with the right to selfdetermination of nations!
Morality begins with sympathetic resonance to human vulnerability. It begins with feeling, but it
must become articulated with critical intelligence if it is to do more than make one group feel
morally superior to others. Once it becomes articulated with critical intelligence it can combine
appropriate condemnation for unnecessary violence with an understanding of the causes of
conflict. It can then understand the causal sequences that lead up to conflict in their full
complexity. Once we understand the complex causes of conflict, we can also see that there is
never just one responsible party.
The articulation of moral sentiment with critical understanding also allows us to recognize
similar situations and distribute our sympathies according to the principle that life is the
foundation of value. All people in vulnerable situations require support according to the degree
of their vulnerabilities and not according to their geographical location or identity. The
expression of sympathy is essential but easy. The work of understanding and changing structures
is equally necessary but very difficult.

War: The Real Crime
Originally posted, 21 April, 2022
I have always thought that there was something oxymoronic about the ‘laws of war.’ Is not war
itself the ultimate lawlessness? When existing legal principles cannot resolve a dispute, when
good faith discussion and negotiation cannot find common ground, the parties to the dispute
retreat to their bunkers and hangars and return with the express intention of destroying each
other. Not only do they intend each other’s destruction, they actively bring it about. What matter
the means, if the end is the death of the enemy and the destruction of their infrastructure of lifesupport?
The lawyer will respond: the laws of war are necessary to protect civilian life, to prevent
atrocities, to ensure proportionality between provocation and response, to limit escalation into
wars of global annihilation. But civilian populations cannot be protected, war itself is the
atrocity, military calculations once hostilities have commenced will always be conducted in
terms of tactical advantage in pursuit of strategic objectives, not constraint and proportionality,
and no mere law will prevent conflict-escalation. Words are too weak, Hobbes argued, to
constrain the actions of people unconstrained by superior physical power. If those in charge of
nuclear arsenals decide that the logic of conflict requires their use, they will be used, the United
Nations be damned.
These reflections come to me in the midst of the debate about Russian war crimes in Bucha and
elsewhere in Ukraine. These allegations must be carefully investigated and, if substantiated, the
perpetrators must be held accountable. However, those of us who are not war crimes
investigators and are not direct combatants have another responsibility: to expose our own
government’s hypocrisy when it comes to recognizing and protecting the supreme value of
human life.
Since the start of hostilities in Ukraine, the Ukrainian government has been demanding more
arms from NATO and NATO has obliged. But pouring arms into the war zone is not the support
that Ukrainians need. The more arms that enter into the country, the more destructive the conflict
will become and the longer it will last. I suppose if one really prefers death to dishonour the
eventual withdrawal of Russian forces after the complete flattening of the country could be
regarded as a victory: but who will be left to celebrate it? Zelensky is perhaps not in a position to
openly admit what is clearly the case (not only in terms of Ukraine, but throughout US history
from the promulgation of the Monroe doctrine): being an ally of the US means signing on to
being its sacrificial victim.
The current US administration no more values the lives of individual Ukrainians than Kennedy
or Johnston valued the lives of Vietnamese civilians, or Bush and Obama valued the lives of
Afghanis. Here is the supreme crime of war: it reduces the value of life to an instrumental
function of the strategic advantage of the contending powers. We can test this proposition in real

time: not only has the Biden administration not called for negotiations to end the war, they are
openly advocating against negotiations. This position was not adopted ad hoc in response to the
crisis. In 2019 the RAND corporation published a brief: “Overextending and Unbalancing
Russia” which analyzed ways in which Russian power could be undermined by a combination of
sanctions, restrictions on export markets for its energy supplies, and encouraging a brain drain of
its most talented scientists and youth. Ukraine provided the pretext for implementing exactly
these tactics.
The number of Ukrainians that will have to die in order to achieve these goals is unlimited, just
as the number of Aghanis or Iraqis that had to die to achieve (or, in those cases, fail to achieve)
American objectives was unlimited. The violence whereby fellow human beings are sacrificed
by the decisions of our government (directly, or in alliance with America) runs deeper than the
kinetic force of the shrapnel that kills them. It begins with their dehumanization, their reduction
to the status of mere means to the realization of geo-political ends. To be sure, Russia is guilty of
the crime of war too, but thinking people have to go deeper into the causes of war as such. If one
values life one does not cheerlead conflict or demand that policies be adopted which ensure only
more death and destruction.
Life is not valuable because it is cloaked in one national identity rather than another. Those
identities are arbitrary historical constructions without ultimate value. 5000 years ago there were
no Russians or Ukrainians: who cares about trivial differences of language or dress when lives
are at stake? Life is valuable because it is unrepeatable: when you are dead you are dead; you
will not be present to reflect upon the glory of your demise either attacking or protecting a
rotting steel mill.
One cannot be naive: if invaded, countries have the right to defend themselves. The principle of
self-defence is not in question. That which is in question is the motives of my own government
as it allies itself to a policy which serves short-term American geo-political interests and
sacrifices Ukrainian lives to achieve them. As with all past conflicts we are led to look away
from the life-interests that connect human beings beneath differences of national identity and
towards childish constructions of friends are good and enemies are evil frames of moral
reference.
This simplistic and false frame of reference conditions us to believe that life is valuable only if it
is on our side. From there it is a short step towards hatred directed against entire nations. From
hatred against entire nations it is another short step towards willing their complete destruction.
That is what is happening in Russia vis-a-vis Ukrainians, but it is also what is happening here
and in Europe against Russians. There is no moral value in hatred; hatred always leads to greater
life-destruction, greater life-destruction to resentment, resentment to the desire for revenge, and
revenge attacks to another round of conflict further down the line.
At some point, humanity must break out of this vicious cycle. Nations need to move beyond their
list of historical grievances. People need to stop wasting intellect and creative power on
inventing new ways of killing. Economies need to be re-oriented towards the production of lifegoods. What deeper moral rot could there be in a society than an economy in which growth is
achieved by selling the means of death on the false pretext that accumulation of more weapons

systems protects life? The only thing that accumulates is capital, in the bank accounts of
corporations far, far removed from the conflict zones where the reality of their products literally
blows up in children’s faces.
If you support weapons shipments rather than demand peace negotiations, you become party to
the crime.

Accumulating Political Capital with
Ukrainian Lives
Originally posted 5 May, 2022
If there were any confusion about what value the United States and NATO countries put on
Ukrainian lives, it should have dissipated by the Biden administration’s admission this week that
its goal is to use the conflict to strategically weaken Russia. In order to accomplish that goal,
Biden is asking Congress to authorize 33 billion dollars of aid (mostly military) so that the war
can be prolonged. If the war is prolonged, more Ukrainians will die and more Ukrainian cities
will be razed to the ground. If a policy knowingly causes more death and destruction it cannot be
coherently defended as serving the interests of the people who will be killed. As with other
proxies in its century-long imperial history, the United States is willing to sacrifice an unlimited
number of Ukrainian lives in order to achieve its own strategic objectives.
And these objectives are justified by appeal to the right of nations to self-determination!
Nations do have the right to self-determination. Ukrainians, as I have stressed in each of my
critical interventions on the causes of the war, have an unquestionable right to protect themselves
from invasion. But this right should be exercized intelligently. One must be wary of advice from
“friends” like Liz Truss, the UK foreign minister, who encouraged Ukraine the continue to attack
Russian territory and argued that the war should not conclude until Russians have been expelled
from the whole of Ukraine, including Crimea.
The right to self-determination means that Ukrainians should set their own war aims, but they
should be mindful of being used. America and Britain will not be pulverized by Russian artillery,
Ukraine will. Two administrations in domestic political trouble see the war in Ukraine as a
means of rallying their citizens round the Ukrainian flag. So far, they seem to be succeeding, at
least in terms of maintaining domestic support for the war.
As for actually solving domestic problems, the policies being pursued by all sides: Russia,
Ukraine, the US, UK, and NATO are making and will make looming economic problems
decidedly worse. Inflation will undermine real incomes in the West (making a massive defeat for
the Democrats in November mid-terms much more likely), sanctions are destroying the Russian
economy, war, the Ukrainian, and pricing foodstuffs out of the reach of consumers in the Global
South.
And yet all sides proclaim they are waging a heroic struggle for: de-Nazification! selfdetermination! the Free World!
Those most under threat, the Ukrainian people, should ask themselves if they really want their
government to be a pawn in the US’s geo-strategic game. They must ask themselves if they want
a needlessly protected war for the sake of the domestic political interests of Joe Biden and Boris
Johnson. They must ask themselves if it is in their interests to assist the West in irrationally

prolonging Cold War conflicts with Russia for which there are no longer any political and
economic reasons.
I pose these questions in light of the complete loss of momentum towards a peace agreement. A
couple of weeks into the war, it looked as though Ukraine and Russia had the framework of a
peace deal worked out. The Biden administration was notable only for its silence about the
negotiations. Were they working behind the scenes to actively scupper a deal? No direct
evidence emerged at the time, but the latest round of remarks and high-level visits (Blinken,
Austin, and Pelosi) support the conclusion that American officials have been whispering in
Zelensky’s ear that Ukraine can win.
Like all nations, Ukranians have the right to defend themselves. However, Ukraine– again, like
all countries– has internal divisions. Zelensky has been busy banning opposition parties that he
has deemed to be traitors because pro-Russia. But these parties are not so much pro-Russia as
pro-Russian speaking Ukrainian citizens in Donetsk and Luhansk. There was a framework (the
Minsk agreements) in place to resolve the civil war that has been roiling since 2014, but
Zelensky, under pressure from far-right nationalists (amongst whom there really are neo-Nazis)
refused to implement them. Peace was possible, war is actual.
Given the unending stream of US weapons, highly motivated soldiers protecting their homes,
low Russian morale, and world-wide opprobrium directed against Moscow, Ukraine might well
one day win. However, the Taliban also “won,” after 40 years of country-destroying warfare. Is
that the type of victory most Ukrainians want to celebrate some day in the distant future when–
just as the Taliban and the United States did– they negotiate a settlement with Moscow?
American military contractors will find much to like in a scenario of open-ended warfare, as will
the American corporations who will no doubt sweep in after the hostilities have concluded to
“reconstruct” (i.e. pillage the assets) of the country. But thousands and thousands more
Ukrainian lives will have been lost than would have been the case had peace been concluded
sooner. Russia will still be there, surrounding Ukraine on 3 sides, still nuclear armed, and still
therefore a threat. The US will still be thousands of miles away, have lost no lives and no
infrastructure. Its politicians will laud the Ukrainians for being martyrs to the cause of protecting
the “free world.” But once there is no more money to be made, their attention will turn to the
next country that they need to destabilize in the same of self-determination and democracy.

The Contradictions of Self-Determination:
Afghanistan Edition
Originally posted, 18 August, 2021
Almost exactly twenty years after the 9/11 attacks that prompted US invasion, Afghan has fallen
to the movement that the US forces attacked to expel: the Taliban. Weepy liberals and hardheaded conservatives have united to denounce Biden’s decision to finally and fully withdraw US
troops from the country. Always willing to play fast and loose with other peoples lives– those of
the poor Americans who make up the foot soldiers of the US armed forces and anyone in the
Middle East, Central Asia, or East Africa who happens to be in the way of their grand strategy–
both sides of the aisle and the think tanks who live by suckling at the teat of the Pentagon decry
Biden’s “betrayal” and demand more, more, more war. That any of these people can maintain
employ as policy analysts and public intellectuals in the face of the complete absence of
connection between their prescriptions and political reality proves that they do not exist to
provide sage counsel, as they proclaim, but to justify the astronomical sums that America spends
on defence. Too many withdrawals and people will start talking about the “peace dividend”
again. (Does anyone remember that vain hope from the end of the Cold War?)
Whatever one’s feelings about the plight of ordinary Afghans (and anyone sentient must
acknowledge the horror to which they are being and have been subjected now and for the past
twenty years), to understand what is happening in the country today one must dispassionately
analyze the forces on the ground contending for power. If a well-equipped, Western trained army
leaves the field rather than fights only one conclusion follows: the soldiers made a rational
decision that the puppet government was not worth dying to support. All puppet regimes face
this problem: as long as the imperialist sponsor is there to protect it, enough locals will support it
because they need to make a living to give it a veneer of credibility. But when the choice is
between death fighting for it or living another day by abandoning it, most will abandon it. If
Kabul looked like Saigon in 1975 it is not because the helicopters looked the same, but because
the Afghan government had the same degree of political legitimacy as the South Vietnamese
government in 1975: none.
Analysts are expressing shock that the Taliban took over in less than two weeks. This reaction
must be staged for public consumption. There must have been honest intelligence analysis
somewhere that stated what should have been obvious even to the casual but objective observer:
the Taliban were the most politically and militarily cohesive force in the country, have roots in
the Pashtun areas that make up half the country, and would rapidly win in a fight with a national
army that had equipment but not motivation. They were driven from power in 2002 but never
defeated. US propaganda reserves to itself the right to define who is and who is not a “real”
member of a dominated nation. Locals who support American objectives are called by the name
of the nationality, opponents are labelled by the name of the political movement they support.
Thus supporters of the South Vietnamese government were Vietnamese, opponents were Viet
Cong. Those who supported the American puppet government in Afghanistan earn the right to be
called Afghani, opponents are Taliban. But despite these propaganda tricks the members of the

Taliban are not from outer space, they have organic roots in the country. They may not enjoy
majority support but their is no way that they could have conquered the country in under two
week unless they enjoyed some mass support in the Pashtun areas. As in Vietnam, they did not
win any battles against American forces, but they have inflicted a massive political defeat on
American imperialism.
Western critics of the American pullout are quick to point to the antedeluvian politics of the
Taliban. They are not wrong that they espouse a reactionary fundamentalist ideology. However,
one has to be unconscionably naive to believe that the purpose behind the American invasion
was to promote women’s liberation and human rights in Afghanistan. Major world powers do not
invade for the sake of human rights promotion. The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was pure real
politik motivated by the need to remind the world, after the shocking vulnerabilities exposed by
9/11, that America will hunt down and destroy any enemy that dares threaten it. As Doug
Bandow has argued, “endless war advocates ever willing to work with the most brutal
movements, like Afghan warlords, and aid the most repressive nations, like Saudi Arabia,
became born again human rights activists, with a special emphasis on the status of women, when
withdrawal was mentioned. But that isn’t why the US intervened. It isn’t what Washington
emphasized over the last two decades. And it wouldn’t cause America to intervene today.” Only
after the Taliban were dislodged from power did the need for new justifications for continued
military operations emerge. Hence the justification of the Afghanistan war morphed from pure
revenge and a warning to other anti-American forces in the region to the first “human rights war”
of the post-9/11 era (Iraq, Libya, and Syria, would follow in the next two decades, all with
disastrous results).
Be that as it may, is it not true that in the wake of the return of the Taliban to power Afghani
women will be exposed to the misogynistic violence of the Taliban and that the tentative steps
Afghanistan made towards becoming a liberal democracy will be rolled back? The answer to this
question leads us into the heart of the contradiction of support for the principle of selfdetermination.
Whether we like it or not, the nation state has been the dominant political form since the
beginning of the 19th century. Struggles by oppressed minorities for their own nation state have
been by far the most pervasive mass struggles of the twentieth century. The number of national
liberation struggles since the turn of the twentieth century far exceed the number of socialist
revolutions. Indeed, for the most part, the struggle for socialism and the struggle for national
liberation coalesced in the wake of the Chinese revolution. Unlike Russia, China had been the
victim of imperialist (both British and Japanese) adventures and Mao was clear (as are today’s
leaders of the Chinese Communist Party) that after 1949 the days of China being subordinated to
foreign rule and exploitation were over. What followed in the wake of the Chinese Revolution
was, I would argue, the most extensive chapter in the history of human liberation struggles. By
the time that the government of Rhodesia was overthrown by the forces of ZANU-PF under the
leadership of Robert Mugabe, white/European rule was ended in Africa (with the exception of
South Africa). India had achieved independence from England, China was ruled by the
Communist party of China, and Vietnam had defeated the United States.

Not one of these post-Revolutionary regimes was able to build a stable socialist democracy. For
a host of reasons that I cannot examine in detail here, national liberation was not followed by the
sorts of social and economic developments that political leaders argued were the material
conditions of democracy and socialism. Some of those arguments were true, some were selfserving. Nevertheless, this period of history is the most extensive chapter in the history of human
liberation struggles because they put paid to the racist myth that the peoples of Africa and Asia
were nothing more than the objects of history. Whatever the post-revolutionary failures, the
revolutions themselves won. These victories proved two things: imperialism imposed an
intolerable burden on its victims, and its victims were social self-conscious human beings, not
backward and inferior subhumans in need of American and European tutelage. Whatever one
thinks of the ideology of the Taliban, they are part of that history of struggle for selfdetermination.
I have no truck with politicized religious ideologies of any sort. I continue to be amazed that
billions of humans believe nonsense about sky gods, spirits and demons, chosen people, and
divine models for human law. I reject all attempts by conservative reactionaries to justify their
rule by appeal to purportedly natural limitations on acceptable social roles for different groups of
people. I believe that all arguments that some subset of human beings, (in this case, the Taliban’s
beliefs about women), are by nature fit for only one social role, have been definitively refuted by
historical developments. All such naturalistic ideologies have been refuted, ironically, by the
very history of struggles for self-determination of which the Taliban are a part.
That irony does not mean that anyone concerned with women’s rights and freedoms should
support any sort of continued American or Western military presence in Afghanistan. It would be
naive to believe the Taliban’s reassurances that they have learned their lessons. A spokesperson
said that “we move with responsibility in every step and make sure to have peace with
everyone… We are ready to deal with the concerns of the international community through
dialogue.” It would also be wrong to dismiss this openness out of hand and treat the Taliban as
some sort of irrational monstrosity incapable of rational dialogue. The more important point is
that those who support women’s rights and freedoms presuppose the legitimacy of the principle
of self-determination. Women have rights and can live freely because they are human beings,
and human beings are distinguished by our capacity to self-consciously shape and steer our own
future.
If one supports the principle of self-determination, therefore, one must support the struggle of
Afghani women to define their own forms of satisfying life. (One must also support their right to
emigrate, if that is what some Afghans choose to do. Western nations must be willing to accept
the refugees that twenty years of war has produced). Nevertheless, not everyone will want to
leave. If the Taliban are going to impose a form of life that is contrary to the humanity of
Afghani women, then Afghani women will have to be the one’s to lead the struggle against them.
There have already been small demonstrations in Kabul against the Taliban organized by groups
of women fearful of the Taliban agenda.
One might object that if women resist Taliban rule they will be subject to violence They
probably will be, just as women who struggled in Europe and America for their freedom were
subject to violence. I do not recall European women calling for invasions to support their

struggles. They regarded themselves as fully capable of overcoming the structures that oppressed
them and able to re-define their social roles in ways that befitted their humanity. The same
recognition is owed to Afghani women. They are fully capable of deciding how they want to live
and defining the social roles that they believe best allow for the full expression of their selfcreative human capacities. Those roles might look differently from those favoured by liberal
norms, they might ultimately coincide, or they might attain some sort of hybrid equilibrium.
What is certain is that no group of humans is free whom others regard as incompetent to
determine their own future. If the American military is required to protect the women of
Afghanistan, then they will never be free.
What American armchair human rights generals forget is that the American armed forces are
violent. Invasion is violent. Bombing wedding parties is violent. Assuming that there is only one
satisfying way for women to live is violent. There is no question here of fatuous cultural
relativism. Human values are universal. Every human beings ought to be able to access the
resources that they need to survive and freely develop. We all have a right to make an active and
meaningful contribution to the rules and laws that we have to obey. We should all be able to
express ourselves and share our talents in valuable and valued ways with our consociates. We
should all feel ourselves to be free subjects in charge of our own lives. However, the concrete
ways in which these values are lived differ according to different traditions and histories. The
Taliban no doubt stand in the way of all Afghani’s fully realizing these values. However, they
are also a reminder that life under foreign domination is intolerable and that human beings will
resist it. Struggles for self-determination are often self-contradictory. They justify themselves by
appeal to the value of self-determination and then deny that very right to other groups within the
nation they claim to have liberated. But there is no alternative for those groups oppressed by
forces like the Taliban to organize themselves. Solidarity with the victims of repressive
governments has to be rooted in respect for their human ability to ultimately solve their own
problems.

Death of the Outdoor Cats: An Essay on
Obligation
Originally posted, 5 April, 2022
It has been one month since my partner Josie and I have seen Skinny and about three since we
have seen Fluffy. Skinny and Fluffy were our names for two feral cats that we fed for the past
decade. They had the misfortune– or good fortune, depending on which perspective one takes– to
show up in our backyard at the same time as another stray, Jack, whom we ended up taking into
the house. Jack had a severed tail. His ailment elicited Josie’s greater sympathies. We already
had another cat and introducing a second was enough trouble. Four would have been impossible.
So Jack came in and Skinny and Fluffy stayed outside.
There is a small community of people who help care for the feral cats of our neighbourhood.
Josie learned from them how to build two shelters from packing containers, styrofoam insulation,
and straw. We gave them food and water everyday and with the help of our neighbour trapped
them once to bring them to the vet. But food, water, outdoor shelter and the brief companionship
of mornings defined the extent of our obligation. On the one hand, we kept them alive; on the
other, they had to endure some very difficult cold snaps and snow storms. On the one hand, they
were denied the access to our home that we extended to other cats over the years; on the other,
they were allowed to “live free,” as a man we met in Buenos Aires said of the feral cats of
Recolleta cemetery.
I miss Skinny and Fluffy, but not in that searing, visceral way one misses a loved one. They were
a presence in our lives every morning and we cared about them. However, when the origin of
care is a chance encounter, it seems to me that one is free to choose the scope and depth of the
caring activity we direct to the other. We were not responsible for Skinny’s and Fluffy’s having
come into the world in general or our world in particular. What ground could there be for the
argument that their showing up in our backyard constituted a claim on being adopted?
There are many feral cats in the neighbourhood, more than anyone couple could feed, much less
adopt. Ought implies can. Therefore, if one cannot care for everything in need, one is allowed to
be partial. Jack seemed more in need because of the trauma he suffered to his tail, and so the
choice was made to take him in and limit our relationship to Skinny and Fluffy to feeding and
shelter.
Sometimes, particularly when it got very cold, Josie would wonder if we were doing them any
favours helping them stay alive. But they kept coming, and that fact seemed to me to
communicate a desire on their part to keep going. I fed them almost everyday for ten years, so I
built some sort of very limited communicative connection. I do not know exactly what Skinny’s
meows and Fluffy’s hisses meant: cats, like Nagel’s bat, remain inscrutable to our attempts at
imaginative identification with their inner life. At the very least they meant that they were
hungry and were relieved that I was there to feed them. I suppose that if they lost the will to live
they could have stopped showing up, but they never did, until now.

Winters would have been harsh, but the summer and fall nights here are long and warm. Perhaps,
as our Argentinian acquaintance suggested, they felt free and did not envy our domesticated cats.
Occasionally, one or both would wander into to house. The sense of confinement seemed to
spook them and they would turn tail and dash out very soon after sneaking inside. We could
probably have domesticated them, but would that move have been the correct one?
An important philosophical principle is exemplified in our relationship with Skinny and Fluffy:
obligations arise from our needs for each other, but are limited by our capacity to satisfy them.
Josie and I could afford to feed Skinny and Fluffy but decided that Jack needed an indoor home
more than they did. (Ironically, Jack never lost his desire for living free and he returned to the
alleys of the neighbourhood never to be seen again a year or so after he came to live with us).
The choice to start feeding Skinny and Fluffy established a dependence on us that generated an
obligation to keep feeding them until our circumstances changed or they died. Once established,
the bond between us was objective, but because it took shape through a random encounter, we
were free to determine its limits.
I think that the way in which a chance encounter ended up generating objective but limited
obligations teaches a more general lesson. In a sense, all experience is a random encounter: the
world is composed of people, processes, and things which operate according to their own
decisions and powers. When we turn on the news we do not know what events we will hear
about; when we walk out the door we do not know who we will meet. Any of these encounters
could generate obligations, most do not. But in an age of too-close digital interconnection, too
many people talk as if every chance encounter with a person in need generates a duty to “do
something,” and every becoming aware of an atrocity somewhere generates a duty to “take a
stand.” But if one is not in a position to do anything, or one really has no understanding of the
issues on which one feels the need to take a stand, the public declarations are empty. Not every
stray cat can be fed; our intellects are finite, we do not need to weigh in on every one of the
billions of events that happen across the world every day.
Perhaps we ought to modify an aphorism from Wittgenstein: of that which one cannot change
and of that of which one lacks understanding, one must stay silent.
Silence is not inactivity or indifference. Silence is the condition of learning. If people only ever
talk (post, tweet) how can they ever learn? However, if everyone keeps talking at the same time,
no one hears anything at all. Therefore, they never hear something they have not heard before,
and therefore they have no opportunity to realize that their perspective is not uniquely true but
must be weighed against other perspectives and the truth worked out through analysis and
argument.
The world is too noisy with people who shout: “All cats must be fed and housed and loved!” but
have no means of realizing the principle and no plan for acquiring them. Better to feed the one
cat in your back alley than to lecture everyone about what they should do. Others will decide for
themselves, on the basis of more detailed knowledge of their situation, what they can do.

Public Policy, Individual Responsibility
Originally posted, 27 August, 2021
One of my first published essays (“Socialism, Individuality, and The Public Private Distinction,”
Re-Thinking Marxism, Vol.12, No,4, 2000) lamented the failure of the Left to protect the idea of
individual freedom from being appropriated by the right. As I have argued subsequently in many
different contexts, the fundamental institutional goal of socialism is to satisfy the conditions of
individual freedom. We do not live our lives as a mass or as mechanical functions of cultural
codes: we each have our own senses and brain, which we use to forge our own paths in life. One
way of understanding the dehumanizing effects of capitalism is to see how it systematically
undermines individuality. It forges a “labour force” out of distinct individuals and distributes
employment according to calculations of profitability. It does not care about whether one’s
employment satisfies one’s hopes or challenges one’s intellect. Socialism is about overcoming
these dehumanizing, de-individuating forces. Its justifying value was not (as Marx made clear)
abstract equality. Its justifying value was all-round individual freedom.
Where Marx and the socialist tradition differs from the liberal-capitalist tradition (although leftliberals have learned much from Marx and socialism) is that Marx does not treat individuals as
abstract islands of self-interest, but as social beings. However, we must be careful how we
interpret this all-important term. What Marx does not mean is that human beings are mere
functional units in an organic whole that has value independently of their individual experiences
and activities. Libertarian critics of socialism have consistently made the mistake of thinking that
socialism treats society as a reified entity above and superior to the individuals whose actions
and interactions produce and reproduce it. Socialism does not sacrifice individuals for the sake of
a reified “greater good.” Marx explicitly warns that we must not counterposing ‘society’ as a
super-individual to abstraction real individuals. Societies and cultures are not organic wholes
apart from individuals but the living, emergent product of material and symbolic labour of
associated people. New generations are born into societies and inherit their traditions, but those
traditions have no value apart from the service they render to existing individuals. When they fail
to satisfy our needs for meaning, they are changed.
Libertarians are not the only ones who misinterpret the meaning of social individuality. Some
socialists also talk as if values like equality or justice have meaning apart from the contribution
that they make to enabling individuals to differentiate themselves and live their own lives. Marx
always warned against levelling types of socialism: socialism for him (and his remains the gold
standard expression of the values of a socialist society) was a world in which individuals were
completely responsible for the people they made themselves to be, because society furnished
them with everything that they needed to make themselves into the individuals that they became.
The goal of the struggle for socialism is to establish collective, democratic control over the
sources of wealth and to use it to ensure the all-round satisfaction of our needs, for the sake of
the maximal richness of individual experience, activity, and mutually affirmative relationships.
Like individual freedom, individual responsibility is a value that socialists should protect from
right-wing appropriation. Socialism is not about paternalistic minding of grown adult behaviours.

It is about ensuring that everyone has access to the natural and social resources that they require
to assume responsibility for their actions. The on-going Covid crisis gives some practical
urgency to these reflections.
We are now coming close to the two year mark of the onset of the global crisis. While responses
have varied, every society has, for a longer or shorter period of time, imposed some degree of
restrictions on freedom of social interactions. The most extreme have been in China and
Australia, where (an obviously futile) eradication strategy has been pursued. The failure of this
approach is most evident in Australia, where millions of people are enduring their fifth or sixth
lock down as the government employs totalitarian means (including deploying the army in
Sydney) in quixotic pursuit of its goals.
Eradicationists point to the lower number of deaths than in countries like the United Sates and
Brazil, where right wing governments have ignored the virulence of the disease (a virulence that
has dramatically increased with the emergence of the Delta variant). The astronomical number of
deaths in countries that have pursued a libertarian response is objective refutation of the material
rationality of carrying on as if everything were the same as in pre-Covid times. Nevertheless, the
value of human life is free activity, open horizons of experience, and mutualistic relationship.
Life ceases to be worth living if these become impossible (hence the growing acceptance–
finally!– of self-chosen medical assisted dying). How long will citizens of China and Australia
tolerate being locked down every time there is an outbreak? Recent demonstrations in Australia
show that citizens are increasingly rejecting their government’s draconian approach.
Libertarians say that each individual must now assume responsibility for their own health and
well-being. The state has no place on the streets and in the cafe’s of a free society.
Eradicationists respond that the government has an over-riding responsibility to protect the
health of its people. The libertarians are wrong because they ignore the fact that individuals
depend upon social institutions and social interactions to survive. But the eradicationists are
wrong too. Governments do have responsibilities to ensure the health of their citizens. But health
must be understood actively and holistically: a healthy life is one filled with self-directed activity
and experience. Being imprisoned at home by state fiat might maintain respiratory function, but
it is not a life worth living over the long term
However, government responsibility is not total. Individuals have brains and must be allowed to
use them: to decide what to eat and how much to drink, whether and how to exercise, what
careers to pursue, and so forth. In matters that regard their own lives, Mill is correct: the
individual is the best judge of their own interests.
But Covid complicates the line between self-regarding and other regarding action. In normal
times, the decision to eat out is self-regarding. But if you unwittingly spread Covid to the
waitstaff, who have to be there because they need the money, your free choice costs them their
health. So some degree of restrictions on choices that used to be purely self-regarding are
warranted. Moreover, if people understand themselves as social beings, as individuals whose
well-being depends upon interactions with others, they should willingly accept some degree of
on-going limitation.

But more than personal restraint and responsibility is required. Colin Leys recent article in The
Bullet rightly argues that sound public policy and investment is needed to manage our future
with Covid. We exercise our personal responsibility as social individuals by insisting that
governments invest tax dollars appropriately. We need well-funded public education campaigns
to combat anti-vaccination nonsense. We need publicly funded elder care facilities, money to pay
for adequate staffing levels in hospitals, and for investments to ensure that public buildings like
schools and universities have up to date ventilation systems. Workers need paid sick time so that
they are not pressured to go to work sick. Mask mandates and occupancy limits are necessary
and legitimate restrictions on individual choice. They are legitimate because they enable social
life to continue by mitigating the spread of Covid. However, once those measures are in place,
social authority has done all that it can do, and people must be left to act on their own individual
assessments of risk. Some people will choose not to eat out, and that is fine. But restaurants have
to be allowed to stay open for those who are less risk averse.
We are past the point where lockdowns on all social interaction are warranted, even if, as appears
to be the case, the Delta variant can infect fully vaccinated people. It is now clear (and has been
for some time) that Covid is endemic. It will not be eradicated. Therefore, we must adapt to it
and live with it. If people are fully vaccinated, they almost never get seriously ill. As I have said
before: human beings, like all complex organisms, cannot eradicate disease. Social policies
which are premised on the goal of preventing all infections are irrational and increasingly
totalitarian. We are under no obligation to be ruled in perpetuity by a Star Chamber of
epidemiologists. We need to teach and learn together in shared public space. We have to be free
to see our friends at the time and place of our choosing. The purposes of human life are
incompatible with total security. Social risks ought to be managed and minimized by social
authority; existential risks define the framework within which human life plays out. They can be
eliminated only by eliminating that which makes life human: uncertainty, vulnerability, and
mortality. Any further calls for a complete lockdown must be resisted on the grounds of
democracy and the value of human life.
That is not to say that restrictions on individual choices are illegitimate. Vaccine mandates are
spreading and these are legitimate because they protect everyone’s health at no cost to the
vaccinated individual. Anti-vax positions are not rooted in any credible scientific evidence that
the vaccines are dangerous. I think the society-wide, legally enforced universal vaccination
would be warranted, but if governments will not force every eligible person to get vaccinated,
they had better not try to sell another lockdown should the unvaccinated start to overwhelm
ICU’s again.
We respect people’s choices by letting them suffer the consequences of their actions. If people
refuse to get vaccinated and then get seriously ill, they should not be placed at the head of the
triage line, as they were in the first 3 waves. There is a readily available alternative to the
ventilator: the vaccine. The vast majority of people who have been vaccinated (I am speaking of
my own context living in the province of Ontario) cannot be made to suffer for other people’s
stupidity. We do not close bars because people drink and drive, we charge the individual who
commits the offence with DUI. By the same reasoning, we cannot shut down the province again
because 15 % of the eligible population refuses a vaccine. If they get sick and die, they have
brought it on themselves. If we allow everyone free choice, then we also have to accept that

some choices work out badly, and the person who made the mistake has to bear the
consequences.
In any case, it should also be clear by now that lockdowns do not offer a long term solution to
Covid. What would a lockdown to slow the fourth wave accomplish other than to set up society
for the fifth wave, and the fifth wave a sixth wave, and so on? Either we choose against
lockdowns once for all (as the UK has wisely done) as nothing more than a delaying tactic and
continue to adapt so that we can live freely with Covid, or we will be in the same boat as the
unfortunate Australians who now wake up each morning to see the army positioned in their
streets to enforce their imprisonment.
It would appear that even universal vaccination of every person on the globe might not eradicate
Covid if the Delta variant can spread to and from fully vaccinated people. Therefore, the on
going obsession with case numbers has to stop. If people catch Covid but do not get seriously ill,
then there is no social interest served by counting their infection and reporting it as part of the
daily sum of cases. The only thing that matters, socially, is the number of cases that require
hospitalization. The more people are vaccinated, the fewer will end up in hospitals. Beyond that
and the other public health measures discussed above, there is nothing more that can be done.
Covid is not going to disappear so we must continue to adapt to it.

Rational Fatalism
Originally posted, 7 December, 2021
In Greek mythology, not even the Gods could control Fate (Moira). Looming just off the horizon
for mortal and God alike was a future that had to be accepted because it could not be avoided.
Oedipus knew that he would slay his father and marry his mother. He took every precaution to
avoid committing those terrible deeds. However, since it was his fate to commit them, every step
he took led straight to his doing that which he was trying to avoid.
Natural science has banished gods from the heavens. The stars are fusion reactors, the
constellations fantasy projections of over-active human imaginations. Fate is a superstition. The
future unfolds on the basis of past actions; there is no preset outcome towards which we are
inexorably drawn. The more we understand the universe, the more we are able to control it; the
more our fate, we might say, is in our own hands.
Yet, despite the obvious explanatory power of natural science and the productive power of the
technology it has helped create, human beings are still subject to the play of forces beyond our
complete understanding and control. This month marks the second anniversary and the beginning
of the third year of the Covid pandemic. There are no signs that it is abating, under control, or
about to disappear. All the evidence suggests that it will join the pantheon of pathogens with
which we have to share space on the planet.
Is there not a lesson here that a rational fatalism can help us understand? On the surface, reason
and fatalism are opposed, but fatalism does not have to involve belief in supernatural forces.
While our future might not be steered by a personified Fate, it might nevertheless be shaped by a
set of causes too complex to ever be fully understood or controlled. We should keep trying to
understand them, but we would be guilty of the same hubris that undoes the tragic heroes of
ancient myths if we think we can ever fully master them.
That does not mean that we should pluck out our eyes in despair at our powerlessness over the
future, as Oedipus did. It means that we must cultivate some humility in the face of the awesome
complexity of the causes that shape our future. Our technology enables us to do much, but it does
not enable us to do everything. What remains is a zone of receptivity in which we must learn to
accept that some problems are intractable and must be borne rather than overcome.
The Covid pandemic has been humbling. A strand of RNA blowing in the wind brought the
global economy to a near stand still. It has killed 5 million people and infected more than 250
million. In response, governments have imposed a cycle of lockdowns and travel restrictions
which continue in different forms and different intensities to this day. Every time a restriction is
imposed it always comes with the same promise: once we flatten the curve, life can return to
normal.

Then, about a year ago, a new front opened in the war: vaccines. Their rapid creation seemed a
scientific master stroke, the silver bullet that we needed to slay the werewolf of Covid once for
all. The mantra shifted from “stay home to flatten the curve” to “get vaccinated in bring this to
an end.” But it has not ended. While vaccine hesitancy has been high in some areas, even in
countries with nearly universal vaccination rates like Israel, immunity waned and the virus has
started to spread again. Not only has it spread, it has mutated. No one knows yet how severe
Omicron will be, but Delta has certainly been bad enough.
Governments have returned to the lockdown playbook. But people are increasingly reaching the
limits of their endurance. Riots have spread from Australia, to Guadaloupe, to Belgium and the
Netherlands. People have had enough. No one but lunatics think that the virus is not real and in
some cases (but not many, 1.89 %) deadly. But the protesters are correct: two years in, freedom
of social interaction must now become the priority. We should get vaccinated, we should wear
masks, we should invest in better ventilation and look for treatments. But we should not
lockdown again.
The reality is clear: we have to adapt, because Covid will become endemic. Endemic: part of our
lives. But life is not just breathing and metabolizing glucose, it is activity and experience. In
order to be meaningful and worth living, life requires free social interaction and relationship.
Rational fatalism is rational because it is rooted in the scientific conclusion that the causal nexus
from which the future develops is too complex to be fully mastered. It is fatalistic because it
concludes that since the future can never be mastered, we must accept that which comes. That
which comes will involve suffering and death. Such is the ultimate fate of all people. Like Greek
heroes, we have to develop the strength of character to bear reality. Only children believe that
every story has a happy ending.
The rulers justify their increasingly militarized response to protest movements against lockdowns
by claiming that if we give “the science” (notice how it is always personified, rather like “Moira”
in ancient myths) just a little more time, it will tame Covid. But it has been two full years and the
virus continues to spread and evolve. By all means, researchers should continue to research,
vaccines should be distributed equally across the world, boosters should be boosted, and masks
worn indoors. But let us also be blunt: The virus is here to stay for the foreseeable future, and
some people will die from it.
It is time to give up the language of heroic battle. It is time to put an end to totalitarian
lockdowns and other repressive measures. It is time to live with our fate: Covid will infect
people and some will die, just as other pathogens have infected people for tens of thousands of
years and will do so for as long as humans are biological organisms.
Mechanical biological functions, respiration and metabolism, do not make life worth living. Each
wave of the virus has been met with the same response: lockdown social life, but force people to
keep working. The left has been very good at demanding welfare measures to support those who
lost their jobs and new protections for essential workers. But Marxists and social democrats alike
have completely dropped the ball on the deeper issue: the state does not cease to be a repressive
apparatus just because it invokes a public health emergency to justify its repressive measures.

Too many on the left have fallen too much in love with lockdowns and the state power that
enforce them.
Lockdowns were initially defensible on grounds of necessity. However, emergencies cannot last
into an indefinite future. Vaccines might not prevent all spread, but the evidence suggests that
they do prevent serious disease in most cases. Vaccine mandates can therefore be justified, but
further repressive measures must be met with politically coherent, organized resistance.
Humans will always get sick. That is the fate that we must rationally accept at this point in the
pandemic.
It is time to say “enough!” No more extraordinary measures. No more lockdowns. No more Star
Chambers of unelected “experts” deciding what grown adults are allowed and not allowed to do.
During the AIDS crisis (which killed at a far higher rate than the 1.89% of Covid sufferers who
succumb), the individual’s right to have sex was not suspended. Public health authorities backed
by armed police and the military did not legally mandate locks on peoples’ zippers. AIDS
patients were treated horribly and homophobia was rampant, but the public health response was
to recommend condom use, not a global ban on fun. The majority of people used their own
brains and started practicing safe sex.
One might rejoin: but Covid spreads more easily than HIV. Plus, there are a lot of irrational
people who refuse to take the necessary precautions. The first point is true, but the evidence
suggests that mask wearing is Covid’s condom. Pass and enforce laws requiring masks indoors.
What about the vaccine hesitant? Pass vaccine mandates and enforce them. But beyond indoor
mask mandates and the wide diffusion of vaccines, the time has come for the state to withdraw
from the living rooms, bars, restaurants, and churches of the nation.
Absent free human interaction and open experience in shared spaces, life is not worth living.
That principle must be the basis of intelligent adaptation to life with Covid.

What’s Wrong With Giving Up?
Originally posted, 21 January, 2022
I am not the biggest Monty Python fan, but some performances prove impossible to forget. One
such skit is the Black Knight, who keeps fighting until he has been completely dismembered by
his opponent. We might say he did not know when to quit.
Those who continue to insist on the need for strict Covid restrictions are our world’s Black
Knight. If the goal was to eradicate Covid, then the strategy has been chopped to bits. The virus
has mutated, evaded vaccines, and cropped up even in those countries like China which have
imposed the strictest lockdowns. Australia, which, after China, probably instituted the longest
lasting and tightest lockdowns in the world now finds itself facing record case counts following
the relaxation of restrictions.
I am sure that there are some scientists in Australia who are arguing today that the relaxation
came too soon, especially in light of the higher transmissibility of the Omicron variant and that
the soaring case counts make the prior sacrifices all for naught. On the other hand, one might
argue in retrospect that the lockdown strategy was doomed from the start and that what we
should have done was focus our energies on the most vulnerable, wear masks, but otherwise
carry on.
However, the past is only important relative to the future. We can learn from it, but there is no
point arguing about should have been done in a moment now behind us.
The justification of the strict lockdowns everywhere, at least initially, was that they were
necessary to eradicate the virus. The virus, however, has proven ineradicable. Short of the
impossible: a true global lockdown of every person on the planet for an indefinite period of time,
Covid seems destined to crop up for the foreseeable future.
Hence the time has come to give up. To stop clanging our swords with Covid. To learn from the
Black Knight’s struggles in vain against a superior opponent. To save a limb or two of social
sanity. The main public danger that Covid now poses is to public mental health. Too many
people are preventing themselves from returning to pre-Covid life because of largely groundless
fears of contracting the virus. Leading epidemiologists have argued that the heightened virulence
combined with the weakened severity of Omicron means that most people will likely contractand almost certainly survive- Omicron.
From a rational perspective, there is no point trying to avoid the inevitable– or to fear it, for that
matter. In addition to vaccines and new treatments, the world also needs a dose of rational
therapy: give up the illusion that Covid can be eradicated, give up the illusion that no one will
die from it, remind ourselves that, as the sanitarium director in Thomas Mann’s The Magic

Mountain said in an unforgettable passage: “we come from the dark, and we go into the dark
again, and in between lies the experiences of our lives.” The good of life lies in the quality and
range of these experiences. Those who want to willingly deprive themselves of experiences for
fear of Covid should by all means be allowed to continue to destroy their lives. They must, by
the same token, be prevented from dictating policies that ruin mine (and yours).
The public responsibilities of social self-conscious agents do not include personal guarantees,
redeemable by every other individual, that they will refrain from ordinary and necessary
activities: working, socializing, entering pubic facilities, that might inadvertently cause others
harm. The lockdown and gathering restrictions that were defensible during the first two years of
the pandemic are no longer justified. I would argue that people have a duty to get vaccinated, to
wear masks, to stand six feet away from others. But we also have a duty to accept the normal
risks of living life as an organism subject to pathogenic invasion. Covid, like all other diseases to
which we are subject, is going to continue to circulate, infect some people, and kill some of
them. As Freddy DeBoer asked in an excellent recent essay, beyond vaccinations, mask wearing,
social distancing, what more can we possibly and reasonably do to control Covid?
The eccentric and brilliant French philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis argues somewhere that
secular-scientific societies did not so much give up belief in God as transfer the fantasy that an
omnipotent saviour god floats above us, looking out for our well-being, to the fantasy of an
omnipotent saviour technology. But just as the imagined god always failed to stop calamity, so
too technologies fail to resolve the ultimate existential-ethical problems of human life.
After the goal of eradicating Covid became largely abandoned, the justification for renewed
lockdowns became that they were necessary to give people time to get vaccinated. In the Global
North, mass vaccination campaigns were rolled out with impressive logistical sophistication. I
was never a fan of state-imposed house arrest (which is what lockdowns essentially are) but I
agreed that they were justified the first two times that they were enacted. The vaccines,
unfortunately, proved to be less effective than originally hoped. The protection they offered
against the Alpha, Beta, and Delta variants rapidly waned and they are hardly effective at all
against the transmission of Omicron.
Hence, our hope that vaccines would free us from the curse of Covid was dashed.
However, the vaccines have proved efficacious against serious disease. Science has not and will
not eradicate Covid, but it has, in the words of Devi Sridhar, Chair of the Department of Global
Public Health at the University of Edinburgh, “defanged it” through a combination of vaccines,
emerging treatments, and mitigation measures like indoor masking.
The problem now is lingering irrational fears about a virus that is deadly to the elderly and those
with pre-existing conditions but not to the general population. When I say it is time to give up, I
do not mean it is time to do absolutely nothing to mitigate spread, but time to give up restrictions
on public life and the irrational motivations that keep them in place in some areas. No one has to
go to a bar, restaurant, theatre, or gallery. Those who do not feel comfortable in those venues
should not attend. But their reticence can no longer be the norm. The rest of us cannot be ruled
any longer by others’ unreasonable fears.

As Dr. Sridhar argues:
“This is part of a larger question about how much we continue to alter what “normal” social
relations are, given the circulation of Sars-CoV-2. Humans are social: we need to hug, dance,
sing and recognize each other’s faces and smiles. A sense of community and connection are vital
to wellbeing too. Public health is not about one disease; it is broadly about wellbeing, which
includes mental health and being able to pay the rent, feed your family, stay warm through
winter and have a meaningful role in society.
Slowing the spread of Sars-CoV-2, even stopping it completely in certain countries, helped save
lives. It allowed two transformative antiviral pills to be made available. It allowed doctors to
develop better ways of treating patients, and to understand what we’re facing. It allowed a better
understanding of transmission and risk.
But now, two years into this pandemic, we need to find a better way of living alongside SarsCoV-2 using the tools we have. We have created ways to minimize the impact of Covid-19. And
now is the time to start to recover and heal as a society and move forward, treating this virus like
we do other infectious disease threats.”
I have been making the same sort of argument, from a philosophical and not scientific
perspective, for over a year. We cannot have a society worth living in if both broad sections of
the public and politicians continue to panic every time there is a Covid outbreak. Neither our
absent gods nor our impressive but limited technological-medical powers can save us from
becoming ill– if not of Covid, of something else. Choosing life means choosing living, and all
living comes with risk.
The aggregated mortality rate of Covid-19 in Canada since the beginning of the pandemic is
approximately 1.3% (31 837 deaths out of 2 822 614 total cases). If one were to disaggregate the
deaths according to age and co-morbidities, the death rate for healthy children, adolescents, and
adults would shrink to insignificance.
And yet there are still members of the general public and some scientists and politicians who are
acting as though Covid is the Black Plague.
It is not, and it is now time to stop acting as if it is going to kill everyone.
It will not.
Choose living.

Critique, Don’t Cancel!
Originally posted 12 October, 2021

Once again, I feel the need to intervene on recent controversies in which the repressive and
regressive tactics of self-styled progressive activists are placing them on the wrong side of
history and in the service of a constricted, suffocating vision of an emancipated future. The
(strangely, perhaps) intertwined controversies engulfing Sussex University Philosophy Professor
Kathleen Stock and superstar comedian Dave Chappelle emphasize the need for progressive
activists to re-learn the political history of censorship and to re-embrace a spirit of comradely
critique, and eschew once for all reactionary-totalitarian cancel culture.
Historically, totalitarian movements have been the ones to demand complete unity of opinion and
expression. They know full well that such a goal is impossible to achieve, so they have exiled,
imprisoned, tortured, and murdered dissidents. That is the primary reason why freedom of
thought and speech is a non-negotiable left-wing demand. The left has had its flirtations with
maniacal group-think- The Cultural Revolution in China perhaps being the most extreme
example. And while the treatment of Stock has not yet reached those levels, the walls do seem to
be closing in on her.
This morning I was forced to read a shockingly backward intervention from her own Union local
which calls upon the University to uphold its commitments to create safe spaces for trans people,
while failing utterly to defend their own member from organized anonymous threats from the
self-identified trans activists demanding her dismissal. This letter is the most shameful
abdication of responsibility to protect a member’s academic freedom that I have ever read. It
explicitly criticizes the Vice-Chancellor’s defence of Stock’s academic freedom. The letter
argues that there should be no contradiction between trans rights and academic freedom– and
there should not be. But there very definitely is a contradiction between academic freedom and
the way Stock is being treating by the anonymous mob of trans activists threatening her, and the
union is doing nothing to protect her.
The letter tepidly adds that they do not think Stock should be fired, but its whole thrust is to reiterate the false accusations that she is some sort of dangerous transphobe upon which the
demands for her dismissal are being based. The letter is the most shameful pandering imaginable
to an anonymous mob which refuses to argue and instead begs the established powers to fire a
worker– and then presents themselves as an alternative to established power!
Alisdair MacIntyre joked, in his book on Marcuse, that the 1960s student rebellions in the United
States were the world’s first parent-financed revolution. Today we have the even more absurd
spectacle of self-styled radicals asking the bosses to advance the cause of social freedom. And
the Union is on board!
The members should remove this leadership immediately. They have shown themselves
unwilling and incapable of fulfilling the basic duty of officers of a union to defend the members
If Stock is unsafe then no one is safe. Those who have read her book will understand that she is

not transphobic and does not demand that anyone be erased from history. She disagrees with
some political demands made by some sectors of the trans movement because she argues– as is
obvious– that females have faced unique forms of oppression as females (hello Texas attacks on
abortion). Since there are female specific problems there is still a need still a need for
organization and mobilization as females. None of these arguments have any negative bearing on
the rights and interests of trans people.
If some sectors of the trans movement nevertheless believe that Stock’s argument is wrong and
harmful, then they should by all means make that case loudly, but through counter-argument, not
reactionary demands for the bosses to fire her. Academic freedom is not the right of academics to
say anything they want. It is a collective right to conjointly search for the truth through the
process of dialogue and constructive disagreement. There can be no prior constraint (much less
politically correct pre-determination) on what is true or false, but only a commitment to advance
the search through reason and evidence. Where good faith arguments are offered- and Stock’s is
obviously a good faith argument- good faith criticisms must be offered in return.
Stock’s accusers have failed in their duty as students and academics to constructively engage the
issues that she raises in favour of childish name calling and threats. If she is wrong, prove her
wrong: she is a philosopher, and an English one at that, so she will be well used to people having
an hard argumentative go at her. But to align one’s self with the bosses power to dismiss is as
backward a move for the left as can be imagined. If you don’t like disagreement join a cult or a
fundamentalist religious movement. Otherwise, make a better case than your opponent or
concede the point.
The Chappelle controversy is less serious in so far as he is in no danger of losing his livelihood.
But the same political problem and the same political solution is at its heart. I am a fan of
Chappelle and I laughed long and hard at The Closer. I was certainly made uncomfortable by
some of the jokes (especially the jokes that cut to the heart of white racism– I don’t think I am a
racist, but I am part of a white world that is, and none expose that tension better than Chappelle).
Chappelle’s shtick is to telegraph that something outrageous is coming, pause a moment, just
long enough for the audience to think that he is going to back off, and then hit a punch line is
even more outrageous than the audience expected.
Not everyone finds it funny. Some find it hurtful. But we cannot ban artistic expression just
because some find it hurtful. There would be no art left. Do we ban the Bible because some Jews
see in it divine sanction to expel Palestinians? Do we burn the Gospels because some Christians
have misinterpreted its message to justify violence against non-Christians? Do we put the
Dharmapada on the Index because some Sinhalese interpret Buddhism in a way that justifies
their war against Tamils? Do we knock down the pyramids of Teotihuacan because virgins were
thrown off of them in acts of ritual sacrifice. On and on and on we could go.
Humour does not cause violence, just as heavy metal music did not cause America’s teenagers to
become suicidal or murderous satanists, as Tipper Gore and other backward church ladies argued
in the 1980s.
Enough!

If you do not like Chappelle’s humour, criticize it, as those who disagree with Stock should
criticize her. The trans comedian Dahlia Belle did just that in a recent piece in The Guardian. It
is a model for how people– academics, artists, people on the street– should deal with
disagreement: expose the problems with the other person’s position and demand (and provide)
better. Belle understands that the progress of any art depends upon criticism. She takes Chappelle
to task for telling weak jokes. Whether one agrees with her or not, the point is, that coherent
agreement and disagreement is possible, because she makes an argument, which is more–
shamefully- that can be said for the executive committee of the University and Colleges Union at
Sussex University.
The struggle against oppression is complex and people will disagree about strategy and tactics.
But the struggle against it is for the sake of a free world, a world where differences proliferate
and people get along. But getting along does not mean that we all agree, or even like each other.
It means that we do not kill each other because we are different. Philosophy and comedy
challenge and provoke, but killing begins where they end. Leave the re-education camps to the
fascists, please.

Fragments for a Wednesday Morning in
January
Originally posted, 5 January, 2022
Academic Freedom Under Threat Again?
News is slowly trickling out of Alberta that Associate Professor Frances Widdowson has been
fired by Mount Royal University. According to the President of the University, Widdowson was
fired for creating a “toxic work environment.” However, there is serious concern that
Widdowson was fired because of her long standing and vocal criticisms of Indigenous
governance, political movements, and Indigenization policies at Mount Royal and across
Canada. I have not read her work (only the controversies that it has generated) and have seen no
detailed account of the precise details that led to her dismissal, so I will keep my comments
general.
I know from over twenty years of work in my Faculty Association, including a two year term as
President and two years on the grievance committee, that often there is more to dismissals that
meets the eye and people are wise to withhold drawing firm conclusions until all the facts have
been publicly released. The Mount Royal Faculty Association has grieved the termination (which
is a vast improvement from the performance of the Universities and Colleges Union in the UK
regarding the harassment of Prof. Kathleen Stock). However, the fact that the parties are in
arbitration means that there is a paucity of information. I have not heard anything specific from
the Canadian Association of University Teachers. CAUT was born in order to defend academic
freedom and has consistently stood up to protect it. I have confidence that if there are academic
freedom issues here, CAUT will mount the appropriate critical response.
While awaiting the details we should keep in mind why academic freedom is indispensable to
universities, and why “toxic workplace” programs are a serious threat to workers of all sorts. Let
us treat the last problem first.
People have different personalities. People have different political beliefs. Not only do we not
love one another (sorry Jesus) we do not like everyone, and not everyone likes us. Social life and
social institutions have to allow for people who may not like each other, who may actively
dislike each other, to work together. The only legitimate grounds for dismissal should be nonperformance of duties over a sustained period and backed by objective evidence. People are not
paid to harass and harangue their colleagues, so a pattern of vituperative abuse of colleagues that
prevents them from doing their job can be grounds for termination. But vague terms like “toxic
work place environment” and testimony that focuses on nothing more than peoples feelings give
bosses too much power and expose all workers to the danger that they will be the victims of
mobbing, organized slander, and scheming to have them fired. Unions do a profound disservice

to their members when they allow parallel disciplinary procedures outside of the Collective
Agreement to take root.
Everyone is beautiful to themselves and their mom. But everyone is also an asshole to someone
else. Ask not, therefore, for whom the toxic workplace bell tolls. Someone, somewhere, is tolling
it for you.
If there is an academic freedom issue in play (and it is hard to imagine that there is not) an
appropriate response has to start from a clear understanding of the purpose and value of
academic freedom. Too often academic freedom is treated as being identical to free speech, and
academic freedom cases evaluated in terms of whether or not the speech in question should be
protected. But academic freedom is not identical to free speech. It is a collective institutional
right of academics to teach and pursue and publish research without deference to any religious,
cultural, disciplinary, administrative, or political authority of any sort. Quite simply, universities
cannot exist without academic freedom.
Universities are not transmission belts for traditions and orthodoxies of any kind save the
traditions of intellectual inquiry in all fields of human experience and knowledge. Because
human beings are not omniscient, our knowledge develops historically, through trial and error
and argument. There can be no growth of knowledge without argument and no argument without
disagreement, sometimes very sharp disagreement, and over fundamental issues. For centuries
universities were transmission belts for religious orthodoxy. Intellectuals who insisted on
freedom of inquiry were burned alive, as Giordano Bruno was burned alive in 1600, or exiled
from their community, as Spinoza was expelled from the Jewish community of Amsterdam. And
it was not only outliers who were in danger. St. Thomas Aquinas was accused of heresy, but in
his case, the charges did not stick. The line between public immolation and canonization is very,
very thin.
No one knows the whole truth. No position is so pure that there can be no grounds for criticism.
Aristotelian physics ruled the Arabic and Christian worlds for a millennium and it was, as
physical science, totally and utterly wrong. Knowledge can only grow and develop if there is
absolute freedom of inquiry, argument, and criticism.
But inquiry, argument, and criticism is not “speech.” Speech is the genus, academic freedom–
inquiry, argument, and criticism- is the species. Academic freedom protects the rights of
academics to melt down all sacred cows, but it does not confer an absolute right to say anything
anyone feels like saying. It protects even the most controversial scholarship provided that
appropriate methods of evidence and argument are demonstrably followed. There can be no
confession of faith, literally or figuratively, required of academics. If colleagues and students do
not like controversial conclusions, they are free to argue against them, in both scholarly and
public fora. But mass petition campaigns to have academics fired or attempts to boycott
academic presses who publish controversial work – as has happened in the case of Widdowsonare unacceptable violations of academic freedom which will destroy the university institution if
they are allowed to succeed.

And the politically virtuous amongst us should keep in mind that attacks on academic freedom
are more often than not directed against the left by the right. We need look no further than
legislative bans across the US South on the teaching of critical race theory to see the ill effects of
mixing self-righteousness and learning. If you do not like your beliefs being challenged,
academia is not for you: start a podcast and talk to your friends. The life of the mind is a life of
intellectual conflict.
Not You Again!
I awaken to what this morning? Not a lockdown, exactly: Ontarians are still free to leave our
homes, thanks be to God (er, the Ontario Science Advisory Council), but more restrictions (piled
on top of the earlier round of restrictions imposed just before Christmas), one year after a full
lockdown, which itself followed about one year after the first lockdown). Are we sensing a trend
here? I won’t repeat the various arguments (and kvetching) that I have made before, but surely I
cannot be the only person bothered by that fact that as we move into the third year of Covid, we
are still pursuing an essentially reactive policy. I do not mean that we should be able to anticipate
mutations: all life involves reactions to unforeseen particularities. I mean that we should have
been working on ways to mobilize more medical and hospital resources so that when a wave
crashes down upon us, we do not need to frantically shut everything down.
There is no such thing as a medical emergency that goes on for three years. Crises that go on for
three years are social, not epidemiological. After three decades of underfunding our public health
care system was woefully unprepared for the pandemic, and nothing has been done to expand
capacity more than two years into the pandemic. Hence with each wave the best the scientific
advisory panel can do is to sell the need for a new round of restrictions on public life. Once
again, the restrictions primarily target institutions and spaces where people gather to enjoy life
and celebrate the powers and riches of human creativity: private homes, bars and restaurants,
performance spaces, theatres, galleries. Perhaps if we ask kindly and promise to keep walking
around the living room the scientist-priests will permit us to have 6 people in our homes rather
than five. After all, their superior intelligence has decided that it is ok for thousands of people to
keep wandering around malls.
This Could Be the Last Time.
The latest wave of the pandemic has been met in Canada with typical passive aggressiveness. In
the US, it has been met with typical schizophrenia: half the country simply carries on as if Covid
does not exist, the other half tries more sober and sane mitigation strategies. The result: over one
million cases on Tuesday, January 4th.
Wow.
Clearly, social life cannot just carry on as if Covid did not exist. However, slowly, finally, new
thinking is beginning to emerge amongst infectious disease experts. Since Covid is unlikely to
disappear, we must learn to live with it. The accordion song of lockdown and open up must end.
This tune has not lulled Covid to sleep and won’t in the future.

Social life cannot be devoted solely to the protection of biological functioning. Biological
functioning is the precondition of leading lives worth living, not worthwhile living itself. The
value of life is realized in the content of experience and activity. Societies have to invest in
institutions and resources that ensure health, but health is only one dimension of valuable lives.
Ask yourself if you would agree to be born into the following scenario: Immediately post partum
you are connected to monitoring devices and nutrient input systems. Every internal system is
regulated to ensure optimum nutrient levels and chemical balances are maintained. Lest any
accident befall you, you never leave the hospital bed but spend your days living in the total
security of constant monitoring. You never break a bone, you never get into a car accident, you
never get sick. Let us say that you can live three hundred years in this environment. Would you
accept it?
Who would accept a life without thought, language, touch, laughter, music, art, exploration, or
challenge of any sort? All risk would be eliminated, but at the cost of all living. We have reached
the point where living in three dimensions must resume. It must resume with precautions and
reasonable adjustments, but we have to start eating, drinking, creating, and learning together
once again. If you are frightened of Covid, then just meditate on the thought experiment above.
No one would desire total total security if they thought through clearly what it would actually
entail.
As Hank Williams once sang, “No matter how I struggle and strive, I’ll never get out of this
world alive.”
Being born is also a death sentence. Let us struggle and strive to mitigate Covid, but it is here
and not going anywhere. We have no choice but to live with it.
Concluding Scientific Post-script.
No one would should take medical advice from a philosopher (and I mean that seriously). So
take it from medical doctors.
Let’s begin with Dr. Anthony Fauci. He replied to criticisms of the updated CDC isolation
requirements by reminding Chicken Little critics that whether they like it or not, living involves
risks.
“So you either shut down the society, which no one wants to do, or you try and get a situation
where you can safely get people back, particularly to critical jobs, without having them be out for
a full 10 days, so long as they are without symptoms.” He went on: “I think what people need to
understand — there is risk in everything when it comes to SARS-CoV-2. That’s just the reality.
Some people think if you do this, there is no risk. There’s a risk to everything.”
Former CDC director Dr. Robert Redfield recently made essentially the same argument:

“This virus will be with us for the duration. We have to learn how to live with it… I’ve always
felt that we need to look at situations and see how to do them in a safe and responsible way,” he
said.
“As CDC director, I never advocated shutting down schools. It wasn’t in the interest of the kids
K-12. We have to learn how to keep them open in a safe and responsible way. That’s the way I
feel now. One of the things we can do is expanded access to testing.”
Let us hope governments, teachers, and university administrators get the message: education
requires real time and space social interaction; it is social interaction.
I will leave the last word to Dr. Andrew Pollard, chair of the Oxford Vaccine Group that created
that AstraZeneca vaccine:
“We can’t vaccinate the planet every six months. … The worst is behind us and the world just
needs to get through the winter … At some point, society has to open up. … When we do open,
there will be a period with a bump in infections, which is why winter is probably not the best
time.
That which one cannot change one must endure (so said the cowboy in Brokeback Mountain).
We cannot change the reality of Covid; I cannot change the reality of these latest restrictions.
But this has to be the last time living and learning spaces are closed down.

Social Democracy Meets Capitalist Reality
Originally posted, 9 October 2021
The contradictions in the contemporary Democratic Party are percolating to the surface during
the debate over the Build Back Better Act. Biden’s tepid by comparison infrastructure bill is
being held up by the social democratic wing of the party that has coalesced around Bernie
Sanders but whose most articulate spokespeople are Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib,
Ilhan Omar, Cori Busch, and Pramila Jayapal. They have already started down Nancy Pelosi and
the democratic establishment, wisely preventing separate votes on the infrastructure and Sanders’
bills. They know that if they pass the first, Sanders’ bill is doomed. Standing in the way of the
passage of Sanders’ bill is a united Republican Party and two right wing democratic senators, Joe
Manchin and Kristen Sinema. Mainstream journalists love to track the day to day of political
intrigue, but understanding the conflict demands that we dig beneath the drama to the social
forces at work.
There is a naive view of public policy that sees it as a dispassionate, technocratic response to
social problems. There is a partisan view that sees it as an arena of competition between different
political parties vying for votes and power. The truth is more comprehensive. There is a
technocratic element to public policy and the partisan dimension is obvious, but both play out
within a framework of social structures and forces. Those structures and forces determine how
problems are framed and defined and they also limit the range of options possible under the
given set of structures and forces. The total set of possible solutions to a given problem is not
mechanically determined by the existing structures and forces, but some solutions are only
possible if the structures and forces are themselves changed. In order to understand conflicts
such as the one playing out within the Democratic Party, we need to understand what sorts of
constraints capitalist structures and forces put on public policy.
The basic structure of capitalist society is defined by private ownership of universally needed
life-resources, competitive markets for labour and raw materials, competition between producers
and retailers over relative market share, locally, nationally, and internationally, and a sovereign
state with authority to determine the legal and policy frameworks within which competition takes
place. Since the function of the state is to ensure social reproduction, and the capitalist form of
social reproduction demands that firms are profitable, the general tendency of state policy is to
satisfy the demands of business for laws and regulations that maximise their profitability.
But there are countervailing tendencies at work in states with liberal democratic political
systems. Firms make profits by exploiting labour (paying less in wages than the value of the
goods that labour produces). Since firms compete with each other for market share, each faces
pressure to produce more efficiently than the others (to produce more value in the same amount
of time). Hence there has been a tendency (slowing recently) towards increasing the productivity
of labour,. As labour productivity increases, the size of the surplus that different social groups
can fight over becomes larger.

Imagine a simple example. In society 1, labour produces 10 dollars of value for every one dollar
expended on it. In society 2, labour produces 100 dollars of value for every dollar spent. In a
capitalist society, the ruling class, which owns the means of production and purchases labour
power will struggle to appropriate all 9 or 99 dollars for themselves. Workers, who depend upon
wages for their means of life, will be motivated to re-appropriate as much of that 9 or 99 dollars
for themselves as possible. In liberal democratic societies, where different social interests and
forces are able to elect political representatives, the state becomes a new site of struggle over the
social surplus. The more that there is to fight over, the more important state power becomes.
Since states have the right to tax, they have the power to redistribute income from capital to
labour, or protect capital from workers’ struggles, (in actual conditions, they do both, depending
on the relative strength of the opposed forces). What is playing out in the United States today is
thus not first and foremost a struggle between the right and left of the Democratic Party, or even
a struggle between the Democrats and Republicans, it is a struggle over the surplus generated by
the exploitation of labour playing out in the political arena.
Why are these structural considerations important? I do not mean to suggest, as some dogmatic
socialists might, that the struggle to reform capitalism is pointless because of the constraints that
private ownership of the means of production, competition, and market forces generate. Those
constraints are real, but they are not mechanical determinations on what is possible. Reforms that
re-appropriate resources, channelling them from profits to public spending, both improve peoples
lives in the short term, and can also open up future possibilities for deeper structural changes
which might have appeared impossible before that reform was achieved. In 1790, legal trade
unions seemed to be an impossible goal because the full weight of ruling class and state power
was set against their organization. Political persistence eventually changed the law, unions were
formed, and over the next century succeeded not only in raising real wages (a feat that most
classical political economists regarded as structurally impossible) but also helped democratize
the work place, by giving the collective of workers some say in the organization of production
(via collective bargaining).
But the history of trade unions also reveals why it is important to understand the pressure that
structural constraints exert against reformist policies. So long as there are classes there will be
class struggle. So long as there is class struggle there will be push back against reforms which,
from the capitalist perspective, stray too far into their ownership and control of life-enabling
resources and the profits that accrue to them through the exploitation of labour. The structural
constraints that I referred to above are not a mechanical-physical force, they are defined,
ultimately, by the class interests of the capitalists. Where labour productivity and profits are
high, capitalists are wiling to allow some re-distribution through taxation, both for the sake of
dampening workers opposition and because they too drive on roads, flush their toilets, and turn
on the lights. These public goods must be paid for, and taxation is the source of the state
revenues which pay for public utilities.
But when profits are threatened capitalists will push back: not because they are greedy (although
they might be) but because they will go out of business if they cannot turn a profit. Thus
structural constraint and class interest coincide: capitalists push back because their businesses are
threatened, but their businesses are threatened because profitability is a condition of survival in
capitalist society.

That which applies economically also applies politically: where there are opposed class interests,
these will be represented in the political arena. The United States is unique in the western world
for not having had an active mass workers’ party for most of the twentieth century. Since the end
of the Great Depression and the New Deal, the Democrats have positioned themselves as the
party of working Americans, but they were not and still are not a social democratic party in the
European mold. European social democratic parties, for all of their problems, were originally the
political expression of the workers’ movement: mass parties whose membership was
overwhelmingly working class and which fought for reforms which (so their main theorist,
Eduard Bernstein hoped) would generate an evolutionary dynamic that would lead to socialism.
The absence of a social democratic party for most of the twentieth century has generated an
amusing historical irony: while workers everywhere else have become disillusioned with social
democratic parties because of their repeated betrayals, America is the only place where social
democratic ideals are generating excitement, because there has been no party to fail to live up to
promises.
Sanders’ two primary runs brought a much needed jolt of creative youthful energy into the
Democratic Party, but also a certain naivete about the party’s history and class allegiances. As is
now par for the source with today’s left, Manchin and Sinema are subject to abstract, moralistic
critique for their positions, but the structural forces that underlie their opposition are ignored. If
Manchin and Sinema were not opposed to the Build Back Better bill, someone else would be.
And even if there were no political opposition, capital would be opposed, and it is never without
the power to fight back. Capitalists are under no obligation to invest in one place rather than
another, or invest in the real economy rather than speculate on exotic financial instruments, or
invest at all (Venezuela was largely undone by a capital strike in which businesses refused to
invest which, combined with sanctions, led to shortages and hyper inflation). Progressive
Democrats need to worry about those sorts of responses more than Manchin and Sinema,
because the long term future of their movement will depend upon showing tangible results to
working people.
The weakness of any reform movement that does not address the underlying source of social
power of capital is that it leaves its opponents alive to fight another day. If the Republicans seize
control of the House and Senate next year, then they can repeal those features of the act that they
find most contrary to the spirit of capitalist enterprise. The only way that reforms can be secured
long term, short of revolution, is to make them so popular that no party who promises to repeal
them can be elected. Public health care in Canada and the UK is an example. Despite repeated
electoral victories of right wing parties, none dare dismantle public health care (although they do
cut here and there and fail to invest adequately). None dare because they know that they would
be unelectable if they vowed to eliminate public health care in favour of a re-privatised system.
Obamacare has survived for analogous reasons in the US: despite its limitations and flaws, it
works for the tens of millions of people that it helped insure.
However, in order to enter into the public mind as a good no longer open for negotiation or
repeal, a policy must be first enacted. Progressive forces in the Democratic Party have to push a
maximalist line up to the point where the choice is compromise or failure. To come away from
this conflict with nothing would be fatal to their cause, because they will be painted as
ideologues who cannot get anything done. The choice at this point in time is not between reform

or revolution but between reform or no reform. It is easy to overplay one’s hand but much more
difficult to raise the political capital to sit down at the table again. They need to expend their
energies building mass support for the policies in the bill, not engaging in social media stunts
that get clicks but do not build a movement.

Freedom, Determinism, and the Persistence
of Unreason
Originally posted, 11 July, 2021
I read an article last week that posed the problem of how to assess the relative weight of
objective as opposed to subjective factors in the determination of individual action. The article
focused on the Black conservative interpretation of the role of character and culture in the
persistence of racism. The article is worth reading for the political insights it offers, but what
struck me was the clear way it posed what I regard as the problem of social philosophy: do
external, objective dynamics determine individual behaviour, or are we self-determining? Unless
we can answer that philosophical-scientific question it seems impossible to settle the practical
matter of knowing when individuals are the cause of their decisions (and therefore blameable)
Those who know my work might be surprised that I would pose this problem as a question, since
form the very beginning of my career I have examined historical events as the product of
individuals being brought together by objective circumstances but deciding to respond to them in
one way rather than another. That is, I have followed Hegel and Marx and argued that individual
(and collective) action is a product of a reciprocal or dialectical interaction between objective
(structural and dynamic) conditions and subjective (interpretative, evaluative) assessments.
The article made me wonder about whether the dialectical synthesis actually explains anything,
or just provides a description that seems to cohere with experience but leaves the deepest
scientific and philosophical problems unresolved. Let me explain by examining the two poles
that the Hegelian-Marxist approach attempts to reconcile. On the one hand, human beings are
organisms that exist within nature and are subject to the same causal forces as impact every
material being. Our brains no less than our arms and legs are material systems and their
functioning therefore cannot escape the laws that govern the behaviour of all material systems.
Think of how much of our life depends upon quote general physical conditions: (blood) pressure,
heat, hydration.
Everyone (who is not completely irrational) will admit that this claim is true as regards the
general parameters within which human life unfolds. I have yet to meet a skeptic about the
reality of human organic needs willing to put a bullet in their head to prove that all needs are
socially constructed. Yet, despite the hourly proof that our technologies provide that the natural
scientific account of the basic elements and forces of the world is an accurate (although
incomplete) account of how they function, the belief persists, and not only amongst the religious,
that human beings are both acted upon by to those forces and nevertheless ultimately free to
choose how they act. In this view, freedom is not simply the power to add to the causal factors
that determine action, but to somehow escape the chain of causes altogether. If the scientific
account of nature is true, and we are natural organisms, then it is difficult to see how that belief
can be true, even if the reasons why we form it are evident.

The persistence of that belief is rooted in our experience of ourselves. When we reflect on our
decisions we do not always find some immediately preceding cause that mechanically
determines us to decide one way rather than another. Sometimes we do (most people will obey a
man waving a gun in our face, because we react instinctively to threats to our life). Nevertheless,
most often we (in effect) “stop” the instinctual drive and think things over. Somewhere in the
conversion of external physical forces to internal electro-chemical signals to intellectually and
emotionally meaningful units of information a space seems to open up where one’s “self”
appears. One of the most important philosophers of mind of the twentieth century, Daniel
Dennet, warns us against Cartesian illusions: according to Dennett (in Consciousness Explained)
there is no substantial self but just distributed brain functions. Be that as it may, there sure is a
phenomenological self that appears to “do the decidin'” as George Bush might say.
The world-interpreting self seems to make a conscious decision backed by reasons that are
distinct from mechanical forces. If I knock the coffee cup next to me in just the right way, it will
fall over and spill. But if you emotionally “push” different people in the same way, they will
respond differently. How can that be unless there is some self that is not totally determined by
objective forces? We praise the person with self control and blame the ill-tempered. But ought
we?
Determinists will say no. The self-composed person is not better than the rage-o-holic. The only
difference is that they have been subjected to different experiences. No doubt, they capture part
of the truth. But can we really reduce character evaluation to experience assimilation? On the
other hand, if we want to retain a space for meaningful evaluation of people’s actions, then we
require what seems scientifically impossible: an account of how exactly the free, deciding self
emerges from the casual networks in which all material systems operate.
The lingering philosophical problem, which I have certainly never solved, is to explain how that
space for choice emerges in the transformation from energy to symbolic information. Terrence
Deacon provides the best account I have read (The Symbolic Species) of how the sense of human
freedom depends upon the fact that we interpret rather than simply respond to an environment.
Nevertheless, even there the moment of transition from raw information to meaningful wholes
remains a black box.
Determinists understand part of the problem– the causal networks– quite well. However, they
seem to leave out what has always struck me as the most important– and most philosophically
difficult– part of the puzzle. Unlike other material systems, even computers, human thinking
interprets and evaluates the world, and not only in crude survival terms. A neural net can be
trained to “make” decisions by assigning weights to different outcomes and the recursively reprogramming itself in light of the feedback it registers. Even if human beings make decisions in
this way, the fundamental difference between our decisions and those of a neural net are that our
interpretations of the world are not functions of (instinctual) programming.
Unfortunately, the best examples to illustrate the freedom of our interpretations from survival
instincts are instances of deliberately irrational behaviour. We have a paradigm case in front of
us at the moment: vaccine hesitancy amongst people at almost no risk of the known side-effects.
If rationality is, in the most basic terms, the ability to make decisions in light of the best available

evidence, then the rational thing to do is to get a vaccine. Two doses of the available vaccines
provide almost 100% protection against serious disease, slow its spread, and thus also prevent
more mutations.
But people who refuse the vaccine do not assess the evidence in this impartial way. They see it
through the screen of libertarian philosophy, suspicion about central governments, or unscientific
conspiracy theory. One could reconstruct the steps by which people assimilate those ideologies
but what one cannot reconstruct is how people convince themselves of their truth, when they are
not supported by evidence. The beliefs seem formed “free” from the influence of material reality,
but at the same time are threats to the health and well-being of the individuals who hold them
and the societies to which they belong. The irrationality seems “freely chosen.” They are not
immediate reactions to an unexpected situation, they are, in a sense, thought out. They can
articulate their “reasons.” But the reasons are unhinged from present realities. The people who
hold them seem blameable, but are they? Or are they seeing things from a different perspective
because they have had a different set of experiences from people who accept the vaccines and the
protection they offer?
Or is there a dialectical explanation? I believe that there is, but I also wonder whether it can be
fully proven. The dialectical argument would maintain that we cannot explain human behaviour
in the same terms as we explain the behaviour of particles, precisely because human beings act
on our interpretations of the world. Thus, we have to examine the social and political context
within which interpretations form. If we can understand the emergence of libertarian ideology,
then we can understand individuals who adopt it. Once we understand the individuals who adopt
it, we have our answer to the question of why some people reject vaccines even in the face of
overwhelming evidence of their efficacy.
But have we solved the explanatory problem or merely provided a description of beliefformation? Not every Republican, for example, is a libertarian. Thus, people which shared
general political beliefs can still differ on the particulars. Against the determinists, there seems to
be some “elbow room” (to use another phrase from Dennett) within which the self makes
choices. But that simply returns us to the problem of the self as a black box.
I think the reason why the problem has not been resolved is because it is impossible to become
completely object to ourselves. No matter how abstract the language of neuroscience is, the
neuroscientist remains an interpreting and self-interpreting being. They can talk the language of
transmitters and connections all they like, they know full well that even as they use it, they are
feeling, caring, emoting subjects of a life that cannot be reduced to brain states. If someone in
their lab screws up, they would hold them accountable. They would use terms like “honesty” and
“responsibility” (and the person who screwed up would probably fall back on objective
circumstances to argue that “it was not my fault.”
There is no avoiding the language of what neuroscientists call “folk psychology.” There is no
avoiding it because it expresses the whole ethical texture of human social life. But could it be
that the language of responsibility is just a way of talking about processes which, in truth, are as
meaningless as the swarm of electrons surrounding the nuclei of the atoms that make us up? The
fact remains that all of these feelings and so forth are symbolically interpreted brain states.

Saying that we are the subjects of a life describes human reality, but it does not explain that
crucial moment of transition.
Perhaps, then, we will never get beyond Kant, who argued that we must always remain opaque to
ourselves at the most basic level of our being both, at once, biological organisms and human
persons. But (again, as Kant argued) this opacity makes no practical difference. The language of
science is required by some purposes (understanding how nature works) and the language of
responsibility is required for others (organizing and governing societies). When we blame
someone we are not making a metaphysical or scientific claim but an evaluative claim about
what people ought to and could conclude and do on the basis of available evidence.

The Value and Disvalue, The Contingency
and Necessity, of Work
Originally posted, 10 November, 2021
Last week John Deere workers voted down a tentative agreement that provided wage increases
which, when judged by the standards of the last two decades, were impressive. But as inflation
spirals in the wake of the pandemic, workers are realizing that comparatively good is not good
enough. In New Brunswick, health care workers, exhausted by the demands of Covid, were on
strike for a week before being legislated back to work by the provincial government. Other
health care workers are walking away from the job, burnt out, unable any longer to make up
through extra effort the problems caused by chronic under-staffing and under-funding. Younger
people are leaving careers they would have died for in the pre-pandemic world. Poorly paid and
exhausting positions in the service industry are going unfilled. In response, governments are
withdrawing income support programs to try to force people back into the workforce.
Any stirring of the collective power of labour after decades of defeats is a welcome development.
Progress cannot be made on any front without the organized power of workers because the
resources that we require to live and do anything else at all are the product of collective labour.
Since fundamental economic changes always impact workers first and most harshly, they need to
be involved as collective agents steering, rather than reacting too, leading, rather than being run
over by, the forces exerted by the economic system. I am not going to lay out a blue print here
for the changes that need to be made. I think that the general directions are already well-known:
we need to shift gradually but decisively away from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. We
need to scale back the intensity and extensivity of human economic activity to preserve (and then
expand) life-space for other living things. We need to shift away from competitive struggles
between firms to maximize their profits to a democratically planned economy that satisfies
fundamental natural and social needs. We need to use technology to reduce socially necessary
labour time and distribute the savings as increased free time for workers. We need to
democratize work places so that decisions about how to produce are made by workers and not
unaccountable managers. None of these changes can be advanced without the organized power
of workers.
But liberal-capitalist society must draw attention away from collective power. Society can only
be changed radically through collective action, so ideologues of the status quo are always trying
to shift our focus from the collective to the individual. In the case of work, problems that are
functions of the organization of work under capitalism are presented as problems of work as
such. When individual workers choose to quit rather than suffer any longer the indifference of
management to the stress and burn out they are experiencing, the mainstream media portrays
these choices as a heroic new path forged by young people turning their back on the work comes
first ethic of their parents. Not only does this picture de-politicize workplace-related mental
health, it ignores the real value, indeed, the imperative necessity, of work.

Work is not essentially wage labour. Work becomes wage labour in a capitalist society, but work
as such is the collective means by which human beings create and recreate their social lives.
Work cannot cease without human life ceasing. If one person quits their job it does not mean that
the need for the job goes away, it means that someone else will either have to do it, or those who
rely on the work will suffer the consequences of the work going undone. Unless we pursue
collective solutions to the problems that individual workers experience, we simply shift the
suffering from the individual who leaves the job to the individual (probably with less power to
survive for a period of time without employment) who fills the vacancy. The most taxing and
demanding jobs end up falling to the most disempowered groups (migrant workers with fewer
formal rights than citizens, new immigrants desperate to start building a new life). The object of
exploitation changes without the causes of the exploitation being addressed.
Those causes do not lay in work as an external demand upon our time but rather in the economic
forces that determine the nature and availability of work in a capitalist society. Work appears like
an oppressive burden only because it is despotically governed, fragmented into meaningless and
mindless detail labour, precarious, poorly remunerated, and not respected. But if we divided
socially necessary labour time more equally, if we used technology not only to free us from the
mind-numbing tasks but also for creative and caring work, if we governed work-places
democratically, and slowed down the pace of life, work would cease to be the alienating
experience it typically is today and become what we sometimes, rarely, feel it to be: our
contribution to the collective health of our societies and a vital source of individual meaning.
Good lives require rest and repose, but they also require reason to get out of bed in the morning.
Utopian literature since Thomas More can be divided into that which paints the best life as
freedom from work and that which (like More’s Utopia) paints it as freedom to work in
meaningful, creative, and life-productive ways. I can well-understand the motivations of people
who dream of a world where every second of one’s life time is one’s own, but I think that they
fail to appreciate how important being needed is in a meaningful life. Freed from its capitalist
form, what else is work other than the social expression of our being needed? The educator is
needed to help educate, the nurse to help heal, the engineer to design systems that support life,
and the builders to make those designs real.
A life of pure leisure would soon become intolerable. Think how quickly kids complain about
being bored because they “have” nothing to do. A truly post-work world would be a world in
which no one would “have” anything to do because they would not “have” to do anything.
Machines would run things and we would be free …. to do what? Make art? cultivate
relationships? Appreciate the sunshine? But the sun does not shine all the time, and art is very
much a form of non-alienated labour and not a leisure activity. I would say the same thing about
relationships: in order to be a good friend, partner, or lover, one must work upon oneself in order
to make one’s elf friendly or lovable. Pure leisure would be pure inertia.
I think that such a world would be as damaging to peoples’ mental health as a world in which the
external pressures to produce according to deadlines and market demands drive people out of
their jobs. Leisure is valued today because it is the other side of the Protestant ethic: work hard
and play hard is the motto that keeps the capitalist machine running. No one can be blamed for

quitting the treadmill, but social freedom cannot be achieved by a few individuals choosing to
drop out.
Since work is fundamental to both the maintenance and meaning of life, solutions to the
problems that it causes individual workers have to be solved by collectively transforming its
organization. But we cannot transform the organization of work without transforming the core
institutions of socio-economic life and the structure of private ownership of universally required
life-resources that underlies those institutions. Demands for mental health support and politically
correct work environments spectacularly miss the mark. The bosses are only too willing to
organize hand-holding “healthy workplace” seminars and sloganeer about Equity, Diversity, and
Inclusion, so long as they maintain control over the resources and wealth upon which our lives
depend.
Of course, work life within capitalism can be better or worse, and we should always demand
changes in the day to day organization of work that make it better. What capitalist work must be,
however, is capitalist: exploitative, alienating, and undemocratic. It is exploitative because
workers are employed to produce surplus-value, not goods and resources that our lives require. It
is alienating, because we are not in control of our bodies and minds when we are at work. And it
is undemocratic because bosses hire and fire at will, according to market conditions, and they
alone have the right and power to interpret market signals. One cannot escape the overall impacts
of this organization of work by quitting, because quitting perpetuates the structural problems.
Someone else will take your place, or the place will be moved to a region of the world where
people have fewer choices and will take whatever job is offered. The solution to structural
problems is structural changes. The boss’s workshops and platitudes will not bring about those
changes; they can only be achieved by workers struggling together for a different world.

Must Everything Be Professionalised?
Originally posted, 4 August, 2021

I went up North to visit my mom, uncles, and old friends on the weekend. As we drove along the
road that links the highway to my hometown a dozen or more cars, many from down south, were
parked on the shoulder. Blueberry pickers!
When I was young, everyone picked blueberries for personal consumption and baking.
Teenagers would sometimes sell a few quarts for beer and pot money, but for the most part
berries were treated as a common good subject to the law of nature as Locke expressed it: take
what you can use, but leave as much and as good for others.
No more. eco-preneurs, fuelled by the explosive growth of increasingly too-precious farmers’
markets, are proving their love of nature by driving 350 kilometers to the outskirts of Sudbury,
tromping around the bush in their stupid fucking Tilly hats and 400 dollar hiking boots from
Mountain Equipment Coop, denuding the bush of berries. Many use rakes that speed the picking
process but also indiscriminately remove the immature berries. Bears and locals alike are
deprived of this most delicious free gift of nature (sooo much better than overstuffed, cultivated
berries which lack the slightly bitter finish of the wild variety). Having stripped the bush clean,
they load basket after basket into the family Subaru and crate them off to Toronto to be sold at
outrageous prices to people who think they are getting an authentic taste of the North but are
really getting sucked into destructive eco-capitalism.
All over, practices that used to be fun and informal are being professionalised and commodified.
One of my favorite pass times when I am in Cape Breton where my partner grew up is to take
long, aimless ambles along the beach, just walking and walking as far as I can go. The best days
are overcast and blustery with just me on the beach and the crashing surf of the Gulf of St.
Lawrence or the open Atlantic. I learned to let my eyes be open to the sands, to look without
focusing. By being receptive, I started to discover beach glass everywhere. Finding it has since
become a bit of a hobby when I am on the island.
(I got hooked when I brought a piece to a beach glass museum near Richibucto, New Brunswick,
which proved to be quite rare: a fragment of dinner ware from an early 20th century passenger
ship that was pink from the Selenium in the glass. The owner of the museum offered me 75$, but
I preferred to keep it and the great story it turned out to bring with it).
As with the berries, so too with the beach glass. The last two times that we have gone to Cape
Breton, I noticed overly intrepid groups of people with shovels and claws and buckets scouring
the beach. I was wondering what they were doing until it dawned on me suddenly: beach glass
hunters! Someday soon they will be driving backhoes onto the beach and there will be a reality
show on TLC: Inverness Beach Glass Wars.

I am not a particularly virtuous person but I have a feel for long evolved local codes. As with
blueberries, so too with beach glass: take a few pieces, but leave as much and as good for others.
But these prospectors of the shore scoop up everything and — you guessed it– truck it to the
farmers’ market to sell to tourists. But the fun is not in the possessing, it is in the walking on the
beach and accidentally finding. If you go looking for it, you kill the solitude of the walk and the
spontaneity of the find that makes the time on the beach meaningful, peaceful, and fun. If you
scoop every little shard up you will rob children the excitement of their first discovery. But you
will be able to sell bags full to tourists who could have found it themselves had the pros not
vacuumed the beach clean.
(In a further parallel with wild blueberries, the professional hunters take everything
indiscriminately. That which makes beach glass beautiful is the polish, acquired after decades of
being dragged to and fro over the sands by the waves. But the stuff for sale is mostly just broken
chunks of glass too new to have been turned into the gentle, translucent drops of glass that make
it so pleasing to the touch and eye).
There is far worse being perpetrated against young people. The athletically talented no longer
just play for fun or go off to sport camp for a week with their friends to get away from their
parents. Now, the most promising are objectified like high performance vehicles, subjected to
testing and monitoring and mechanical programming for optimal achievement. Twelve year olds
are subjected to the oppressive rule of nutritionists, personal trainers, and coaches for every
gesture and move of whatever sport they play. The pure enjoyment of bodily movement is
destroyed by the (generally quixotic) search for a professional contract.
Schools too are being ruined by precocious professionalization. Grade eight students are
expected to have portfolios by the time they graduate and undergraduate university students are
busy building CV’s before they have read a book cover to cover. The only things that
undergraduate students should be doing are reading, drinking red wine while talking all night in
someone’s stuffy apartment about the ideas that excite them, and then going home, reading some
more, and doing it again the next night.
Like my eyes and the beach glass, in order to arrive at a destination one mustn’t zero in but be
open to all possibilities. Insight and understanding arise slowly and unexpectedly. “To increase
your hold, relax your grip” (Lawrence Durrell, “Keepsake”). Anyway, destinations soon prove
boring. Life is movement.

Crimes Against Humanity, Crimes Against
Education
Originally posted, 28 June, 2021
The discovery of a second set of unmarked graves outside a former residential school, this time
in Saskatchewan, is yet another reminder of the history of crimes against the humanity of First
Nations people. These crimes were perpetrated by successive Canadian governments and various
Christian Churches, but they were abetted by the indifference of too many ordinary Canadians.
There are sure to be more gruesome discoveries as First Nations communities continue to expose
the history of abuse to which they were subjected in the residential schools.
To call these institutions “schools” is as absurd as calling the way Christian Churches treated
Indigenous peoples “love.” Indeed, the residential schools expose the contradiction at the heart
of Christianity. Ethically, Christianity purports to be an institution and practice of universal love.
Yet, it also claims that eternal life is reserved for those who accept Christ as their saviour. The
later belief invested it with a proselytising zeal that made it a willing accomplice of colonialism.
(One finds an analogous contradiction in the history of Islam during the period of Arab
expansion beyond the Arabian peninsula into North Africa). The two sides cannot be easily
reconciled.
Love is a social value that conduces us towards concern for the well-being of the beloved. To
destroy someone that you claim to love proves that you did not really love them. Love demands
respect for the integrity and uniqueness of the beloved. To love someone is thus to value them as
they are. Out of love we might struggle to protect the beloved from forces that would harm or
kill them, but the lover never harms or kills the beloved. Where Christians have been motivated
by love they have allied with progressive forces, as, for example, in mid-1960’s Latin America,
where Liberation Theologists joined with anti-imperialist revolutionary movements to oust USsponsored dictatorships. This unity was possible because love intends the well-being of its object
here and now.
The problem is quite otherwise when one claims to know what one must do to ensure the good of
the soul for all eternity. Anyone who believes that they possess this sort of knowledge is going to
feel that they are invested with a holy mission to save others from their ignorance. If love can
motivate people to fight for a better life here and now on earth, the belief that one possesses
knowledge of what a divinity intends for us throughout eternity can motivate them to impose the
good news (gospel) on non-conforming others. If what is at stake in belief or non-belief is eternal
life or death, then believer can convince themselves that forced conversion is an act of love. But
the reality here and now (the only reality that matters to actually existing, living human beings),
of forced conversion is destruction of the existing way of life. The destruction of known ways of
life by foreign powers is always harmful on every level to the peoples whose languages and
cultures are destroyed.

Therefore, love is not compatible with forced conversion. The lover must accept the wisdom of
Peter Tosh: “If you know what life is worth/You will look for yours on earth/and now we see the
light/we gonna stand up for our rights.”(“Get up, Stand Up“). All we know is life on earth. In
order to live well, to live peacefully, to care for one another, we must live with and accept the
differences through which our humanity is expressed. No one needs to be converted to anything:
people themselves will ultimately change forms of life that no longer work of prove unsatisfying.
As a social virtue love means respect for the capacity of people to determine their own lives and
lifeways.
Residential schools were as far from a loving relationship as one can imagine. The most poignant
critique from a survivor that I have heard stated simply: “How can you send children to a place
where there is no love.” (130 Year Road Trip)
Where there is no love there cannot be education either. Residential schools were schools in the
bureaucratic-authoritarian sense of the term. That is, they employed the power of confinement to
subject their inmates to a curriculum conceived in abstraction from their actual intellectual needs.
Schooling in this bureaucratic-authoritarian sense is, as Ivan Illich pointed out 5 decades ago, the
very opposite of education.(De-Schooling Society) All human beings require education because
our intellectual capacities do not automatically unfold. Education, in contrast to schooling, does
not and cannot force anything on the learner. Education begins from where the learner is and
builds up, adds to, deepens and enriches the already existing soil of the the learner’s capacity you
understanding, interpretation, criticism, and creative activity. Education does not leave the
learner as they were: it is not mere replication of existing external social and cultural forms in the
mind of the learner. Education always frees the individual mind to critically appropriate the past
and contribute to the creation of new, life-affirmative practices in the future.
The crucial difference between loving education and hateful indoctrination is that the former
does not require violence because it always works with the learner. As Paolo Freire famously
argued, education links learner and teacher in a dialectical relationship of reciprocity: teachers
learn and learners teach where the subject matter leads (The Pedagogy of the Oppressed) The
only authority in a genuine learning space is the truth of the subject matter in question.
Indoctrination– the forced imposition of falsity or one-sided truths as if they were true or wholeis violent and requires violence because the student subjected to it knows and feels the falsity or
one-sidedness, and rebels. The victims of indoctrination, whether indigenous children forced into
residential schools or political dissidents marched off to re-education camps (as in Cultural
Revolution China) must always be separated off, isolated, and coerced into accepting dogma as
truth. But truth– as Plato argued– is freely available and freely shared. Dogmas, by contrast,
must literally be “beaten into” the victim being forced to repeat them.
Humanity is the capacity in each and every human being to shape their own future. This capacity
is rooted in our intellectual ability to understand our real conditions of life and what to do when
those conditions are oppressive, need-depriving, or otherwise unsatisfying and stagnant.
Education is therefore always political, not because it transmits slogans to passive cadre, but
because it cultivates and deepens the human capacity to understand the difference between free
and unfree social circumstances. Hence educated people are always the enemy of oppressive
powers, because oppression presents itself as good for its victims. But when victims know what

is really good for them the lies the oppressors tell are exposed, and the structures of oppression
eventually collapse.
The truths of the colonial history of Canada are still in the process of being exposed.
Overcoming their impacts on First Nations people remains a work in progress. The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission was supposed to be the start of fundamental legal and social
transformation of the relationship between the Canadian State and First Nations’ peoples, but as
with so much of Canadian history, official pieties have substituted (thus far) for the promised
meaningful changes.
I do not want to add to the pile of such pieties here. As I wrote years ago in “The Wish to be a
Red Indian,” I worry that well-intentioned Canadians proclaiming their solidarity with
Indigenous peoples often inadvertently drown out Indigenous voices. Solidarity sometimes
requires silence so that long-suppressed voices can speak. One must always be careful (as I argue
more formally in an essay in honour of Ato Sekyi-Otu to be published soon), to avoid conflating
solidarity with speaking for oppressed people. The most important thing that we can do, I would
argue, is to start electing governments that actually put theory into practice: honour the treaties
that were supposed to define the relationship between the state and First Nations, resolve
outstanding land claims, and ensure that First Nations have access to the resources that their
societies require to shape themselves in accordance with their citizens needs and goals.

II: Evocations

Into the Mystic: John McMurtry, 1939-2021
Originally posted, 2 January, 2022

New Year’s Day dawned dreary. Covid cases continued to spike. I knew that the winter term
would begin once again on-line. I worried that I would not be able to hide my absolute lack of
enthusiasm for another 12 weeks of sitting in front of my computer pretending to teach from my
students.
And then things got worse.
At about one o’clock, as I was working on a lecture, an email notification popped up. John
McMurtry, path-breaking Canadian philosopher, my doctoral dissertation supervisor, and critical
interlocutor and friend for 25 years had died.
The news was deflating but not unexpected. In one of those strange coincidences that seem to
surround death I had reached out to him on the day of the solstice to wish him season’s greetings
and to send him a paper I had just finished. The strange thing is that I did not want to write the
paper, but felt some push to do so. I wrote it very quickly, at the behest of Chinese organizers
who invited me to submit a proposal for a conference on political economy. The time frame was
very short and I initially thought about ignoring the invitation. But something gnawed at me. I
wrote the proposal and then the full paper in only 2 weeks. The paper put McMurtry’s idea of
“life-capital” to work in a re-reading of the core principles of Marxist political economy. I sent
him the paper on the solstice. In his response, he told me that the bladder cancer from which he
had been suffering off and on for a few years had returned, and that he knew that his time on the
planet was drawing to a close. Philosophical to the end, he did not lament his fate but told me
that he was at peace with death, knowing that he had given everything he had to life.
There could be no clearer illustration of what Socrates meant when he said that philosophy is a
preparation for death. He did not mean that adopting this or that set of principles dispels the fear
of death; he meant that a properly cultivated philosophical disposition enables one to live the
right way, so that when the end comes, one can face it knowing that one has lived every moment
as fully as possible and struggled to do the right thing as much as beings of limited intellect and
contradictory passions can do.
John instilled that philosophical disposition in me. It was his greatest strength as a supervisor.
Never be lazy, he would urge, spell out the argument, don’t skip steps, be rigorous, and above
all, don’t simply repeat things that have already been said. “Say it fresh or don’t say it,” he once
told me. I have tried to follow that advice in every sentence I have written since.

John was, as the name of the column he used to write for the Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives newsletter The Monitor stated), an iconoclast. He was not always easy to work with
and he could be a trenchant (but not dogmatic) critic of others’ work (including my own). But he
did not cultivate disagreement for its own sake: if someone thought that his arguments were
inadequate or failed, he wanted to know what, in particular, the problems were. He also wanted
to see a more comprehensive alternative articulated. His commitment to the “unforced force of
the better argument” (Habermas) led to many broken chains of communication with other
philosophers. Ideally, one would hope that all philosophers would be committed to debate until
an agreement acceptable to both sides was reached. That was often not the case. I was included
on many an email chain where the opposite would happen: under persistent questioning from
John people would, like Socrates’ dialogue partners, just walk away rather than continue the
discussion.
For the past 25 years the cause of the aporia was always the same: the inability or unwillingness
of philosophers from other traditions to demonstrate how their positions answered the key
problems of philosophy in ways that were as comprehensive and practically efficacious as the
“life-value-onto-axiology” John spent the last quarter of his career developing. From my
sometimes observer and sometimes participant perspective, I felt that sometimes John might
have interpreted acceptable conditions of agreement in too-fine-grained terms. Consequently,
opportunities for overlapping consensus, to borrow a term from Rawls, were missed. However,
in the main I would see people hunker down in their traditional position rather than open
themselves to the possibility that McMutry had found a genuinely new set of concepts– implicit
in, but not systematically developed by, Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.
John often attributed this reticence to careerism and gate-keeping, but I think the answer lies
deeper, in the path-dependencies that emerge after years and decades of work. Few and far
between are Saul on the road to Damascus epiphanies: people tend to stick with the ideas they
have worked on over the course of their career, not because it provides a pay cheque, but because
their whole self has been invested in them. Philosophers thus regularly miss opportunities for
real philosophical growth, but perhaps that tells us that philosophers are human beings too and
cannot always follow the ideas where they lead.
McMurtry’s ideas led from analytic Marxism towards what G.A. Cohen, his supervisor at the
University of London (before Cohen moved to Oxford) “some of the most exhilarating
philosophy I have ever read.” Though exhilarating, the orienting idea of his new departure is in
fact as old as recorded human thought and as easy as breathing to understand: all value in the
universe depends upon the existence of sentient life. All coherent scientific, philosophical and
political thought must begin from the principle that life-support is the foundation of every other
good. Every other good, in turn, is an instrumental condition of healthy living or an expressed
and enjoyed capacity of living things. Unlike the dominant trends in analytic and continental
philosophy at the time he began to chart this course, McMurtry maintained that values were not
subjective dispositions or cultural constructs but fundamental elements of the lived world (hence
the ten cent term “onto-axiology”– values grounded in being). Subjective dispositions and
cultural systems had to be judged in terms of the degree to which they enable the health and
development of living beings (and not just humans– life-value philosophy is resolutely antianthropocentric). Life-value thinking thus opened the way to a coherent synthesis of scientific,

philosophical, and political understanding, if people would drop their one-sided commitments
and re-think their arguments in life-value terms.
Few were willing to do so explicitly (although, if one looks at work from the last twenty years, it
is remarkable the extent to which the problems of need-satisfaction, global health,
environmentally coherent public policy, and life as a foundational value appear). McMurtry
claimed no credit for this global turn, and I think that positions like Sen’s or Nussbaum’s were
cases of reaching similar places by different roads). What McMurtry did that no one else did was
to articulate a systematic, universal foundation for positions like Nussbaum’s capabilities
approach to social justice or Doyal’s and Gough’s theory of human needs. His achievement was
not nearly as overtly influential as it should have been in academic philosophy.
I think this lack of explicit influence bothered John, but I also believed him when he said,
repeatedly, that what matters is that the ideas circulate, not personal recognition. One has the
right to the work, not to the fruits, he would say, paraphrasing Krishna’s advice to Arjuna in the
Bhagavad Gita. I learned that passage from John, and I have meditated on it many nights when
petty professional jealousies stir in my mind and heart.
Just do the work as well as you can do. Then do it better again the next day. Nothing else
matters.
Central to John’s later philosophy was the idea that each person is part of a greater whole of life.
He derived this position from Indian philosophy on the one hand (the ultimate identity of
consciousness and being in a boundless oneness beyond ego and its attachments) and Marx’s
idea that the “individual is the social being” on the other. We both emerge from and depend upon
social connections to each other and to the earth. If we meditate on that fact it becomes clear that
the value of our lives is not exhausted in our ego-centric attachment to our own existence, but is
in truth realized in the contributions that we make to the universal social subject. This universal
subject has no natural life and death and is not bounded by the finitude of individual
consciousness. When we identify our good with the good of that boundless social subject we can
die secure in the knowledge that our ego dissipates but we live on in the future of the life-whole
that our contributions helped sustain.
Having satisfied himself that there was nothing more for him to give, he passed peacefully into
the ego-less universality of earth and memory.
When I learned of John’s death I did not feel so much sad as philosophically alone; the
possibility of further conversation about life-value philosophy seemed over. But the dialogue can
continue because the ideas still exist, and that is just how John would want it to be.

Ovid
Originally posted, 23 December, 2021

Tonight,
in the bar,
I see
a grey non-eminence
realize his place
is not here.

The thirty-somethings
keep laughing
as he shuffles,
invisible,
back to his room.
And I think:
“That is me
in five, maybe ten years.”
And I wonder:
“When did thirty-somethings
start looking so young?”

Morning now,

King Street.
I forgot
how west wind damp dreary
this city is in December.
Not a place to tarry.
But if I could
stop time slipping away
by sinking my fingers
into the low-slung clouds
I would hang on,
even if it stopped
the sun
from shining
forever.

But they are nothing
to sink a grip into:
formless vapours
carried off by the wind
that makes me tighten my scarf
and urges me on my way.

This is not a love song

or an essay in nostalgia;
it is a page
from the book of changes.

When I was young
the dark
of my small town
was deep and quiet.
Every night
I feared
that the whole world
would drown in it.
Then a train
would rumble
down the tracks
a hundred feet
from our little company house
and I would curl into the covers,
reassured
that people were still alive,
attending to things.

The next day,

the only sign of the train
was the pieces of shimmering grey ore
that had bounced from the cars.
They would cry out to me
to keep them safe
from the hell-fires of the Copper Cliff smelter.
I heard their plea
and once a week
would gather them,
–my shells, on my sea shore–
and keep them safe
in the box
where I kept my rock collection.

The mine is still there
but the tracks
have been ripped up.
And the trestle
from which we would jump
into welcoming snow
torn down too.
There are no more
10 000 ton lullabies

to sing children back to sleep.

It is night now.
I pour a gin.
In the dim light
of the backroom
Seamus Heaney comforts me
with poems of bog people,
elderberries,
Troubles,
and the pen
he dug with
all his life.

The wind that
days ago rolled down the Rockies,
traversed the corn-fed expanse
of America’s Great Plains,
deked through through the cables of the bridge,
and skated over the river
now worries the limbs
of our mulberry tree.
I pause and sip.

I wonder:
“What will be
the last book
I ever read?”
Ultimate things
scare soft-minded people.
But listen to Socrates:
philosophy is preparation for death.

Add 2 to 1 and 3 to 2 and 5 to 3
and so on, to infinity.
Divide 3 by 2,
5 by 3,
8 by five ….
The higher you go,
the closer you get
to the secret ratio
that governs
the arrangement of everything:
nautilus shells,
sunflower seeds,
hurricanes,

spiral galaxies,
Gothic cathedrals,
and the features
of your face.

There will be a last book.
But not to fear:
There is no heaven,
no hell,
just points,
distributed along a curve,
spiralling outward
1.6 times bigger every turn
forever.

Golem
Originally posted, 26 September, 2021

Why don’t poets
sign the song
of thermodynamics?

Instead of pulling heart strings
or playing with words,
they should praise
the magic of dust
accreting into world;
hymn the light
that fills the void
between
no-thing-no time
of origin
and no-thing-no time
of end.

A face is beautiful
and the sea sublime,
but they are nothing

compared to
the impossible alchemy
that turns
0+C+H+N+Ca+P+K+S+Na+Cl+Mg.
into me.

No one needs told:
flowers are pretty,
the heart mourns a lost love.
How does the table– mostly space–
resist my touch?
How do things that do not care,
make up someone who does?
And from whence
the compulsion
to ask these questions,
whose answers
are too much to bear?

Primo Levi traced the arc of
a carbon atom
from limestone, to leaf, to lobster
and back.

Erosion tears at the rock face,
a child rips the leaf from the limb,
the fishers boil the lobster,
mad-drunk on rum.

The atom feels nothing.
It bonds again
with any compound
that needs its electrons.
The indifference of the elements
to the suffering they make possible
made him call out to God.
But there was no answer.

Or rather,
the answer was silence.
(Pascal heard it too,
but bet differently,
and was wrong).
There is no salvation,
no redemption.
Truth sets us free,
but in the way of a carbon atom

on its unseeing journey
through time and space.

J: 1.9.6.1
Originally posted, 15 August, 2021
Ox:
plod
the sonorous monotony
of your duty,
clomping footfall
after clomping footfall,
plowing the field
for other people’s problems.

But remember
the Chinese horoscope:
“If this works out,
it will be fun.”

Everything good,
Heraclitus says,
is born of strife.
If my love is difficult,
it is also real.

We can look back

now
and see our older selves
foreshadowed
in our laughing faces
in that picture
we both love so much.
Time scrapes away the sheen
of younger flesh,
but leaves behind
the pleasing lines
of experience.

Today, let’s smile together
and remember:
the umbrella
that protected you
from Bergen’s infernal rains,
and the drunken opera singer in Rome,
and the man with the Beaver nickle
tattooed on his forearm
who had been in jail in Vancouver.
Let’s recall the kittens in Fez
that you wanted to protect,

even though everyone
thought you were crazy.
Let’s step lively
with the cats of Recolleta,
the one’s the guy called “free”
and not “stray.”
Let’s savour the jamon
from that little working class bar in Madrid
where we hid out from the rain
when we were searching
for Goya’s Passion of St. Anthony.
Let’s hear once more
the honking jostle of St. Mark’s Place,
feel the tickle of the wild grass
of Aspy Bay,
and re-taste the vodka
under the glowing midnight sky
of St. Petersburgh.

Memory is magic:
The thought of joy
is joyous
but the thought of pain

is not painful.

You stared into the abyss
and thought about going under,
but you refused to drown.
Linger with the memories,
savour even,
but don’t think too much
on what has gone before.
Too much thinking
and you think yourself gone.

Have another drink.
Tarry with me here
a while longer.
Be glad
we can not see
too far forward.
We are not so old
that the world
might yet surprise us.

III: Readings

Readings: Kathleen Stock: Material Girls:
Why Reality Matters to Feminism
Originally posted, 27 July, 2021

The history of liberalism is, from one perspective, the history of struggles to extend the scope of
human and citizenship rights. From the generic demands of the “rights of man and citizen”
declared on behalf of the whole world by the French Third Estate, different groups that make up
the whole world and have consistently mobilized in their own name to demand that rights be
concretized to meet their unmet needs. Women, workers, and enslaved people in the French
colonies were the first to argue that the Declaration was too abstract. Since it failed to include
their perspectives, its abstract rights could not satisfy their needs. In the twentieth century,
African Americans were forced to struggle again for their civil rights; radical feminists deepened
the fight against new forms of patriarchy, and gays and lesbians began a struggle for their own
liberation. Disabled people have organized in pursuit of their rights; environmentalists have
argued in favour of animal rights and the extension of rights-protections to natural spaces.
Indigenous people have articulated specific sets of rights and struggled to have them recognized
by settler-colonialist societies. All these movements continue in one form or another and still
novel avenues open. In the last twenty years trans persons have become more organized and
vocal in defence of their rights.
Like the struggles that preceded them, trans activists have highlighted the ways in which existing
interpretations of equal rights have failed to address their particular concerns. Like other groups
that have stood up for their interests, trans activists too have faced strong opposition, and not
always from right wing defenders of a conservative sexual morality. Indeed, some of the most
heated arguments have erupted between some groups of feminists and lesbians and trans
activists.
Kathleen Stock’s Material Girls: Why Reality Matters to Feminism, attempts to lower the
political and rhetorical temperature between the two camps through calm and careful argument.
The positions that she adopts on the underlying scientific and philosophical issues will not
produce universal assent, but they ought to encourage reasoned argument oriented by the goal of
building solidarity between feminism and trans activists. Even though she has been a target of
vituperative condemnation by some trans activists, Stock makes it clear throughout her book that
she fully supports their general demands demands for legal protection against discrimination.
“Trans people are trans people. We should get over it. They deserve to be safe, to be visible
throughout society without shame or stigma, and to have exactly the same life opportunities nontrans people do.’ (p. 241) She does not believe that the law can be a vehicle that compels others
to believe what she regards as scientific untruths about the non-reality of biological sex, but on
the more important issue of building a world in which trans people can live secure, full, and free
lives her agreement is unequivocal.

Where Stock differs most sharply from some trans activists is on the complex question of the
relationship between biological sex and gender identity. Stock maintains that biological sex is
real, defined by the male-female dichotomy, and unchangeable. She recognizes the difficulty of
providing a universal definition of biological sex that covers the array of morphologies and
chromosomal arrangements that are found in human beings. These complexities not
withstanding, she does arrive at a complex definition of sex that adequately covers the actual
range of male and female bodies that we find in nature. While she insists that evolutionary
dynamics and human social life both prove the reality and importance of biological sex, she does
not deny that trans people’s gender identities do not align with their biological sex. She does
deny that feelings about gender identity should always override the material reality of biological
sex. That is the claim that so angers many trans activists, especially in the UK.
The debate between so-called TERFs (trans exclusionary radical feminists) and trans activists in
the UK has tended to degenerate into name calling, de-platforming, and threats of violence.
Stock herself has been on the receiving end of accusations of transphobia and has been subjected
to de-platforming. However, any charitable reading of her book reveals her to be a sober minded,
witty, calm, careful thinker. She is sharply critical about some claims that some trans activists
make, but when people make claims which other people can reasonably question, the appropriate
response is counter-argument, not shouting at them to shut up. Matters that involve the public
invite public debate, and trans issues, since they involve changes to laws and traditions, involve
the public, making them matters of general concern around which open, non-dogmatic, debate is
important.
Stock never claims to have every answer and is honest where she thinks her arguments need
further work. All she demands is that argument be met with argument, not vituperative ad
hominem.(pp.40-43) She is a philosopher by profession, but also in the best normative sense of
the word: she has the courage to expose some absurd implications of incautious claims, but is
also open to being proven wrong. Her book is analytic philosophy at its best, marshalling a close
attention to the implications of her opponents’ principles for the sake of creating shared
understandings and better policy.
The book flows smoothly over some very difficult philosophical, political, and scientific issues. I
want to concentrate on the three that I found most important. 1) the complex relationships
between the biological and socio-cultural dimensions of human being; 2) the reality of sex and
the demands of trans activists; and 3) the problem of solidarity and separatism in the construction
of political movements.
The relationship between the biological and socio-cultural dimensions of human being is a long
standing and very difficult philosophical and scientific problem. Trans persons’ struggles have–
like feminists before them– revealed the sharp political stakes behind what, on first blush, seems
a rather simple matter. Human beings are, after all, animals. We are undoubtedly shaped by biophysical forces. Our lives and health depend upon a few key physical parameters: hydration and
nutrition levels, the ability of our immune system to recognize pathogenic threats, the structural
integrity of our skin and skeletal structure. At the biological level, human beings are a complex
organic system defined by intricately evolved relationships between organs. Organs are
functional arrangements of tissues which must operate within fairly narrowly defined parameters.

We cannot live if our hearts are removed, or our lungs, or both kidneys. If we flood our bodies
with toxins we will die; if pathogens like Covid for which we lack antibodies invade, we can
become seriously ill or die.
No matter how committed one might be rhetorically to the position that scientific facts are
“socially constructed,” no one is going to eat plutonium for lunch, because they know that
whatever word we use to refer to atomic element 94, the element itself is highly radioactive and
will kill anyone near it. Even if a language lacks a word for the element, the element itself exists,
and will kill everyone exposed to it, whether they know of it or believe in it. Stock rejects the
arguments of social constructivists like Judith Butler along analogous lines: “It follows from the
logic of Butler’s worldview not only that there are not two pre-given, stable biological sexes, but
also that there are no pre-given facts about natural selection. There is no sexual reproduction.
There are no pre-given chemical elements or biological species.”(63) In its hard form, social
constructivism carries on a lamentable confusion on the left between the mind-and-languageindependent elements and dynamics of the physical universe and the changing, fallible,
susceptible to ideological and life-destructive use of human science. The hypothetical deductive
method has unarguably produced (fallible and corrigible) insights in to physical nature. The
computer on which I am typing does not work by magic. A fricassee of plutonium will kill you.
There can be no room for reasonable debate (a debate between two positions each of which is
plausibly true) on matters of the basic biological foundations of human life. However, most
social constructivists are not concerned with scientific facts about biological life. They are
rightly concerned with the way in which claims about purported biological facts have been used
to justify oppressive systems. For example, the exclusion of women from public life from ancient
Athens to the French Revolution was justified by appeal to spurious claims about women’s
nature. But the problem here is not “biological determinism,” but a bad, sexist argument rooted
in scientific ignorance on one hand (women are not less intelligent than men) and ideological use
of that misinformation facts on the other. Stock urges critics not to throw the baby of objective
investigation of natural processes out with the bath water of ideological misuse of scientific
findings. (pp.70-71)
Once we shift focus, from physical dynamics to human interpretations, we arrive at the live
centre of the debate that most concerns Stock. If it is obvious that human beings have a
biological nature, and no one can coherently deny this nature when it comes to objective facts
like “humans will die if they eat plutonium,” why have the facts about our sexual nature become
so politicized? After all, a penis or vagina is an organ just like a heart or kidney, and no one says
that their functions are socially constructed. The answer is that facts about our circulatory system
do not determine our identity but function as frames within which we live our lives. But having a
penis or vagina, or XX or XY chromosomes does not always determine how we feel about
ourselves, how we express ourselves in private, or present ourselves in public (or how we would
do so if it were safe), or how we feel about other people of the same or opposite sex. One
fundamental dimension of feminist and later gay and lesbian struggle was to free people’s selfunderstanding of their life-horizons and sexuality from their biological sex characteristics. Trans
activism radicalizes this struggle further.

So why would a feminist and lesbian activist like Stock oppose their argument that what matters
to people’s well-being is not sex characteristics but gender identity? If she insists that biological
sexes are real, but admits that trans people do not feel aligned with their biological sex, must she
argue that being trans is “unnatural,” in the pernicious way that sexists thought that women
politicians were “unnatural” or homophobes that that gay and lesbian desires were “unnatural?”
One can see why critics would draw this conclusion, but it is not in fact the argument that Stock
makes.
Stock provides an excellent overview of the history of the development of different meanings of
gender, from its early use to indicate socially constructed dispositions that arose form social
pressures imposed on members of the biological sexes to its current use, “gender identity” which
links gender with inner feelings unconnected to one’s biological sex. (pp.109-141). She rejects
that interpretation of gender identity because she thinks it implies that how one feels can literally
change what one (biologically) is (p.148). Some trans activists may disagree, in which case they
need to respond to the substance of her argument. The substance of her argument is not that trans
people do not exist; she is not– as she is sometimes accused of doing, trying to “erase” trans
people. Instead, she is arguing that trans people should be understood to be trans people: trans
men, trans women, or non-binary, but not identical to men or women just because they claim to
feel “like” a woman or a man. Stock therefore does not believe that a (biologically born) male
who identifies as a woman (a trans woman) is a woman. She rejects the slogan “trans women are
women,” but she does not reject the (to my mind, more politically important claim) that trans
women, trans men, and non-binary people have every right to social and legal protection where
and as appropriate.
That last point leads to the second major point of contention between Stock and some trans
activists and the second part of the book upon which I want to focus– whether or not trans
women should have full, free, and unfettered access to those spaces that have normally been sexsegregated: change rooms, high-level sporting competitions, and, especially, women’s shelters
and rape crisis centres. Since Stock argues that one cannot literally change one’s sex, she
believes that sex still matters in a number of domains. It matters in medicine, both in terms of
treatment and the allocation of research dollars to diseases that typically affect females, and
statistics (if biologically male trans women are counted as females, statistical incidence of
female-typical diseases will be distorted). It matters for similar reasons in crime statistics: if
rapes committed by biological males identifying as women are counted as female crimes,
important statistical distortions could be introduced. It matters in sport, where recently
transitioned trans women could have an unfair advantage over biological women. It matters for
the personal and sexual integrity and autonomy of lesbians, who are sometimes told that they
need to “get over’ their lack of attraction to trans women (i.e., biological males). And it matters
to women who, for a number of sounds reasons, want some spaces preserved as female only
(pp.76-108).
On all of these issues Stock presents cogent arguments. They all follow from her principle that
since biological sex is a reality, wherever recognition of biological sex makes a political,
economic, or emotional difference to women’s and girl’s lives, the gains they have made by
forcing society to recognize and valorize their concerns must be preserved and female
exclusivity maintained. Where such differences do not matter, then trans women should be

welcomed fully and freely. A spirit of mutual recognition of distinct interests should prevail, and
where possible, practical compromises worked out (Men’s, Women’s, and Unisex bathrooms, for
example).
The third aspect of her book that I want to discuss is the issue of the continued salience of
feminism as a women’s movement. Why, Stock asks, should the emergence of new and
legitimate trans demands be accepted at the expense of the historic gains of women to build some
spaces free of males?(pp. 252-261) Stock’s arguments here are once again reasonable and
recognize the legitimacy of trans struggles. She also insists that political struggles, in order to be
coherent, have to have a specific focus determined by the well-defined interests of the people in
whose name the movement was built. The women’s movement was built to address patriarchal
domination (rooted historically in the sexual division of labour) of girls and adult women.
Introducing trans demands into feminism as a women’s movement simply muddies the waters,
according to Stock, sidetracks the struggle into abstract debates about whether trans women are
women, and thus weakens the political power of feminism and trans activism.
My own work has long argued in favour of the need for unified mass movements that connect
human beings across differences. The fundamental problem, in my view, is the way in which the
resources that all need are controlled by a minority and exploited for their own enrichment.
However, I have also acknowledged the need for distinct groups to voice their distinct demands
in separate political organizations. Stock adopts a separatist position when it comes to trans
demands. She does not believe that either the women’s or the gay and lesbian movement can do
an adequate job defending trans people’s interests, because the interests of women, gays, and
lesbians are different from the interests of trans people. The attempt to incorporate trans demands
into the heart of feminism and gay and lesbian movements has dulled their ability to fight
specifically for women and gays and lesbians. The language of women’s and gay and lesbian
liberation has been replaced by a vacuous ideal of inclusivity.(p.244) Again, her argument is not
with the legitimacy of trans demands but with the fit between their content and the interests of
women, gays and lesbians. If every movement tries to be everything, it must empty itself of
coherent demands. The practical result will be infighting on the one hand (as the reality of
different interests makes itself felt) and failure to solve the substantive problems on the other.
I agree that different problems sometimes require different movements, but on almost all the
problems so cogently discussed in the book I also think that the general way forward requires
everyone receiving a healthy dose of an older feminist ideal: androgyny. Stock herself makes this
recommendation (p.249) If neither sex nor gender identity mattered as much as they still do,
many, many problems of women, gays, lesbians, trans and non-binary people, and heterosexual
males too would be on the way to being solved. That is not the world we inhabit, but it is the
world I think we should build towards.

Lessons From History XIV: Georg Lukacs:
The Destruction of Reason
Originally posted, 15 February, 2022
The Destruction of Reason by Georg Lukacs was written in the wake of the Second World War.
Lukacs set out to trace the arc of what he called “irrationalism,” from its origins in post-Hegelian
German philosophy, through Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to Heidegger, racist theorists like
Chamberlain, to its conclusion in Hitler and the Nazis. Little read today (on account both of its
length and reputation for a mechanical and reductionist approach to the history of philosophy)
the resurgence of right-wing populism and its anti-scientific ideology make the book relevant
once again.
As I write this morning, a small group of anti-vaccine protesters continues to blockade the
Ambassador Bridge whose spans I can see through the window of my study. (Note: they have
now been dispersed and arrested). While there were only about 100 (raising questions about the
sympathies of the police, who, as Indigenous activists across the country have pointed out, would
certainly have broken the blockade by force if the protesters had been Indigenous) they are the
Canadian vanguard of a global anti-vax, anti-science movement. There is a difference between
criticizing the policy implications of scientific reasoning (readers of the blog will know that I
have been critical of lockdowns and travel restrictions), and outright rejecting clear statistical and
empirical evidence. The irrationality of the anti-vax crowd is double: on the one hand, they
cannot evaluate even the simplest statistical evidence of correlation between vaccine refusal and
disease severity and risk of death, and on the other cannot properly judge the relationship
between means and ends. If their goal is an end to lockdowns (and I share that goal in the
abstract), then the appropriate means is to get vaccinated. The higher the rate of vaccination, the
lower the rate of hospitalization, the less reason there will be for restrictions and lockdowns.
But arguing with these protesters (as I have done) soon reveals that they are not there to debate
probabilities. The movement has a strong right-wing populist flavour that should be a source of
political concern. Thus far, Canadian politics remains free of a mass right-wing movement akin
to Trumpism in the US, but it is emerging around former Conservative MP Maxime Bernier and
his People’s Party of Canada (whose role behind these protests has yet to be exposed but I am
sure they have had some hand in them). Argue and confront we must, because these groups have
an acidic effect everywhere on coherent policy and practice. The protesters at the bridge are
motivated by grab bag of right-wing skepticism and pseudo-science (anti-vaccination, climate
change denial, etc), but they are united in an undemocratic conflation of their own firmly held, if
nonsensical, positions, with generalizable social interests. And: they seem ready to use violence
to advance their goals.

I do not think Canada is on the verge of a Nazi take over. However, the coalescence of the far
right and anti-science should sound alarm bells because even small groups of determined
activists can have disastrous effects for others. Tens of thousands of workers are off the job in
Windsor and across the river in Michigan (which should serve to correct any naive beliefs that
this movement has anything to do with working class interests, short or long term). In the US, the
results have been far worse: world-leading mortality figures as a result of mass refusal to get
vaccinated and wear masks. Lukacs’ reminder to philosophers (and scientists) that they have a
special duty in the face of mass irrationality is thus newly poignant:
“From the lesson that Hitler taught the world each individual and each nation should try and
learn something for their own good. And this responsibility exists in a particularly acute form for
philosophers, whose duty it should be to supervise the existence and evolution of reason in
proportion to their concrete share in social developments.” (91)
Again, the point is not that every anti-vaxer or climate change denier is a Nazi. Rather, the point
is that the solution to social problems must be rooted in reason, evidence, and rational argument–
a point the academic and post-modern left tended to forget, but best remember or suffer the
consequences of adding anti-science fuel to the right-wing populist fire.
I share the principle that Lukacs defends with such vigour over 850 pages. However, I cannot say
that I agree completely with the arc of philosophical history that he traces. The book is thus
something of a fallacy of division: true overall, but false in the inferences its makes to some of
its parts (particular philosophers). However, with regard to those targets that have retained their
philosophical importance into the twenty-first century– Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Carl Schmitt–
Lukacs’ criticisms are spot on and deserving of contemporary re-appraisal.
The foundation of Lukacs’ critique is the principle that the social implications of a philosophical
system express its concrete truth. No matter how high thinking appears to ascend above the day
to day, it must ultimately be judged in terms of the social forces that it enables or impedes. While
this principle is true, one must also be careful to not interpret it in too mechanical a fashion. The
social foundations and implications of philosophical systems cannot straightforwardly be read
off the class position of the authors (if that were so, Engels, the communist factory owner, would
have been impossible). Most philosophical systems that have any degree of social impact tend
also to be internally complex. Internal complexity can lead to contradictory social implications:
one side can be seized upon by one group and a second side by another and both used in
distinctive ways. Descartes’ was appropriated by orthodox Catholics like Malbranche, but also
by the Enlightenment philosophes a century later.
Lukacs regularly acknowledges this internal complexity in theory, but in practice falls back into
a mechanical materialist reading that he once (in History and Class Consciousness) and later (in
The Ontology of Social Being) rejected. “What ultimately determines an ideologist’s
philosophical level is the depths to which he fathoms the questions of the day his ability to raise
these questions to the peak of philosophical abstraction, and the extent to which the standpoint
derived from his class position allows him to explore these questions in their full breadth and
depth.”(9) There are enough denunciations of “petit bourgeois” complicity to make even the
most dogmatic Stalinist of old wish the book had been more rigorously edited. More seriously, in

my view at least, his mechanical materialism also causes him to regularly overlook points of
important connection between Marxism and some non-Marxist traditions. This problem is
particularly acute when it comes to pragmatism, which Lukacs lumps in with “irrationalism,” but
which actually derives from (among other sources) Hegel’s historical social philosophy. (See for
example Josiah Royce’s excellent lectures on Hegel and German Idealism). Lukacs thus charts
an inconsistent path between revealing the truth of philosophy as response to broader social
problems that opens up and closes off certain forms of action and reducing philosophy to a
mechanical reflex of the changing needs of the ruling class.
This problem notwithstanding, Lukacs’ understanding of “irrationalism” must be taken seriously.
While he dates its origins from the work of the later Schelling (who retreated from his early and
influential understanding of the dialectical development of nature from mechanical material
relationships to self-organizing living organisms), the real turning point is Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche. The problems with which irrationalism wrestled were real: the non-reducibility of all
natural and social forces and processes and purposive systems to the terms of mechanical
materialism, but its solutions were nothing more than re-statements of the problem. The history
of irrationalism “hinges on the development of science and philosophy, and it reacts to the new
questions they pose by designating the mere problem as the answer and declaring the allegedly
fundamental insolubility of the problem to be a higher form of comprehension.”(104) The key to
understanding irrationalism is that it follows from the denial of the dialectical (historical)
development of science and rationality. Both advance by degrees, but at any given moment
contain contradictions. Irrationalism abstracts the problem from its history and declares it
insoluble by scientific means. It then then leaps over the concrete historical solution into
‘intuitions’ of meaningful wholes whose existence cannot be demonstrated but must be taken on
faith.
The concrete historical solution requires social changes and further scientific research using
better, more comprehensive methods. But irrationalism rejected both in favour of reactionary
politics on the one hand and the elevation of subjective feeling over objective truth on the other.
“After Schopenhauer and especially Nietzsche, irrationalist pessimism broke down the
convention that there existed an objective external world and that an unrestricted and thorough
perception of it would indicate a way out of the problems arousing despair. Knowledge of the
world was now increasingly converted into (more and more arbitrary) interpretations.” (87)
The academic left has still not assimilated the disastrous consequences of the idealist reduction
of objective natural and social reality to interpretation. Doing so ultimately reduces truth to force
and power, and the right– as the on-going protests across Canada show– can regularly mobilize
more determined forces in support of even the most non-sensical empirical positions. Cultivating
a respect for scientific truth as (corrigible, fallible, and historically revisable) explanation of
objective processes cannot on its own combat right wing forces, but to the extent that respect for
historically developing science becomes socially pervasive, the right’s mobilizing ideologies can
be isolated and mocked.
Thus, while Lukacs explains in his long historical introduction the unique features of German
history that made it susceptible to irrationalist subjectivism, the danger is general. Germany was
particularly vulnerable because of the failure of the liberal revolution that gave birth to

republican liberal capitalism (as in France) or modern liberal-capitalist institutions despite
symbolic feudal holdovers (as in the United Kingdom). This German “backwardness,” also
decried by Marx and Engels, led to a nationalist glorification of archaic institutions and gave
philosophy an outsized role in the national psyche as a mark of German superiority. At critical
turning points Germany turned to an alliance between archaic social classes (the Junker nobility)
and a strong, authoritarian state (Frederick II, Bismarck) to advance capitalist development while
impeding corresponding political changes towards republicanism and democracy. Lingering
feudal elements were then celebrated as triumphs over the mechanical and bureaucratic
structures of capitalist life (think of Weber’s critique of bureaucracy) when in reality they were
signs that Germany was playing catch up with the rest of Europe. When competitive pressures
forced it to embark late on the imperialist adventurism, it brought Germany into conflict with the
major Western European powers (WW1). Its decisive defeat and subsequent humiliation set the
stage for Hitler.
Lukacs does not maintain that late-nineteenth century German philosophy consciously advocated
for fascist dictatorship. Fascism was a unique response the the crisis of German (and global)
capitalism of the 1920’s. He does maintain that the victory of the Nazi’s in 1933 casts a new and
sinister light on the previous century’s major philosophers, and in particular, Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche, and Heidegger.
Schopenhauer presented himself as an apolitical pessimist who boldly and honestly exposed the
meaninglessness and futility of human existence. Individual human beings were nothing more
than instances of a universal will shaping itself through projects that were, as individual lifeactivities, meaningless because finite and doomed to go under. The philosopher who gleans this
insight from his reflections is thus entitled to withdraw to his study to chuckle over the
misguided concerns of the peons about how they will pay the rent secure in their belief that they
have seen through the futility of such mundane worries. “This elevation above ordinary egotism
entails no obligations on account of its ‘sublime’ mystico-cosmic generality: it discredits social
obligations and replaces them with empty emotional promptings, sentimentalities which may on
occasion be reconciled with the greatest crimes against society.” (209) Since life as such is
meaningless, Schopenhauer concludes, problems of social life are meaningless too.
If one assumes that social problems are insoluble, then it follows that political organization is a
waste of time. The wise person– Schopenhauer– cultivates a detached aestheticist attitude to the
meaningless goings on of the lives of the hoi poloi and looks forward to death: the return to the
quiescence of de-individuated being. “”For the futility of life means above all the individual’s
release from all social obligations and all responsibility towards men’s forward development…
the strongly accented aristocratism of Schopenhauer’s philosophy lifts its adherents far above (in
imagination) the wretched mob that is short-sighted enough to fight and to suffer for a betterment
of social conditions. So Schopenhauer’s system, well-laid out and architecturally ingenious in
form, rises up like a modern luxury hotel on the brink of the abyss … And the daily sight of the
abyss, between the leisurely enjoyment of meals or works of art, can only enhance one’s pleasure
in this elegant comfort.” (243) However, should anything threaten to disturb that comfort,
Schopenhauer was willing to exit the attitude of detached repose and embrace reaction. When
revolutionary workers were in the streets of Berlin in 1848 demanding a republican government,

Schopenhauer gave a Prussian officer his opera glasses so he could better target the workers.
(343)
Nietzsche’s principle of the will to power was derived from Schopenhauer, but whereas his
predecessor preached aloof withdrawal, Nietzsche demanded active engagement with the
emerging democratic and socialist forces of the day. Lukacs excoriates liberal interpreters of
Nietzsche like Walter Kaufmann who tried to salvage his reputation from the reactionary
implications of his constant attacks on workers and democrats and his overt celebration of
domination, exploitation, and the reduction of the mass of human beings to the status of tools for
use– slaves– of a new master aristocratic class. Lukacs is unsparing- and, I believe– correct in his
contention that Nietzsche is the philosopher of German imperialist reaction par excellence.
“What Nietzsche provided,” Lukacs demonstrates, “was a morality for the socially militant
bourgeoisie and middle class intelligentsia of imperialism.” (353) How can anyone who has read
Nietzsche deny that “he levelled against his age the criticism that democracy was blunting the
struggle between masters and mob and that the maser-race morality was making too many
concessions to slave morality?” (355) While his sister and the Nazi’s might have edited the work
to draw out its most extreme reactionary elements, they did not put those elements in the works.
They were there all along. “Nietzsche, from first to last, was trying to make the idea of human
equality intellectually contemptible and to wipe it out: that was his basic aim throughout his
career.” (366)
Lukacs is capable of acknowledging the genius and wit of Nietzsche, but what he refuses to doand he is right to so refuse, (as too many philosophers, including many on the left will not do) is
to abstract the witty culture critique from the menacing political demands for re-establishing
novel conditions of servitude. He thus concludes that “Nietzsche’s brightly variegated, mutually
irreconcilable myths yield up their ideational unity, their objective coherence: they are all
imperialist bourgeois myths serving to mobilize all imperialist forces against their chief
adversary [the working class].” (394)
Less convincing than his expose of Nietzsche is his critique of lebensphilosophie (lifephilosophy) and in particular the contributions of Dilthey. While later versions of vitalism (as
Lukacs calls it) did contribute to the fascist glorification of war as the highest expression of an
active human spirit, Dilthey’s work in no way created the “philosophical mood” that opened the
door to fascism. (416) (The seeds of the fascist perversion of life philosophy should be traced
back to Nietzsche’s one-sided affirmation of predation as the highest expression of life). Lukacs
does note that Dilthey’s attempt to develop a method that could explain “the spiritual world’s
relationship to the physical” was a response to a genuine philosophical-scientific problem.(424)
In fact, Lukacs himself would turn to the very issue in, to my mind, his most important work,
The Ontology of Social Being. Dilthey’s only fault seems to have been that he did not turn to
Marxism for the method he was looking for, even though the Marxism of that time would not
have been able to supply the tools he needed to understand symbolic life in its own terms, i.e.,
non-reductively.
More successful is his critique of Heidegger. As with Nietzsche, Lukacs does not deny that
Heidegger was a philosopher of remarkable insights. “Thus, what Heidegger termed
phenomenology and ontology was in reality no more than an abstractly mythicizing,

anthropological description of human existence; in his concrete phenomenological descriptions,
however, it unexpectedly turned into an-often grippingly interesting– description of intellectual
philistinism during the crisis of the imperialist period.” (498) He is quick to add that his
sympathetic readers (especially those who rehabilitated his reputation after the war) ignore the
objective realities of his work and career. First, as most people know by now, Heidegger was a
member of the Nazi party who helped implement Nazi policy in German Universities (including
firing Jewish faculty) when was rector at Freiburg. Despite what he later said– that these moves
were a necessary accommodation to overwhelming Nazi power– Lukacs is able to demonstrate
(probably for the first time) the underlying connection between Heidegger’s phenomenology and
an acquiescent attitude to political power.
Like Schopenhauer, Heidegger’s existential phenomenology converts concrete social problems
(the reduction of people to mere things in industrial capitalism), into a permanent existential state
(they-ness, or ‘das Mann’). “Bourgeois man’s sense of becoming inessential, indeed, a nonentity, was a universal experience among the intelligentsia in this period.” (503) Heidegger
captures a real social truth, but then converts it into a permanent existential problem of human
being. A quiescent attitude to social life thus follows naturally from such premises: “the threat to
personal ‘existence’ is so deflected as to prevent its giving rise to any obligation to alter one’s
external living conditions or indeed to collaborate in transforming objective social reality.” (507)
Tragically, when the power to which one acquiesces is bent on genocide and global imperial
domination, the consequences of inaction are unspeakable. In one of the most poignant passages
in the book, Lukacs makes clear the real world implications of Heidegger’s rhapsodizing about
the call of Being. Calling out the allies who accepted Heidegger’s post-war argument that he
should be allowed to resume his career because no one could know what they would have done
in the same circumstances (but we do know: some, like Walter Benjamin paid the ultimate price
and were murdered by the Nazis, while others went into exile) Lukacs reminds everyone the type
of person many of of his students became: “Heidegger discretely refrains from saying … that
those young men were not only in a ‘situation confronting death’ under Hitler, but also took a
highly active part in murder and torture, pillage and rape. Evidently, he considers it superfluous
to mention this, … who can tell what a pupil of Heidegger intoxicated by Holderlin ‘thought and
lived’ when he was pushing women and children into the gas chamber at Auschwitz?”(833)
We do know what Carl Schmitt, Nazi legal theorist and a key architect of Nazi policy and
political practice thought, because he published widely at the time. Shamefully, contemporary
thinkers who consider themselves leftists like Chantal Mouffe have revived this arch-Nazi’s
work. This revivalism is even worse than in the case of Heidegger. Schmitt lacks all of
Heidegger’s genuine insights into basic existential structures of experience. His political theory
amounts to little more than fancy-talk justification of arbitrary power. Mouffe and others in her
train turn to Schmitt for his critique of liberalism, but fail utterly to distinguish between
immanent critiques of liberalism from the left (for example, Marx), and fascist critiques from the
right. Schmitt did make abstractly cogent arguments against liberalism, but their proper
evaluation must take into account the ends that those criticisms served: the justification of Nazi
totalitarianism and imperialist violence. Fortunately, Lukacs was already on the case in
1951.”Schmitt absorbed all the nineteenth century anti-democratic polemics in his system in
order to prove the irreconcilable antithesis of liberalism and democracy and to show the
inevitable growth of mass democracy into dictatorship.” (655) The political logic of the

exception that intrigues Mouffe and Giorgio Agamben was really the power of the dictator to do
anything he wanted. “Schmitt revived for the age of Hitler the old theme of pre-war antidemocratic propaganda, namely, Germany’s ideological superiority over the democratic states.”
(660) The open and mostly uncritical embrace of an unrepentant Nazi plots the distance that
some wings of the academic left have drifted from theoretically and practically coherent
positions.
Lukacs’ tome, despite it biblical length, thus repays reading. Does he prove that the objective
implications of the history of irrationalist philosophy from the late Schelling was the rise of the
Nazis? That would depend upon our criterion of success.
I do not think that Lukacs uncovers a straightforward intellectual-historical logic that that takes
us from theological revival (in Schelling) to Hitler. In fact, Lukacs shows unequivocally in the
last chapter of the book that Hitler cared not at all for philosophy of any sort. He was not even
committed to the racist pseudo-science of a Chamberlain. Chamberlain provided the Nazi’s with
a theory that “those belonging to the other races … were not human beings in the proper sense of
the word.”(710) Hitler and other Nazi’s would use his ravings, but at the end of the day Nazi
ideology was “a hotch potch, concocted with unscrupulous demagoguery, of the most diverse
reactionary theories for which the only criterion was whether they would enable Hitler to
hoodwink the masses.” (723) Hitler was a pure cynic, uniquely willing to us any means at his
disposal to advance his ends, but he was not the logical outcome of a dialectic of reaction.
Nevertheless, his opportunism and ability to exploit a social crisis that could also have benefited
the left was made possible by the gradual relinquishing of concern for objectivity and evidence
and the waning of the ability to distinguish universal values from forcefully asserted mythical
destinies. The affirmation of subjective feeling, intuition, and myth do not sound dangerous until
demagogues like Hitler put them to work smashing all opposition. By the time a Hitler can win,
the forces that could have opposed a Nazi-like movement have lost their internal strength and
coherence because the universal principles upon which they once stood and for which they
fought have been discredited. Once there is no longer any recognized difference between
universal truth and fervently held belief, the most dogmatic upholders of the most dangerous
myths prevail.
From that perspective, The Destruction of Reason teaches a truth that today’s leftists sorely need
to re-learn.

Readings: Nothing Less Than Great:
Reforming Canada’s Universities, Harvey P.
Weingarten
Originally posted, 26 November, 2021
The arguments that Harvey Weingarten makes in Nothing Less Than Great will be familiar to
anyone who has paid attention the various position papers issued by the Higher Education
Quality Assurance Council of Ontario (HEQCO) over the past decade. Before leading HEQCO,
Weingarten was the President of the University of Calgary, and before that, Provost of McMaster
University. I have been critical of HEQCO’s approach to quantitative evaluation and institutional
differentiation. (Follow the first link and see “What is Called Critical Thinking” and
“Universities and the Importance of Disciplinary Traditions and the second and see “Teaching
Loads and Research Outputs of Ontario University Faculty Members: A Critique,” and Ontario’s
Differentiation Policy for Post-Secondary Education, a Critique”). Nothing Weingarten argues in
this book changed my mind. However, I do not want to reiterate past differences but read the
book with fresh eyes. I have come to share some of Weingarten’s concerns, especially about the
future of the Humanities. I do not think he lights on solutions in his book, but I do think that
restoring them to health will require new thinking about the organization of undergraduate
classes, not only in the Humanities, but across the University.
The book is concise and focused, intended for the tax paying public more than academics.
However, I hope academics read and engage with its arguments. Academics as a group tend to
avoid playing an active role in the governance of their institutions. Relatively few are willing to
serve on University Senates and fewer still are active in their Faculty Associations. The degree of
ignorance about government policy is both concerning and surprising. While we regard ourselves
as indispensable experts, Canadian governments regard us public sector workers. When the
broader public sector is targeted (as has happened with regard to wages in both Manitoba and
Ontario), academics are included. As Weingarten makes clear, the days of relative government
neglect of the inner organization of universities are coming to an end. The disaster at Laurentian
(which Weingarten does not discuss) was a shocking example of collusion between the courts,
the Ontario government, and the Laurentian administration. As the problems caused by COVID
hopefully continue to fade and the new Strategic Mandate Agreements between the Ontario
government and Ontario’s Universities kick back in, we would be fools to think something like
Laurentian could not happen again. Weingarten is making his own arguments, but those
arguments also provide insight into what government’s might be thinking. Academics should pay
attention.
The book is organized into 11 short chapters dealing with 9 substantive challenges: the economic
benefits of university education, accessibility, curriculum reform, the proper fit between
university education and labour markets, the proper relationship between governments and
universities, impediments to institutional innovation, the sustainability of universities in their
current form, their overall quality, and the impact of Covid-19 on their future. I have argued at

length elsewhere against the learning outcomes approach championed by Weingarten. I have no
disagreements with his position as far as accessibility is concerned. I will concentrate on the
question of the social purpose of university education, curriculum reform, the future relationship
between governments and universities (using Ontario as my example), and the sustainability of
the system.
Weingarten is a social scientist and he writes like one: the book is short on poetry and long on
statistics. His directness is a good thing. He does not hide his interest in systematic change and
he provides statistical evidence to support his criticisms and recommendations. However, as is
often the case with statistical evidence, the background problems that it does not measure is often
as important as the phenomena that it does measure.
Weingarten is the sort of administrator that I liked to deal with when I was president of the
Windsor University Faculty Association: he does not mince words and is clear about his practical
agenda. Honesty is important: if there are competing agendas regarding the future of universities,
then it is important that the opposed sides understand the other’s position. Obfuscation and
circumlocution mitigate conflict in the short term but ensure that changes happen by stealth and
force in the long term. If changes are going to be made, academics should be out in front leading
them rather than reacting, surprised at an agenda that was hidden from them (and to which they
did not pay enough attention to suss out). In Ontario, the looming introduction of performance
based funding is a sign that changes are already underway. It behooves those of us who care
about the university as a public educational institutions (let alone our workplaces) to pay
attention to the implications of those policy changes already underway and those that will follow.
Weingarten begins from the principle that the main purpose of the university is economic: the
sort of education that students receive should prepare them for future careers, and those future
careers should contribute to the international competitiveness of the Canadian economy.
“”Virtually every survey asking students why they have chosen to pursue post-secondary
education indicates that the dominant, although not exclusive, reason students go to university is
to get the knowledge and credentials necessary to get a good job. Equally, the dominant reason
that Canadian governments now and in the past have invested in a public higher education
system is to educate a workforce that has the knowledge and skills to drive the economy.”(15)
Weingarten acknowledges the complexity of the demands different constituents (faculty,
students, the government, the tax paying public) place on universities. He acknowledges the
importance of interest-led research and discipline-focussed teaching. But he is clear and keeps
coming back to the point that research and teaching must ultimately prepare students for future
careers and the national economy for the rigours of intensified international competition.
No reasonable person involved with academia can deny the importance of future careers to
students. It is easy to talk about the intrinsic value of education from the comfort of one’s
tenured position. At the same time, Weingarten cites abundant evidence that university education
still pays off for students, regardless of the discipline that they study.(17-20) Although
humanities enrolments are declining, surveys show that humanities students find meaningful
work at higher than average salaries (21). Moreover, studies also reveal that there is no
mechanical relationship between one’s major and one’s future career. The evidence suggests,
therefore, that regardless of what one studies one’s investment in university education pays off,

often in unexpected ways. Weingarten concludes that “reams of data” confirm that “going to
university is worth it.”(27) The worry about whether university education is worth it, about
whether it increases one’s prospects for a bright career, is misplaced.
Misplaced, but also concealing a different agenda that Weingarten is not shy to discuss. The real
concern of critics of the existing higher education system is the relative autonomy of the internal
academic organization of the university from economic forces and political power. Whereas once
this relative autonomy was regarded as essential to the purposes of the university, today,
Weingarten notes, the “apparent reluctance of universities to move and adapt quickly and to be
more responsive– their seeming inability to initiate significant curriculum or program changes or
reforms– is seen as a negative.”(103) Why, if the evidence shows that university graduates do
better economically on average than people who do not go to university, do politicians and
reformers keep going on about jobs and the need for universities to adapt? Because jobs are a
rhetorically effective way of putting deep institutional reform on the agenda.
The general public is not going to be motivated to demand changes to the university because they
suddenly become incensed by the distribution of power between the Board of Governors, the
Senate, and the Faculty Association. Most will not feel confident about entering into an abstract
debate about whether Classics and Philosophy should still exist. Some might be more engaged
(as the conservative backlash in the United States against Critical Race Theory indicates) by
media-stoked culture wars, but as with most political problems, the majority of people do not
really care. The sure fire way to start a public debate is to talk about tax dollars. If politicians are
convinced, despite the evidence, that universities are not producing job ready graduates, then
they will start to worry about whether tax money is being well-spent. If politicians start making
noise about wasted tax dollars, their constituents start to take an interest in the problem. Political
momentum can be built around demands for accountability, innovation, and closer alignment
between the academic mission of the university and the economic forces that politicians serve.
Lurking not too deeply in the shadows of this debate are business leaders eager to tell the media
and politicians that university graduates are not well-prepared for the world of work.(68-74) If
that is true, then one wonders why buisnesses keep hiring university graduates and paying them
more than non-university graduates. Moreover, one wonders why they appear to hire graduates
regardless of their disciplinary background.(67) Weingarten does not explore this tension in the
evidence that he presents. He does not, I suggest, because his real goal is structural
transformation of the university sphere, and the criticisms made by business leaders are a way to
get the attention of the politicians who can force institutional change on universities.
So what sorts of changes does Weingarten want to see? First, he wants to see curriculum reform
that prioritizes skills over content. Second, he wants to see more institutional differentiation.
Third, he wants to see more quantitative evidence that universities are doing the educational job
that they claim to be doing. Weingarten believes that the sustainability of the university system
depends upon making these deep structural changes. I will discuss each in turn.
Weingarten’s concerns around curriculum concern both the existing disciplinary structure of
universities and the content of particular courses. The disciplinary shape of the contemporary
university was formed in the nineteenth century and has barely changed. New departments have

been added as science developed and political forces created new disciplines, but the university
is still composed of departments, organized in the faculties and schools, each of which defends
their interest in their own perpetuation. Perhaps of more salience today, the nineteenth century
university was centred on the humanities, and the distribution of faculty positions continues to
reflect that historical role, even as enrolments decline. When Weingarten worries about
sustainability, it is hard to not think that he has the Humanities most in mind. (121) That is not to
say that he thinks that the traditional humanist disciplines should be eliminated, but he insist that
the disciplinary structure of the university be rethought.
His argues forcefully that undergraduate students are not being well-served by a structure that
treats learning as the transmission of disciplinary knowledge. “Content is largely what professors
teach, what they evaluate, and what universities credential. There is considerable controversy,
however, over whether students, in the right numbers and to the right extent, are learning the
cognitive and behavioural skills we expect graduates to possess.”(54) In order to remain relevant,
Weingarten argues, teaching should be re-organized around problem-solving, inter-disciplinary
courses. This transformation, he believes, will ensure that students learn the generic skills they
will need for success in the future: literacy, numeracy, analytic and critical thinking,
communication, and creativity.
Weingarten cites alarming evidence that these skills are not being effectively taught. One survey
that he references claims that fully 25% of Canadian university graduates lack basic literacy and
numeracy skills.(58) When I say basic, I mean basic: inability to write a coherent paragraph or
solve the problem: 1 is to 5 as 5 is to x. If true– and I am not doubting the studies– then there is a
serious problem. No one should have an advanced degree that cannot communicate their
thoughts in written language or understand basic arithmetic. But is the problem the prioritization
of content over skills?
It might be. I will return to the relationship between skill and content in a moment. First, I want
to add a consideration that Weingarten does not explore: the learner side of the teacher-student
relationship. I say this not to bemoan the stereotypical “younger generation.” They are no
dumber or lazier than any other generation, but they do face heightened social and economic
pressures. These heightened pressures must factor in to a complete account of the failures of
universities to teach basic skills. The study that Weingarten cites does not disaggregate the data
into relative performance of different universities, but I would be willing to wager that schools
such as Windsor, where I teach, mid-sized comprehensive institutions with a high proportion of
first generation university students, many working class and many working, some as much as 40
hours a week, perform the worst. I do not think that the relatively poor performance is due to
incompetence on the part of professors or a too narrow focus on transmission of disciplinary
content, but owes to the fact that students do not have the time to devote to their studies. How
can a student be expected to excel academically if they are not only working 40 hours week, but
must also listen to the incessant drum beat of parents and politicians fussing about whether they
will find a job in the future? No amount of curriculum reform will solve that problem.
(Curriculum reform will also not solve the problem of the anxieties that prevent so many
students today from finding the courage to think, but that is a discussion for another day).
Solving the time problem requires social changes and a different understanding of the purpose of
university education. I will return to this issues in conclusion.

That said, I do not disagree with Weingarten that a too narrow focus on content can impede the
development of essential intellectual capacities. However, the solution is not to impose generic
skills development strategies and learning outcomes on departments, but to encourage professors
to think about how to articulate the development of these capacities through the teaching of
disciplinary traditions. To use philosophy as an example, professors need to ask what they are
doing when they teach a historical philosophical text. The wrong ways to deliver the content is,
on the one hand, to take the students through the arguments and focus on the historical problem
or, on the other, to try to mechanically map the old content onto a contemporary problem. It is
highly unlikely that a 500 year old philosophical problem is going to match up directly to a
contemporary problem. What they can do is serve as a foil that enables students to think
differently about a contemporary problem. Learning to think critically– which is what
philosophy should help people do if it does anything– is not first of all a matter of learning to
apply abstract rules or even detect errors of reasoning. Learning to think critically is first of all a
matter of learning to think differently about problems, learning how to see problems become
problems, and about how to change our frame of reference so that new solutions open up which
would not come into view unless the initial framing presuppositions were exposed.
This approach does not abandon disciplinary traditions but puts them to work developing
different facets of different skills. Studying philosophy, t stick with that example, is not about
memorizing what an old philosopher said, it is about learning to think about fundamental
problems of experience and knowledge in new ways, ways that are vitally important to the
intelligent conduct of any practice or occupation. One cannot abstract the skill component from
the content and establish it as a generic learning module. Just as learning to throw a curve ball
requires the pitcher to learn to grip and throw a real ball, repeatedly, so philosophy demands
reading and writing about real philosophers, also repeatedly. Weingarten is right to expose a lazy
pedagogy that does little more than report on the contents of great books. The solution is a
demanding pedagogy that puts the books to work exposing the unargued presuppositions of
established ways of organizing life.
For Weingarten, a renewed focus of skills is connected to the need for institutional
differentiation. Institutional differentiation was a key recommendation of an Ontario government
report published in 2013 on the future of post-secondary education. In that report,
“differentiation” meant that every school should identify core strengths upon which to
concentrate and to build. The underlying idea is economic: universities should identify their
comparative advantage and market themselves accordingly. This recommendation is a significant
departure from what I would argue is the main justification for a geographically dispersed public
university system: accessible intellectual comprehensiveness. Local students should be able to
access a local university which both covers the major traditional disciplines and is responsive to
new developments and tendencies. The idea of differentiation will hurt comprehensive
universities outside of major cities the hardest. The Laurentian administration appealed in part to
the differentiation strategy to justify its cuts. As the dystopic outcome of that debacle shows,
Northern, Francophone, and Indigenous students will suffer the most under this approach to
institutional restructuring. Weingarten champions accessibility, but accessibility has two sides:
whether students can afford university, and the type of university they are able to access.(43) If
students outside of Southern Ontario do not have access to schools offering a full range of
programs, they will have no choice but to leave their regions, exacerbating the brain drain for the

North to the South and increasing the economic and social inequalities that have always divided
the province.
Weingarten also champions a second type of differentiation: market driven creation of new
institutions with a narrow, vocational focus and emphasis on rapid credentialing. The two
examples of new institutions that he discusses at length are from the US: the Western Governor’s
University and the University of Minnesota-Rochester.(78, 110-11) Both are geared to students
looking for quick, career-specific training. I have no issue with new institutions responding to
unmet social needs, but I do not think that these institutions should be called universities or
allowed to compete with them. Universities are, as their name implies, concerned with the
totality of human intellectual endeavour, from the study of our spiritual traditions to the hardest
of the hard sciences. The purpose of the university is to combine broad appreciation of the
different dimensions of human knowledge (and the historical tensions knowledge-production has
produced) with deep understanding of a discipline of most interest to the student. Not everyone
needs to go to university when they are 18; not everyone who finds themselves in need of retraining needs to go to a university to re-train. People can come to university later in life; other
institutions can provide job-specific re-training better than universities and they should be
allowed to operate. But they should not be put in direct competition with universities.
A proper university education takes time. If short term employment rates become a deciding
issue in the allocation of funding, and universities and educational start-ups are funded from the
same envelope, universities will lose public funding to institutions that prioritize timely retraining. If market forces are going to be the decider, then more universities will face bankruptcy
and close. Weingarten does not explicitly argue that competition should be allowed to drive
existing universities under, but he does explicitly endorse allowing market forces to operate in
the public education in the hope that it will spur innovation. “If today’s universities do not move
expeditiously, others will step into this space, whether from the public to the private sphere,
leading to greater diversity of higher education institution in Canada than currently exists. This
would not be a bad thing. In fact, it should be encouraged.”(168) I fear that this sort of
“innovation” will produce more Laurentian’s than progressive pedagogical experiments.
Both curriculum reform and innovation are tied to Weingarten’s overriding concern: the
development of new metrics that allow universities to prove that they are doing what they claim
to be doing and can be used by governments to hold universities accountable. Weingarten does
not believe that everything relevant in education is measurable, but he does believe that those
aspects of it that can be measured ought to be and the results used to establish baselines for
institutional quality.(57) He is concerned (as I noted above) that institutions are failing a large
percentage of students who are graduating without basic literacy and numeracy skills. He is also
concerned about the broader issue of public funding: democratic societies earmark a certain
percentage of the total social product for investment in public services. The political institutions
responsible for those allocative decisions have a duty to ensure that those funds are wellspent.(83) Weingarten argues that if it turns out that universities are in effect wasting money by
not educating students, or not educating them in a way that prepares them for contemporary life,
forcing changes upon them by reducing funding is entirely appropriate.(95)

There are two problems with this argument, one economic and the other philosophical. The
economic problem is that the attempt to correct qualitative institutional failings through
quantitatively reduced funding does not address the problem but could send universities into a
death spiral. I agree that increased funding is not the guaranteed solution to every problem.
Contemporary societies must fund a wide array of public goods; if a dollar goes to one institution
it cannot go to another, so eventually, zero sum choices must be made. However, reducing
operating budgets cannot improve the quality of instruction, because the qualitative problem has
to do with the practices through which students are taught. If students are failing, then new and
better practices must be developed. Reducing funding just means–as Laurentian shows– that
institutions will lose departments and people. But the decision to close departments will not be
made on the basis of how well or poorly they are teaching their students, but on the basis of their
relative costs.
The relative cost of a department can be worked out by dividing the cost of the faculty by the
number of students. The higher the ratio of faculty to students, the more cost effective (other
things being equal) that department is. For example, if the average engineering professor teaches
500 students per term and the average philosophy professor teaches 50, then engineering is 10
times most cost effective than philosophy (ignoring for the sake of argument equipment costs
and other expenses). Guess who will get chopped when budgetary push comes to shove?
The second problem is philosophical and returns us to the problem of the purpose of the
university and the time it takes to fulfill that purpose. Many years ago, I argued that the
university should be valued as an institution that provides space and time for the development of
practices of cognitive freedom. I meant that thinking is always free in relation to its object. When
we think about a problem we turn a fixed material reality into an idea that our minds can freely
examine. The intellectual examination of material problems opens up new pathways for creative
and transformative social interventions (problem-solving, if you prefer) which produce new and
hopefully better realities. Everyone thinks all the time, but not everyone is aware of what they
are doing when they think (although everyone can become aware). Developing that awareness
can be achieved by disciplined self-reflection, experience, and popular education, but I would
argue that university education is the most comprehensive and systematic way of cultivating
practices of cognitive freedom.
These practices have objective value and make observable contributions to the social world, but I
do not think that they are measurable in the sense in which Weingarten would use the term. They
are not measurable because their primary effect is internal: people who become aware of their
cognitive freedom experience a changed relationship to the world. Instead of treating it as a hard
and fast reality that compels them to behave one way rather than another, they learn t see it as a
series of problems and challenges. One can confront those challenges either by conforming or by
working to change reality. More than that, however, university helps people realize that human
experience is multifaceted: different objects of experience and different domains of life require
different criteria of excellence. We do not judge beauty by the same standards as we judge fuel
efficiency. Cultivating cognitive freedom enables us to understand that there are different criteria
of excellence and when we need to switch between one set and another. Even more than that,
cognitive freedom allows us to understand that those criteria of excellence are historical: they
change and (hopefully) improve as historically suppressed voices start to speak, new

perspectives are brought to bear on old problems , and the social interests behind principles
assumed to be natural exposed.
Cultivating the critical and evaluative capacities through which our cognitive freedom is
expressed takes a lifetime. No one should be paying tuition forever, obviously, but society has to
ask itself whether it is willing to fund four years of relative autonomy from the mundane
demands of economic life so that students (of any age) can cultivate these capacities. The pay off
will not be measured primarily in terms of new inventions, money-value growth, or novel
philosophical insights, but in terms of the richness of the lives of the people who have devoted
themselves to their studies. Quality must indeed be assured, but the quality assessed has to be the
quality of the educational experience in all of its dimensions, not just whether students are
acquiring skills in the sense that employers use the term. The only persons who can really
evaluate whether their lives have been enriched by education are students themselves. I have
been an educator long enough to have received many emails from former students years after
they graduated. They wanted to reach out and share with me how much their philosophical
studies turned out to mean, in ways they could not have imagined. Those realizations are the
most important metric of institutional quality. When students recognize, sometimes many years
later, that their studies have made them more perceptive, more open to the nuances of
experience, more able to speak their minds and stand up for their positions, as well as better able
to listen, more patient, more able to take the time to think things through, I think universities
have done their job. However, these goods are expressed in terms of enriched life-experience;
their value cannot be captured in surveys and questionnaires.
Democratic societies can decide for themselves how to allocate scarce resources. But once those
allocative decisions have been made, the institutions responsible for spending the money must be
left alone to organize and govern themselves. No one would accept a politician telling the
surgeon how to operate. We must either accept that politicians also lack the expertise to tell
professors what and how to teach, or citizens should put professors out of their misery and vote
to replace universities with training institutes.

Lessons From History XII: Marx and Engels:
The German Ideology, Volume II: True
Socialism
Originally posted, 10 September, 2021

Even the most seasoned Marxist typically avoids the long slog through Young Hegelian German
philosophy which takes up most of The German Ideology. Under the reasonable principle that
life is too short to waste on ideas that have been rendered dead by history, students tend to focus
their attention on Chapter One of Part One. There, Marx and Engels criticise Feuerbach’s
abstract, romantic materialism and sketch the contrasting principles of historical materialism.
I have been drawn back more and more to The German Ideology in recent years as part of a
larger project to construct an interpretation of historical materialism that avoids the twin
problems of reductive physicalism on the one hand and anthropocentric culturalism on the other.
If I am correct, then Marx and Engels charted a new (but still mostly unfollowed) synthetic
alternative to these one-sided poles. Against contemporary ideologues who would make all
scientific knowledge a social construction historical materialism insists on the objective reality
of the physical universe, its complete and utter independence on a universal scale from human
thought and activity, and the over-riding practical imperative to make human knowledge
adequate to the object. On the other hand, as historical materialism, its object is not nature as a
physical system, but human society, which cannot be comprehended in physicalist terms but
requires categories developed from the study of historical processes. The two sides are connected
by the principle (which in fact goes back to Aristotle) that the structure of knowledge depends
upon and follows from the nature of the object studied. Human society develops out of our work
on the natural world, but that world owes its existence to physical forces unleashed long before
there were any human beings. Its elements and dynamics are indifferent to the beliefs and
theories of human beings, except on earth, where intellectual-practical activity has changed raw
nature through the construction of human societies.
There is still more work to be done to fully understand the contemporary implications of that
chapter, but for unrelated reasons my attention was drawn deeper into the book, to Volume Two,
which focuses on a now forgotten set of thinkers known as the “True Socialists” Their
appellation tells us everything we need to know about their work: pompous, self-important,
moralistic. There work was without value in the mid-nineteenth century and its has not improved
with age. But Marx’s and Engels’ critique is worth reading because it exposes exactly what
social philosophy should not be: verbose platitudes posturing as radical critique.
The chapter is not a model of charitable critique. There are no academic nicities. Marx and
Engels are openly contemptuous. The professor in me grimaced at the vicious mockery of
opponents, but the philosopher in me laughed out loud. Philosophy can be the stuffiest of
disciplines but it does not have to be. It concerns, ultimately, the human condition in all of its
dimensions, and what is more human than humour? If someone is pompous and self-important

enough to think that their pretentious abstractions are more politically real than blood and sweat
political struggle, what choice does a critic have than to hoist them on the petard of their own
arrogance? There is nothing more justifiably funny than the spectacle of the unjustifiably
arrogant prophet brought brutally down to earth. And that is what Marx and Engels do.
Despite its name, True Socialism had nothing to do with socialism as a political movement for
fundamental social transformation. It was, at best, a German literary (using “literary” in a purely
descriptive sense) philanthropic movement masquerading as politics. But what draws Marx’s and
Engels’ ire is that these authors had the temerity to criticise actual socialist theorists and
movements as inferior to their treacle prose and poetry. One would have to read the whole
chapter to really get the humour, but the following passage is typical. One true socialist,
Hermann Semmig writes that “French socialists and communists … have by no means
theoretically understood the essence of socialism … even the radical (French) communists have
still by no means transcended the antithesis of labour and enjoyment.” Marx and Engels respond,
sarcastically “That is to say, our true socialist here is reproaching the French for having a correct
consciousness of of their actual social conditions, whereas they ought to bring to light “Man’s
consciousness of his essence.” (460) Behind the sarcasm they are making a serious philosophical
point.
Sound social philosophy does not speculate about the essence of man. It does not criticise society
on the basis of moralistic abstractions. It does not compare society as it is with how some theorist
thinks it should be. Instead, sound social philosophy must study,empirically, how actual societies
function. The “essence” of society is not an idea but a governing dynamic whose effects can be
observed in the operations of major social institutions. Likewise, the “essence of man” is (as
Marx puts it in the Theses on Feuerbach) “no abstraction inherent in each individual.” It is rather
the capacity for constructive labour through which actual societies are produced. “As human
beings express their lives,” they argue in Volume One, “so they are.”(31) Or, as Marx puts it in a
later essay, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, “People make their own history, but
not in circumstances of their own choosing.” In short, there is no “Man” to understand; there are
only concrete human beings using available resources to reproduce their lives and running up
against specific constraints generated by the governing dynamic of that society. Real alternatives
stem from concrete problem solving efforts, not scholastic abstractions or the sentiments of the
romantic heart.
The truth of True Socialism is thus that it is pure sentimentality. Another true socialist Rudolph
Matthai tries to infer the guiding values of socialism from his feelings about natural beauty and
harmony: “gay flowers … tall and stately oaks … their satisfaction, their happiness lie in their
life, their growth and blossoming.” Rather like some contemporary “post-humanist” philosophers
today, Matthai sees only one side of nature. His romantic souls turns away from the other side, of
which Marx and Engels are only too happy to provide him with a reminder: “”Man” could
observe a great many other things in nature, e.g., the bitterest competition between plants and
animals.”(p.471) Matthai invites us to consider “the lilies of the field.” Marx and Engels do:
“Yes, consider the lilies of the field, how they are eaten by goats.” (472) Again, the crucial
philosophical point is that this sentiment gets us nowhere because it expresses only the good side
of life. In order to change the world we have to understand how it actually works.

Philosophical abstractions are ill-suited to comprehend how the world works precisely because
they abstract from the the problem to be explained: why society is as it is and operates the way it
operates and causes the sorts of observable damage to peoples lives that it causes. However, I do
not think that Marx and Engels are rejecting philosophy, but rejecting bad philosophy. Concrete,
historically grounded philosophy, philosophy which understands “the needs of the time in which
[i]t arose” has an important role to play in social transformation. It articulates the alternative
values that will guide social transformation, but it demonstrates how these values arise from the
real needs and activities of human beings, (and not the philosophical mind and poetic soul.)
I remain committed to helping produce that sort of social philosophy. I also believe that every
graduate student in philosophy, regardless of their interests, should read this volume. First of all,
graduate students are always in danger of taking themselves too seriously, so they should pause
and have a laugh. But more seriously, graduate students, because they are in danger of taking
themselves too seriously, are highly susceptible to the danger of confusing whatever
philosophical theory they are working with with reality itself. The problem is not just that there
is more in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in anyone’s philosophy, but that philosophy must
conform to and explain the world. The world does not answer to philosophy, philosophy answers
to the world. That in no way demeans philosophy but illuminates its real, on going task. The
world still needs philosophers, but one’s who understand the proper contribution our discipline
can make.
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Leopardi: Dialogue Between Fashion and
Death
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What else could I have chosen for the lucky thirteenth iteration of this occasional series of essays
on works that I have found influential or amusing than this short dialogue by the great Italian
pessimist poet Giacomo Leopardi? (1798-1837) Leopardi died young but he did not live fast. His
life was wracked by ill health, physical pain, and loneliness, but he proved Feuerbach correct:
suffering is the mother of great poetry. His art can still move because it sings the song of human
truth: the only way to avoid suffering and death is to never be born. Anxiety, pain, and
annihilation are constant companions and threats: there is no human life that lasts more than a
few minutes that will not be marked by them. If we are going to nonetheless make the journey,
we have to very quickly shed childishly naive hopes that everything always works out for the
best. Things will work themselves out, but not always for the best.
I came to Leopardi’s work through the philosophy of the Italian Marxist Sebastiano Timpanaro.
Timpanaro drew upon Leopardi to make a point against what he regarded as the idealist
tendencies of too many Western Marxists on the question of the relationship between material
nature and human society. Material nature, for Timpanaro, was that which cannot be
fundamentally altered by human consciousness or action. Human beings build cultural worlds
out of natural resources and we interpret our lives according to symbolic systems whose
meanings are not mechanically reducible to survival imperatives. Nevertheless, socialism can
never cut itself free from what Marx called the realm of necessity. All things are subject to
entropy, everything built will ultimately collapse, everyone born will die. A mature political
philosophy must accept the finitude of individual life and refuse technotopian fantasies.
Socialism will not create new human beings and cannot supercede the existential vicissitudes of
illness, failure, old age, and death.
Timpanaro pointed me towards Leopardi as an honest poetic painter of the slow but inevitable
encroachment of the dark into the light of life. Ironically, however, I drew on his work to help
make my case against pessimism in my book Embodiment and the Meaning of Life. I argued that
in order to solve human problems we have to understand the “frames of finitude” within which
our lives are led. Pessimists like Leopardi (and Schopenhauer) are important because they
confront us with the reality of these frameworks. Still, I argued that they are ultimately wrong to
conclude that life is at best a misfortune to be endured. If we understand the inescapability of the
frameworks, we can concentrate our efforts on solving the social problems we have the power to
solve. The more we solve social problems, the more we create the conditions within which we

can all live as well as possible. The limitations that we face in life become challenges to take life
seriously, finding meaning and value in the struggle.
The short dialogue between Fashion and Death reveals another side to Leopardi– a sardonic wit
that cuts through naive beliefs with the razor sharpness of a Diogenes the Cynic. (To be called a
“Cynic” in ancient Greece was not an insult but a commendation. The word comes from the
Greek for dog, Cygnus. Dogs were regarded as honest companions, hence a cynic was someone
with the courage to tell you the no bullshit truth). The dialogue is only five and a half pages long,
but it helps explain one of the most profound perplexities of human choice: although we fear
death, many of us live in ways almost guaranteed to shorten our lives. The term was not
available to him, but Leopardi understands Fashion as a social expression of Freud’s death
instinct: a drive that insidiously undermines us from within even as it promotes what appear to be
free, life-affirming choices.
How is this possible? Because the biological and social sides of our being can become alienated
from each other. As biological beings, we depend upon connection to a life-sustaining natural
world. Our lives are threatened by disease and catastrophic accidents. At root, social organization
is our way of protecting our lives. However, social relationships also generate their own
symbolic values. Social relationships might grow up from the soil of life-protection, but they
soon become independent of this function in our minds: the way which one appears to others
overtakes materially rational considerations of survival value. Once we begin to value the
opinions of others about whether we look au courant more than the testimony of objective
evidence, we have succumbed to Fashion’s power.
But what is so insightful about Leopardi’s presentation of the problem is that he suggests that the
pervasiveness of this phenomenon suggest something deeper is going on then simple mistakes
about our ultimate good. There seems to be some tendency at work that drives us into the arms of
Fashion, who promptly hands us over to Death. We embrace Fashion to evade the boredom that
overcomes us if we are unoccupied for even a few moments. But trying to cure the boredom by
wrapping ourselves in Fashion’s comforts speeds our demise (which at least cures the problem of
boredom).
In the dialogue, Fashion tries to convince Death that they are sisters in arms. At first, Death is
indifferent to Fashion’s attempt to engage her in conversation. She becomes more interested
when Fashion proves that she has as great a power over mortals as Death. While everyone is
afraid to die, they also stampede to acquire the latest styles and gadgets: “A little at a time, but
mostly in these past years, to help you out, I have caused the neglect and the elimination of the
exertions and exercises which favor physical well-being, and I have introduced innumerable
others that weaken the body in a thousand ways and shorten life and have caused them to be
highly valued. I have put in the world such orders and such customs that life itself, both of the
body and of the soul, is more dead than alive.” While the switch has flipped on exercise (it is
now perhaps the dominant fad), the later point still rings true, but with an even more threatening
twist today. The soul-deadening consumerism upon which capitalism relies for its reproduction
and growth is a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions playing havoc with the climate.

And yet– as Fashion tells her sister Death- people refuse to get off the treadmill, even as it
threatens to deposit all of us into the grave of an unlivable climate. Stalwart critics of
anthropogenic climate change are once again gearing up to demand that governments take
decisive action to cap and reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the up coming climate summit, but
millions and millions of people are still shopping and buying cars, all the while demanding that
someone else do something to solve a problem that they have no intention of changing their
lifestyle to address. Last week, as the talk of the commentariat was on the climate summit,
Chevy announced the launch of its biggest V-8 engine ever.
Could it be that the persistence of social problems despite literally millennia of struggles to solve
them is a function of an inner drive to self-destruction which re-appears periodically to undo
solutions we once thought permanent? That is a supposition only a pessimist can love. I do not
think that human history can be explained by any absolute; it neither advances steadily towards
complete freedom nor are practical advances ever fully undone from within by some impulse to
periodic self-destruction. But if we are going to deal in absolutes, we are better off listening to
the pessimists, because they force us to confront the worst realities of life as a vulnerable being.
If we still have the strength to go on and take another breath rather than killing ourselves after we
listen to their dark mass, it must be because there is something essentially good in the merest
self-conscious presence before the spectacle of the world. And if there is something good simply
in being sensuously open to the unfolding of the world, there is something better in being able to
develop life-affirmative connections with things and creatures and people. But that betterness is
not given to us, we have to work together to create the conditions in which everyone can
experience it.

